The Cognitive Load of Financing Constraints: Evidence from Large-Scale Wage Surveys

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we take advantage of the implicit cognitive exercise available in standard Labor Force Surveys to propose a new indicator of financing constraints which is based on the cognitive load they generate (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). Survey respondents are requested to report their monthly wages, which we compare to their administrative, fiscal counterparts. We propose a well-defined index of worker-level uncertainty, which filters out their potential rounding behavior and reporting biases. We estimate it using unsupervised ML/EM techniques and find that workers tend to perceive their own wages with a degree of uncertainty of around 10%.

Through the lens of a simple rational signal extraction model, this amounts to estimates of workers' attention ranging from 30% to 84% depending on their wage, education, tenure and gender. Most importantly, we show that the attention of the lowest paid 30% of workers is cyclic and increases steadily by 17 percentage points in the ten days preceding payday, before immediately dropping on that day, which, through the lens of a simple model, is indicative of end-of-month financing liquidity constraints. Furthermore, this pattern reveals that the cognitive cost induced by these financing constraints arises from the not too concave (or convex) costs of achieving high levels of attention, and the convex costs of maintaining it over time.⁴

Keywords: Behavioral Inattention, Cognitive Costs, Wage Volatility, Poverty and Financing Constraints

JEL classification: C83, D14, I32, J31

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Classic economic theory assumes that agents are fully rational and fully able to process information available in their economic environment. However, this framework has been increasingly challenged by a series of empirical and theoretical contributions, which reveal that many individual decisions are flawed and suffer from psychological biases. Faced with a complex informational environment and endowed with limited cognitive capacities, agents tend to focus their attention on the most relevant or the most salient characteristics of their economic environment, while they pay less attention to other characteristics or misunderstand them.

A growing body of literature in psychology, economics and cognitive sciences further suggests that the degree of inattention is related to the overall “cognitive load” of agents and affects different dimensions of individuals’ decision-making and performance. We contribute to this literature by proposing an original way to measure the cognitive load in the population of French wage earners and by documenting its monthly fluctuations in different populations of workers. To that end, we leverage large-scale data from the French Labor Survey and reinterpret the items requesting workers to report their own wage as a cognition exercise enabling us to propose a well-defined and direct measure of workers' cognitive load. More precisely, we compare this self-reported wage with its fiscal counterpart and propose a structural mixture model, which delivers a well-defined index of worker-level uncertainty. Our method also addresses the issues raised by potential perception or reporting biases and rounding.

We find that over our period of analysis (2005 to 2015) workers tend to perceive their own wage with a degree of uncertainty of around 10%. Through the lens of a simple rational signal extraction model, this amounts to estimates of worker attention of between 30% and 84% depending on wage, education, tenure and gender. Secondly, the sampling scheme of the French LFS enables us to document whether attention evolves over time in different populations of workers. We find that the 30% lowest paid workers, who are most likely to struggle to make ends meet each month, exhibit suggestive patterns of cyclicity: their attention is minimal in the middle of the month, and increases steadily until payday, suggesting that their budget constraints become increasingly tight during this period of the
Month. Finally, their attention drops immediately once payday is reached. This feature of the cyclical evolution of attention is not compatible with a pure informational story, whereby workers are measured as more attentive simply because they are more informed. Conversely, we show that this feature of the data is well rationalized by a mechanism of credit constraints with costly budget constraint monitoring.

As workers are not incentivized to report accurate amounts in the LFS, we expect that they give information involving the least effort and simply provide approximate answers off the top of their heads. Our setting thus offers a precise depiction and quantification of the real-life variations in cognitive load associated with the potential necessity to keep a precise record of wages, for the general population of French workers. Overall, our results are indicative of the fact that the bottom 30% of workers in the wage distribution have a higher mental burden, especially in the last days before payday.

This proportion can furthermore be interpreted as an estimate of the share of the overall population suffering from liquidity financing constraints. Estimating the size of this population of agents who are at a kink of their intertemporal budget sets is important, as they typically have a high marginal propensity to consume, and are critical in heterogeneous agent macro models.

La charge cognitive induite par les contraintes financières :
Estimations issues d’enquêtes sur les salaires

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article, nous tirons parti de l’exercice cognitif implicite contenu dans les Enquêtes Emploi (Insee) et proposons un nouvel indicateur de contraintes financières reposant sur la charge cognitive qu’elles génèrent (Mullainathan et Shafir, 2013). Les salariés répondant à l’enquête sont invités à déclarer leurs salaires mensuels, que nous comparons aux valeurs reportées dans les formulaires fiscaux. Nous en dérivons un indice d’incertitude de niveau salarié, qui tient compte des éventuels biais de déclaration et des comportements d’arrondi. Cet indice est estimé à l’aide de techniques non supervisées de ML (EM). Les résultats montrent que les salariés ont tendance à percevoir leur propre salaire avec un degré d’incertitude d’environ 10%. Interprétées dans un modèle simple d’extraction de signal, ces valeurs correspondent à des niveaux d’attention des salariés variant de 30% à 84% selon le niveau de salaire et de diplôme, l’ancienneté dans l’emploi et le sexe du salarié considéré.

Nous montrons surtout que l’attention des salariés les moins bien payés est cyclique et augmente progressivement de 17 points de pourcentage dans les dix jours précédant le jour de paie, avant de chuter instantanément à cette date. Notre modèle théorique montre que cette évolution mensuelle révèle l’existence de contraintes financières en fin de mois, et que la charge cognitive induite par ces contraintes financières résulte de coûts pas trop concaves (ou convexes) à atteindre des niveaux d’attention élevés, et de coûts convexes à les maintenir dans le temps.

Mots-clés : Inattention Comportementale, Coûts Cognitifs, Volatilité des Salaires, Pauvreté et Contraintes Financières

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1 Introduction

Classic economic theory assumes that agents are fully rational and that they are fully able to process the information available in their economic environment. However, this framework has been increasingly challenged by a series of empirical and theoretical contributions revealing that many individual decisions are flawed and suffer from psychological biases, as was suggested in the seminal contributions of Kahneman et al. (1991) and Kahneman (2011). Confronted with a complex informational environment and endowed with limited cognitive capacities, agents tend to focus their attention on the most relevant or (less fortunately) the most salient characteristics of their economic environment, while they pay less attention to other characteristics or misunderstand them. Several empirical contributions have documented such inattention biases in the perception of the characteristics of consumption goods. Examples include evidence about inattention to the mileage of used cars sold on the second-hand market (Lacetera et al., 2012), to goods’ “shrouded attributes” (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006), to sales taxes (Chetty et al., 2009; Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, 2017), or inattention to energy pricing (Ito, 2014; Allcott, 2011).

A growing body of literature in psychology, economics and cognitive sciences further suggests that the degree of inattention is in fact related to the overall “cognitive load” of agents and affects different dimensions of individuals’ decision making and performance. Several papers have estimated the impact of cognitive load on a number of individual outcomes; the vast majority of them are undertaken in laboratory conditions. For example, and closest to our research question, Mani et al. (2013) invited rich and poor individuals to think about their everyday financial demands. Their main experiment showed that this had no impact on the cognitive performance of the rich (as measured by Raven’s matrices), while the performance of the poor declined significantly. The authors rationalized these findings by the fact that thinking about everyday financial demands created a cognitive load which tapped the “mental bandwidth” of the poor, but not of the rich. The experimental result was further confirmed in real-life conditions, for a sample of approximately 500 Indian farmers who were exposed to quasi-experimental variation in actual wealth, in pre- versus post-harvest conditions.

Our paper proposes a transposition of this quasi-experimental setting to the (much) larger population of wage earners in France, where “harvest time” is simply replaced by payday, as in Carvalho et al. (2016) and Mani et al. (2020). This setting allows us to vary the distance to payday in different populations of workers who are defined in terms of their wage, thus varying the magnitude of their potential financing (liquidity) con-
straints. We also propose an original measure of the level of attention that workers allocate to the monitoring of their budget constraint. By documenting its covariation with liquidity constraints, we provide evidence about the external validity of the results in Mani et al. (2013) in a much wider setting and for the case of a developed country. To that end, we leverage large-scale data from the French Labor Force Survey (LFS) and reinterpret the items requesting workers to report their own wage as a cognition exercise, which enables us to propose a well-defined and direct measure of workers’ cognitive load. More specifically, we compare wages that are self-reported by workers with those of their (worker-level) fiscal counterparts and propose a structural mixture model which delivers a well-defined index of worker-level uncertainty (or inattention, according to Gabaix, 2019). The model addresses the issues raised by potential perception or reporting biases and rounding and has to be estimated using machine learning (EM algorithm) techniques.

We find that over our period of analysis (2005 to 2015) workers tended to perceive their own wages with a degree of uncertainty of around 10%. Through the lens of a simple rational signal extraction model, this amounts to estimates of worker attention of between 30% and 84% depending on wage, education, tenure and gender. Secondly, we rely on a feature of the sampling scheme of the French LFS which makes the date of interview and critically, its distance to payday orthogonal to worker characteristics and exogenous. This enables us to revisit the question that is debated in Carvalho et al. (2016) and Mani et al. (2020) and to document whether attention evolves over time in different populations of workers. We find that the 30% lowest-paid workers, who are most likely to struggle to make ends meet each month, exhibit suggestive patterns of cyclicality: their attention is minimal in the middle of the month and increases steadily until payday, suggesting that their budget constraint becomes increasingly tight during this period of the month. Finally, their attention drops immediately once payday is reached. This feature of the cyclical evolution of attention is not compatible with a pure informational story, whereby workers are measured as more “attentive” simply because they are more informed. Indeed, such a story would predict that attention increases discretely to reach a peak at payday, and then decreases steadily until the next payday rather than increasing steadily during the last 15 days of the month. Conversely, we show that this feature of the data is well rationalized by a mechanism of credit constraints with costly budget constraint monitoring, in which the costs of achieving high levels of attention are not too concave (or convex), and the costs of maintaining attention over time are convex.

As workers are not incentivized to report accurate amounts in the LFS, we expect that they give information involving the least effort and simply provide approximate answers off the top of their heads. Our setting thus offers an accurate depiction and quantification of the real-life variations in cognitive load associated with the potential necessity to keep a precise record of wages, for the general population of French workers. Overall, our results are indicative of the fact that the bottom 30% of workers in the wage distribution have a higher mental burden, especially in the last days before payday (Mani et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2018; Schilbach et al.,
2016). This proportion can furthermore be interpreted as an estimate of the share of the overall population suffering from liquidity financing constraints. Estimating the size of this population of agents who are at a kink\(^2\) of their intertemporal budget sets is important, as they typically feature high marginal propensity to consume and are critical in heterogeneous agent macro models (Kaplan and Violante, 2018).

Beyond the new empirical evidence about the cognitive load arising from financing constraints, we make an original methodological contribution to the literature by providing a novel and direct measure of attention. In contrast, most of the papers which rely on real-world (i.e. non-experimental) data indirectly elicit measures of attention from choice or action data, and their departure from “fully rational” benchmarks. A notable recent exception is Handel and Kolstad (2015), who combine real-world (health plan) choice data with a survey specifically designed to measure different dimensions of agents’ information sets and risk preferences, and are able to identify the separate contributions of these factors to agents’ decisions. While their empirical proxies are optimally designed for their research question, the limitations of their dataset is its relatively small scale (ca. 1,700 non-missing observations) and non-recurrent. In contrast, our empirical proxies are slightly less optimal but, as we show in the paper, still contain a lot of information about workers’ attention efforts. Moreover, the statistical power of our setting is magnified by the large-scale, recurrent and scientific sampling procedure of our data, which prevents any selection issue on workers’ unobservable characteristics for our estimation sample.

Our paper relates to several strands of literature beyond those mentioned above. First, the empirical literature in labor economics has documented that the distributions of self-reported wages are close to discrete because of rounding, while those constructed from administrative sources are more continuous. For example, Pischke (1995) proposes a methodology to correct for this feature of LFS data in analyses of wage dynamics. Biscourp et al. (2005) also document that the French LFS is not ideal for documenting wage rigidities (Dickens et al., 2007) because rounding behavior introduces a “noise” in the measurement of wage variations. Our work directly contributes to this literature, as our enhanced understanding of workers’ reporting behavior delivers alternative, more structural methods of smoothing and de-biasing survey data. More importantly, we propose turning this “old” problem on its head and consider that the “noise” introduced by workers is an object of study in itself rather than purely a nuisance in the data.\(^3\) Second, our paper also relates to the literature which documents the economic impact of uncertainty. Most notably, Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012) show that increased uncertainty makes first-moment policies, such as wage subsidies, temporarily less effective because agents become more cautious in responding to price changes. Our results suggest a channel by which the amount of uncertainty may be endogenous, as it may be amplified by inattention. More generally, our paper also points to the debate in macroeconomics which discusses how

\(^2\)Typically generated by a borrowing limit of the type we consider in Section 2.

\(^3\)See also Binder (2017) for a similar strategy of “making the most” of survey data, which we discuss below.
(alternative) mechanisms of imperfect information extraction and processing have aggregate consequences, particularly via their impact on households’ marginal propensities to consume (Sims, 2003; Luo, 2008; Reis, 2006).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical set-up and clarifies the links between attention and financial constraints. Section 3 details the data and our two empirical proxies of wages while Section 4 contains our empirical model and estimation strategy for estimating attention at the worker level. Section 5 reports the results obtained from our refined exercise of variance decomposition, with a particular focus on the monthly cycle of attention synchronized by paydays exhibited by low-wage workers. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2 Theoretical Framework

In this section, we propose a parsimonious model of costly attention designed to guide our empirical investigations and the interpretation of our results.

Baseline set-up. We consider a worker $i$ who is paid on a monthly basis and has to make daily decisions about consumption between two subsequent paydays. This time interval is normalized to 1 without loss of generality. The objective function of this worker for the month under consideration is written as:

$$U^{(0)}(C_t, F(\cdot)) = \int_0^1 u(C_t) dt - R_A \int \bar{C} - W F(W) dW - R_B \int_0^\bar{C} (\bar{C} - W) F(W) dW$$

where $C_t$ denotes instantaneous consumption and $W$ is the wage payment, which from the perspective of the worker is imperfectly known and therefore uncertain. In this objective function, the baseline utility function $u$ is assumed to be strictly concave, which implies that it is optimal to smooth the total monthly consumption $\bar{C} = \int_0^T C_t dt$ over time, i.e. $C_t = \bar{C}$ $\forall t \in [0; 1]$. To keep notations as parsimonious as possible, we neglect time discounting within the considered month.$^4$

We assume that it is possible to transfer revenue (or rather, liquidities) across time. As in Allcott et al. (forthcoming), we model this directly in the objective function via the two integral terms, which are simply to be interpreted as the reduction in the continuation value of the next period from starting it with debt rather than being debt-free, or alternatively as the increase in the continuation value arising from starting

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$^4$Subjective time-varying discount factors could be introduced to capture present bias as in Laibson (1997) or O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Such hyperbolic discounting is usually associated with the introduction of multiple “selves” which complicate the definition of the relevant welfare criterion (as different selves have different utilities). If we stuck to the criterion embodied in Equation 1, introducing discount factors would mainly affect the consumption profile $C_t$ (thus potentially allowing for decreasing patterns over time) and would weaken the incentives to pay attention and to exert this effort early, but the sections’ other insights would still hold qualitatively. Unfortunately, our data are not rich enough to convincingly test the empirical relevance of such assumptions, as (in particular) we do not have information about the monthly consumption profiles of our sample workers.
it with savings. Specifically, the first term captures the potential ability of the worker to transfer income across time symmetrically, at a potentially idiosyncratic interest rate $R_A$. This parameter is typically driven down to 0 in the case of workers who are unable to transfer revenue in the next period, e.g. because they lack access to the necessary financial products. The second term, parameterized by $R_B$, captures the potential asymmetry between the cost of borrowing and the gains from saving. It is typically negligible for financially (or liquidity) unconstrained workers but large for those facing large interest rates premia or psychological costs upon borrowing. For example, Allcott et al. (forthcoming) document that borrowers are typically willing to pay a significant premium for an experimental incentive to avoid (future) payday borrowing. In what follows, we will label these two types of costs (purely financial or psychological) as “financing constraints”.

A critical object of Equation 1 is the probability density function $F$ of imperfectly observed (or “guessed”) wages. We consider that workers formulate default guesses $W_d$ about their true (fiscal) wage, $W_f$. A natural benchmark to consider is that they face Gaussian relative uncertainty in terms of their wage, i.e. that the relative errors they make when guessing their wage are normally distributed:

$$w^d = w^f + \eta \iff w^f = w^d - \eta \text{ with } \eta \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2) \quad (2)$$

where $w^d$ and $w^f$ denote the logarithms of $W^d$ and $W^f$, respectively. We specify the error term $\eta$ in the logarithmic space in order to abstract from scale effects. From the perspective of the worker, the guessed wage $w^d$ is known but the true value $w^f$ is not, such that $F$ has a lognormal probability density function with mean $w^d$ and variance $\sigma^2$. This Gaussian benchmark is intuitive and furthermore corresponds to the class of distributions with maximal (Shannon) entropy within the class of absolutely continuous density functions with a given variance $\sigma^2$. In other words, these distributions are the least informative for workers and therefore correspond to a well-defined “worst case” scenario.

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5The benefit of this modeling strategy (which resembles a standard Bellman equation in unspecified dynamic model) is that we do not need to observe or explicitly model decisions in subsequent periods, as their continuation value is captured in the two integral terms.
6Allcott et al. (forthcoming) actually equate the concavity of the overall continuation value term as their main measure of risk aversion (beyond the concavity of $u$) as there is no heterogeneity in financial fees across agents in their setting. In our Equation 1, it captures both financing constraints and loss (risk) aversion.
7Our set-up focuses on the analysis of the uncertainty parameters $\sigma$ and $\sigma_m$, which appear to be most relevant and important in the empirical section of the paper, although the model allows that workers’ perceptions $w^d$ of their own wage could be affected by biases. Increasing the level of attention could allow them to mitigate such biases, thus allowing them to decrease their expected financing costs or to increase the utility derived from optimized consumption. However, as explained in Section 4, our data do not allow us to separately identify such cognitive biases from pure (under- or over-) reporting strategies. Furthermore, our results show that these biases do not fluctuate during the month, such that they do not seem to be correlated with attention.
8Probability density functions of maximal entropy are usually introduced as starting points in Bayesian update processes of the type considered in this section. Our empirical application also focuses on the Gaussian case, as the empirical literature considers that the lognormal hypothesis is a good approximation of the distribution of wages and income in general (Heckman and Sattinger, 2015). However, our estimation procedure could easily be adapted to alternative parametric assumptions via inverse transform sampling.
Incorporating all these elements into Equation 1 yields:

\[
U(0)(\bar{C}, w^d, \sigma) = u(\bar{C}) - \bar{C} \cdot \left( R_A + R_B \cdot \Phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^d}{\sigma} \right) \right) + e^{w^d + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}} \cdot \left( R_A + R_B \cdot \Phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^d}{\sigma} - \sigma \right) \right)
\]

The first order condition of optimality with respect to \(\bar{C}\) can be written as:

\[
u'(\bar{C}) = R_A + R_B \cdot \Phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^d}{\sigma} \right) \geq R_A.
\]

where \(\Phi\) denotes the cumulative density function of a normalized Gaussian random variable (with mean 0 and variance 1). Equation 4 shows that risk-neutral workers facing no financial constraints \((R_A \geq 0, R_B = 0)\) equate their marginal utility of consumption with the marginal utility gain of transferring revenue across time, \(R_A\). In contrast, if workers are loss averse or face additional financing constraints in the form of an interest rate premium \(R_B\), they will lower total consumption \(\bar{C}\) in order to create a buffer preventing them from consuming beyond \(Wf\) with a too high likelihood.

Equation 4 also shows that financially unconstrained and risk-neutral workers \((R_B = 0)\) are unaffected by the uncertainty surrounding \(W\). In contrast, financially constrained workers have a lower consumption when they face a higher level of uncertainty. Indeed, differencing Equation 4 in the neighborhood of the optimal consumption level \(\bar{C}\) gives:

\[
\frac{\partial C}{\partial \sigma} \Big|_{\bar{C}} = \frac{R_B}{\bar{C}} \cdot \frac{w^d - \ln \bar{C}}{\sigma} \cdot \phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^d}{\sigma} \right) - \frac{R_B}{\bar{C}} \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma} \cdot e^{w^d + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}} \cdot \phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^d}{\sigma} - \sigma \right) - u''(\bar{C})
\]

This quantity is negative as long as \(w^d \geq \ln \bar{C}\), which has to hold at least in expectation to ensure that the consumption path is sustainable.

However, this does not imply that it is necessarily welfare improving to benefit from lower perceived wage uncertainty in our setting, despite the concavity of \(u\), as this only affects the financing optimization part of the objective function, and it does not take the opportunity to transfer revenue into account. Using the

\[u'(e^{w_f}) < R_A, \text{ such that for unconstrained workers } (R_B = 0) \text{ whose optimal consumption level } \bar{C}^{NC} \text{ is such that } u'(e^{\ln \bar{C}^{NC}}) = R_A, \text{ we have } \ln \bar{C} < w_f = E[w^{df}] \text{ given the concavity of } u. \text{ If workers are financially constrained, given Equation 4, their optimal consumption level is lower than } \bar{C}^{NC}, \text{ such that for all workers, } E[\ln \bar{C} - w^{df}] \leq 0. \text{ This ensures that the consumption path is sustainable across months.}
\]
Envelope theorem, we get:

\[
\frac{\partial U(0)}{\partial \sigma} = -\bar{C} \phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w_d}{\sigma} \right) \left( R_B - \sigma \cdot \frac{R_A + R_B \Phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w_d}{\sigma} - \sigma \right)}{\phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w_d}{\sigma} - \sigma \right)} \right)
\]

Therefore, workers benefit from lower uncertainty whenever financing constraints are high, i.e. whenever \( R_A \) is small relative to \( R_B \):

\[
\frac{\ln \bar{C} - w_d}{\sigma} \left( \ln \bar{C} - w_d \right) - \sigma \geq \frac{R_A}{R_B}
\]  

Equation 6 typically does not hold in the case of the financially unconstrained workers \((R_B = 0)\) as the ratio on the right-hand-side converges to infinity in their case. Workers who are financially constrained only have an incentive to increase their attention effort (relative to the default) in order to better monitor their monthly budget constraints. Attention is strongly correlated with financing constraints and, in this respect, can be interpreted as an indicator of their magnitude.

**Introducing attention.** We now introduce the possibility that the workers under consideration make efforts to improve their knowledge of the realized value of \( w \) at a date \( \tau \in [0; 1] \). They begin with the default optimal consumption policy computed above from optimizing \( U(0) \), and decide whether to improve their knowledge of \( w \) and adjust consumption if it is optimal to do so. The new objective function is written as:

\[
U^{(m)}(\bar{C}, \bar{C}) = \tau.u(\bar{C}) + (1 - \tau).u \left( \bar{C} + \frac{\tau(\bar{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau} \right) - K(m).h(1 - \tau)
\]

\[-\bar{C} \left( R_A + R_B \Phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^*}{\sigma_m} \right) \right) + e^{w^*} + \sigma_m \left( R_A + R_B \Phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^*}{\sigma_m} - \sigma_m \right) \right)
\]

where \( \bar{C} \) maximizes the initial objective function in Equation 4 while \( \bar{C} \) is the new optimal monthly consumption to be computed.

More importantly, \( m \) denotes the amount of “attention”. To fix ideas, we model it as the amount of effort that is allocated to searching for a complementary signal \( s \), which is assumed to be orthogonal to \( w^* \) without loss of generality,\(^{12}\) but also Gaussian with mean \( w^f \) and variance \( \sigma_s^2 \). This signal allows the workers to decrease their mean squared error and improve their estimate of the “correct” wage via Bayesian updating as:

\[
w^f = m.s + (1 - m).w^d
\]

\[= w^d + m.(s - w^d)\]  

\(^{12}\)This only corresponds to a normalization assumption.
where \( w^r \) is the updated guess (which is ultimately “reported” in our data). In this equation, the attention parameter \( m = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \sigma_s^2} \) parameterizes the Bayesian update process and can be interpreted as an “attention” parameter ranging between 0 and 1. If both \( w^d \) and \( s \) are distributed as Gaussian random variables, then the Bayesian update \( w^r \) is also distributed as a Gaussian random variable with probability density \( \varphi_m \), with mean \( w^f \) and variance:
\[
\sigma^2_m = (1 - m).\sigma^2 \iff m = 1 - \frac{\sigma^2_m}{\sigma^2}.
\] (10)

Ultimately, the updated distribution of the wage remains log-normal, which rationalizes the specification of Equation 7.

Lastly, the cost of collecting this signal depends on the date \( \tau \) at which the signal is obtained via the \( h(1 - \tau) \) term (the earlier, the more expensive) and the overall informativeness of the signal via the \( K(m) \) term. This cost can be understood as a pure cost of effort, or as the opportunity cost of reallocating mental resources to the monitoring of the budget constraint (Shah et al., 2018).\(^\text{13}\) We typically expect that the relative costs of collecting the signal \( s \) and of accurately implementing the Bayesian update process embodied in Equations 8 and 9 could be affected by financial literacy and the education level of the considered worker (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).

For ease of understanding, consider first that the level of attention \( m \) and the date of information collection \( \tau \) are exogenous. The first order condition for \( \bar{C} \) becomes:
\[
u'(\bar{C} + \frac{\tau(\bar{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau}) = R_A + R_B.\Phi\left(\frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^r}{\sigma_m}\right)
\] (11)

Equation 11 shows that consumption is set to optimize the trade-off between maximizing utility and mitigating the cost of potential financing constraints, as in Equation 4 but with a more accurate depiction of these (expected) constraints. To simplify, we assume first that \( w^r \approx w^d \), i.e. that the Bayesian updating process does not alter workers’ guesses too much. In this case, whenever \( m \in [0;1] \), the uncertainty surrounding the budget constraint is lower than previously, which enables workers to lower their precautionary buffer\(^\text{14}\) \((\bar{C} \geq \bar{C})\). As a consequence, the instantaneous consumption flow rises to a level which takes account of both this lower buffer and of the catch-up term \( \frac{\tau(\bar{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau} \), which is due to the fact that consumption until date \( \tau \) was too low in these circumstances. In some cases, however, the Bayesian update process could lead workers to revise their guess significantly, and sometimes downwards. In the latter case, this revision could counter

\(^{13}\)Our assumption that the two dimensions of attentional effort (time consistency \( 1 - \tau \) and depth \( m \)) are multiplicatively separable is obviously a simplification, as complementarities could be at play. However, estimating such complementarities would be excessively demanding in terms of data, and we think Equation 7 is already a useful first benchmark to test against the data, despite its restricted form.

\(^{14}\)This follows from the concavity of \( u \) in Equation 11: it is easy to check that \( \bar{C} = \bar{C} \) does not qualify (is too low) as \( \Phi\left(\frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^d}{\sigma_m}\right) > \Phi\left(\frac{\ln \bar{C} - w^d}{\sigma_m}\right) \) (keeping the assumption that \( w^r \approx w^d \)).

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the buffer effect and lead to a decrease in consumption at the end of the month.\textsuperscript{15}

It is also informative to inspect how utility varies as either $m$ or $\tau$ increases. Relying again on the Envelope theorem, we get:

\[
\frac{\partial U^{(m)}}{\partial m} = \frac{\sigma_m}{1-m} \frac{\bar{C}}{2} \phi \left( \ln \frac{\bar{C}-w^r}{\sigma_m} \right) \left( R_B - \sigma_m \phi \left( \ln \frac{\bar{C}-w^r}{\sigma_m} - \sigma_m \right) \right) - K'(m).h(1-\tau) \tag{12}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial U^{(m)}}{\partial \tau} = K(m).h'(1-\tau) - \left( u \left( \frac{\bar{C} + \tau(\bar{C} - C)}{1-\tau} \right) - u(C) \right) + \frac{\bar{C} - C}{1-\tau} u' \left( \frac{\bar{C} + \tau(\bar{C} - C)}{1-\tau} \right) \tag{13}
\]

Equation 12 is analogous to Equation 5 and can only be positive if the workers under consideration face high values of $R_B$ (relative to $R_A$), and if the ultimate gain from being better informed in terms of consumption (net of financial costs) is higher than the marginal cost of paying attention, $K'(m).h(1-\tau)$. In other words, financially constrained workers only have an incentive to increase the attention level they allocate to monitoring their budget constraint, and they will only do so if the attention cost is not too high.

Lastly, Equation 13 clarifies the trade-offs involved in the determination of $\tau$. Delaying the information collection effort lowers the cost associated with maintaining attention via the term $h'$. However, it comes at the cost of lowering instantaneous utility because of either maintaining an excessive precautionary buffer for a longer time (or maintaining an excessive consumption level for too long if the initial guess $w_d$ is too high), thus leading to disproportionately low levels of utility at the end of the period (given the concavity of $u$). Ultimately, whether collecting additional information $s$ about wages increases workers’ utility depends on the relative magnitude of the utility cost of increasing consumption smoothing on one hand, and the costs in terms of having to maintain the attention effort for a longer period of time on the other hand.

**Endogeneizing attention.** We now consider the more credible situation where both $m$ and $\tau$ are endogeneously selected by workers. The previous developments imply that financially constrained workers only have an incentive to set a strictly positive level of attention $m$. Among this population of workers, the optimality first order conditions are such that $\frac{\partial U^{(m)}}{\partial m} = 0$ and $\frac{\partial U^{(m)}}{\partial \tau} = 0$ in Equations 12 and 13, respectively (in the cases of interior solutions).

Taking the full differential of all three first order conditions enables an analysis of how the optimal attention level $m$, or equivalently, the standard deviation $\sigma_m = (1-m)^{\frac{3}{2}} \sigma$, co-evolve with $\tau$. Working with Equations 11

\textsuperscript{15}To simplify, we focus in this section on settings where both the prior $w_d$ and the signal $s$ are unbiased estimators of $w_f$. In reality, however, they may be affected by behavioral biases, respectively $b$ and $B$. In the latter case, $w_f$ would also be affected by a bias $m.B + (1-m).b$. If $B$ is very different from $b$, this could drive a large adjustment between $w_d$ and $w_f$. Our data allow us to test this assumption, but provide little supporting evidence.
and 13, and for \( \bar{C} \) close to \( C \) we get:\(^{16}\)

\[
\frac{dm}{d\tau} \approx \frac{h''(1 - \tau).K(m)}{h'(1 - \tau).K'(m)}
\]

As \( K, K', \) and \( h' \) are all likely to be strictly positive, the sign of \( \frac{dm}{d\tau} \) is informative of the sign of \( h'' \), that is to say, of the shape of the cost function associated with maintaining a given level of attention over time. If \( \frac{dm}{d\tau} \) is measured as negative in the data, then \( h \) is concave. In contrast, if it is positive, then this reveals that the cost \( h \) of maintaining attention across time is convex.

We also show in Appendix A that Equations 11 and 12 deliver bounds for \( K'' \). The derivation shows that the sign of \( \frac{dm}{d\tau} \) is informative of the sign of \( K'' \): if \( \frac{dm}{d\tau} < 0 \), then \( K'' \) is necessarily negative and large in absolute value, i.e. \( K \) is necessarily concave. In the opposite situation where \( \frac{dm}{d\tau} > 0 \), then \( K'' \) is either positive or negative but small in absolute value. This implies that \( K \) is either convex or not too concave, as otherwise, it would be cheap to pay attention during the entire month. To our knowledge, our setting offers one of the few opportunities to approach the overall attention cost function and document its qualitative features.

**Synthesis of empirical predictions.** To summarize, our simple theoretical framework delivers the following theoretical predictions:

- Financially constrained (or risk-averse) workers are likely to pay more attention overall (i.e. increase \( m \), lower \( \sigma_m \)) in order to monitor their budget constraints.
- Financially constrained (or risk-averse) workers only have an incentive to vary their attention level over the month, and pay more attention \( m \) as the budget constraints tighten and, equivalently, to decrease their level of uncertainty \( \sigma_m \).
- For financially constrained (or risk-averse) workers, the cyclicality of the attention effort is informative of the features of the cost function associated with paying attention. For example, an increase in attention over the month (as suggested by our empirical results reported below) suggests that the cost of maintaining attention is convex while the cost of attaining a high level of attention is either convex or (at least) not too concave.

In the remainder of the paper, we aim to test these predictions against the data and we will contrast the results obtained in different populations of workers who are likely to face different magnitudes (and types) of financing constraints:

- First, low-wage workers are more likely to hit their financing constraints in the second integral term of Equation 1 and are therefore more likely to be exposed to the cost term \( R_B \). We therefore expect

\(^{16}\)See Appendix A for the full derivation and discussion of these results.
that those workers will exhibit lower overall uncertainty $\sigma_m$, higher attention $m$ and higher cyclicality of these quantities during the month, from payday to payday. Our setting will allow us to estimate a (rough) bound in terms of wage, separating workers facing financial constraints which they have to address by varying their (costly) attention level, and those who do not need to do so.

- Second, we borrow from the literature and investigate whether women, who are likely to be more risk averse than men (Borghans et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), exhibit different behaviors in terms of attention, both overall (in level) and in evolution across time.

- Similarly, we will also investigate whether workers with a shorter tenure exhibit specific patterns. We hypothesize that, on average, these workers have accumulated less wealth as an additional safety buffer, such that they may exhibit higher values of $R_B$ in Equation 1, all else equal. Furthermore, these workers are likely to be less informed about bonuses, payment of overtime, and other firm-specific dimensions of their employer’s wage policy. This implies that the volatility of their default prior $\sigma$ is likely to be high, thus amplifying the expected costs associated with losses in the second integral term of Equation 1, and increasing their incentives to pay attention to mitigate this volatility.

- Lastly, we will also be able to incorporate proxies of education as a coarse measure of financial literacy in our empirical analysis. As mentioned above, financial literacy is likely to affect the relative gains and costs of paying attention, as collecting signals $s$ and implementing Bayesian updates may not be straightforward for less-educated workers. This would be reflected in the attention cost functions $K$ and $h$ and would lead to a higher relative cost of paying attention.

3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

3.1 Data Sources

Our main dataset is the French “Enquête sur les Revenus Fiscaux et Sociaux” (ERFS) survey. This dataset is constructed from the French implementation of the EU-wide Labor Force Survey (LFS) and is matched with income tax files. The resulting dataset provides us with values of wages that are self-reported by workers in the LFS, which can be compared with information about taxable wage income that is directly provided by the fiscal administration. These files have been used in several papers, mostly in the field of public economics (Aghion et al. (2017); Garbinti et al. (2018) among others).  

17More closely related to our own work (but in French) is Biscourp et al. (2005), who show that self-reported, rounded data, in the absence of adequate econometric treatment of the type in Section 4, do not allow us to accurately quantify nominal wage rigidity. Note that the present paper alters and refines their conclusions as our methodology addresses their main concern, and we show that self-reported data are affected by further behavioral biases, which are likely to affect any measurement of wage rigidity based on survey wage data. Prati (2017) also addresses a related but somewhat different question (the measurement of hedonic recall bias) using a dataset, which also contains self-reported values of wages (from SalSa, “Enquête sur les Salaires Auprès des Salariés) and administrative information about annual wages at the worker level sourced from the DADS, a statistical source which we also introduce in Section 4 in order to construct a useful complementary indicator of wage volatility. However the SalSa
Table 1 describes the structure of the ERFS files in greater detail. The LFS component of the dataset consists of 4 rotating panels of individuals who are interviewed in 6 consecutive quarters, either face to face or by phone. They are asked about their wage in the first and sixth waves of the interviews. Each panel of the LFS is then matched with the fiscal data for the fourth calendar quarter. This implies that Panels 3 and 4 (in Table 1) are matched twice with the fiscal data. This feature provides a - short but - very useful panel dimension. Our estimation sample is ultimately restricted to workers surveyed in the Panels 3 and 4 of the LFS, between 2005/2006 and 2015/2016.\textsuperscript{18}

The sampling scheme of this dataset is critical for us. It is based on pre-defined small clusters of 17 to 23 accommodations which are randomly sampled and then exhaustively surveyed within two-week windows. The small size of these clusters and their randomization ensure that the precise dates of the interviews are clustered but randomly sampled, and therefore are uncorrelated with observed (and unobserved) characteristics of workers, as documented in the methodological documentation of the Statistical Institute\textsuperscript{19} as well as in Table 9 in Appendix C. This orthogonality between the dates of interviews and worker-level characteristics is a very interesting feature of the survey which allows for temporal analyses (presented in Section 5.3) that are unaffected by self-selection issues (Carvalho et al., 2016; Mani et al., 2020).

| Table 1: Description of the Panel Structure of ERFS: the Matched Fiscal (POTE) Data and French Labor Force Surveys |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Year $t - 1$ | Year $t$ | Year $t + 1$ |
| Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| Panel 1 | Wave of Labor Force Survey | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage |
| Panel 2 | Wave of Labor Force Survey | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage |
| Panel 3 | Wave of Labor Force Survey | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage |
| Panel 4 | Wave of Labor Force Survey | Wage reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage | Wave reported in LFS | Fiscal wage |

Notes: In this table, Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 denote quarters 1 to 4 in a given year. Each “Panel” of the LFS is surveyed six times, during six consecutive quarters. The rolling panel structure of the survey induces that there are four types of panel, each surveyed over a different set of quarters. Self-reported information about wages is only collected in the first and sixth interrogations, while fiscal information is only introduced once a year in interrogations corresponding to the fourth quarter.

dataset has no panel dimension and the sample is six times smaller than our final estimation sample (ca. 3,000 observations, against more than 19,000 in our sample).

\textsuperscript{18}To be precise, workers with fiscal information for years $t$ and $t + 1$ are either surveyed in the third quarter of $t$ and the last quarter of $t + 1$, or in the last quarter of $t$ and in the first quarter of $t + 2$. As explained in detail below, one important variable (job title) is missing from the source files in 2013 and 2017, which means that our estimation sample is restricted to the following years: 2005/06, 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12, 2014/15, 2015/16.

\textsuperscript{19}The two-stage sampling scheme results from the trade-off between pure randomization (clusters of size one at the limit) maximizing statistical power - i.e. minimizing the correlation across characteristics of workers within clusters - and the mitigation of data collection costs. The Statistical Institute computed the optimal cluster size allowing for a negligible impact in terms of clustering while allowing for significantly lower data collection costs.
3.2 Harmonization of Wage Concepts

One difficulty for our analysis is that the baseline concepts of wage differ in the LFS and in the fiscal data. For a large fraction of surveyed workers, it is, however, possible to adjust fiscal wages and make them comparable to the wage concept of the LFS.\textsuperscript{20}

**LFS concept of wage.** The LFS concept of wage corresponds to the monthly wage earned by workers for their main job by month of LFS survey, including monthly bonuses. The following question is asked in face-to-face interviews: “What is the total monthly compensation that you receive from your main occupation?” The answer given by workers can refer to wages that are either gross or net of social contributions.\textsuperscript{21} In principle, workers can retrieve this information from their bank account or their payslip. However, they are not required to do so, first, in order to limit interviewing times and, second, to mitigate feelings of intrusion and thus increase response rates. Furthermore, payslips for a given month are typically edited and given to workers with a delay of several weeks, so that they are not always in possession of them at the time of the LFS interviews.

As a consequence, answering this question boils down to a wage nowcasting exercise. In France, the main component of a wage is typically highly stable, as it corresponds to workers’ core contract. Nowcasting a wage therefore means that workers have to remember this component and guess the variable elements (monthly bonuses, overtime), if any. The strategy used by workers to complete this task depends on their level of financial literacy. In addition, as discussed in Section 4, their survey reporting behavior may not be entirely truthful. One of the important challenges of this paper is to document these aspects in order to devise a robust estimation strategy for their actual level of attention.

**Concept of wage in the fiscal files.** Income tax returns contain information about taxable wage income. Since 2006, the corresponding item in the fiscal form is pre-filled with information provided by employers. Taxpayers are allowed to correct the reported amount if required, but most wage earners do not have to alter anything. Fiscal wage earnings encompass wages (including overtime), bonuses and the following additional components, when applicable: paid leave, payments termination of contract, complementary financial support from employer or work committee when the corresponding amount is higher than €1,830. Furthermore, social contributions and the deductible fraction of the “generalized social contribution” are excluded.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20}As explained below in Section 4 in greater detail, our analytical framework is robust to time-invariant differences in wage concepts. The main purpose of the treatments described in this section and of the further selections described in Section 3.3 is to remove (as much as possible) the differential components that are likely to evolve over time.

\textsuperscript{21}This is the first question in the “Labor Income” block of the survey. The exact question (SALMEE) reads: “Quelle rémunération totale mensuelle retirez-vous de votre profession principale ? (salaire du dernier mois, y compris primes et compléments mensuels)”. A technical document intended for the interviewers of the National Statistical Institute specifies that payments to complementary health insurance made directly by employers on behalf of employees should be excluded, and that the question refers to the concept of the wage slip. The variable TYPSAL indicates whether reported wages are to be understood as gross or net of social contributions.

\textsuperscript{22}2.4% of the generalized social contribution (CSG) and 0.5% of the contribution to the reduction of the social debt (CRDS) are not deductible.
Harmonization and resulting sample selection. Overall, the concepts of wages in the LFS and in the fiscal sources are broadly consistent, apart a small number of difficulties. First, as previously stated, workers are allowed to report wages that are either gross or net of social contributions. However, most of the respondents (ca. 90%) actually report net wages. To ensure consistency in our comparisons between self-reported and fiscal wages, we simply select net wages as our baseline concept and discard the remaining 10% of workers who report gross wages. Second, a small number of occupations benefit from very specific tax treatments, which means that the fiscal wage item is a poor proxy of their actual wages. We therefore also discard the corresponding workers: journalists, artists, apprentices, childminders, local officials, scholarships, and any workers hired by individual employers under the CESU scheme.

The greatest difficulty for us stems from the fact that wages in the LFS correspond to monthly wages, while the fiscal information is an annual aggregate, which we normalize throughout by 12 to obtain a monthly average. For workers with smooth career paths, the difference between the two concepts is negligible. Where a worker has experienced unemployment spells or job/employer changes, however, the annual fiscal average is likely to be a poor proxy of the monthly wage surveyed in the LFS. We therefore restrict our sample to workers with tenure in the same firm longer than 15 months. This selection has two main benefits for our purposes: first, it selects relatively stable workers whose annual averages are a good approximation of monthly wages. Second, the 15-month threshold prevents fiscal proxies from being polluted by any severance payments as a result of job changes. To mitigate this risk even further, we also discard workers who report having multiple employers.

Even in this population of “stable” workers, irregular overtime and wage increases may still slightly pollute the comparison of the two wage proxies. We therefore focus on full-time workers with a single employer as this population is less likely to work irregular overtime than part-time workers.

Finally, one last minor difficulty lies in the treatment of bonuses and other elements of incentive pay, as in the LFS most workers report wages that are net of bonuses, particularly annual bonuses, whereas they are included in the fiscal proxy. This difficulty is relatively easy to solve using the rich set of complementary indicators which describe the various components of incentive pay that are available from the LFS. Our overall strategy is to leave the self-reported wages untouched (in particular, to preserve rounding), whether gross or net wage corresponds to gross wage net of social contributions but not of income taxes. This also corresponds to the concept of wage that is most understood by workers, as it appears clearly at the bottom of all payslips (both gross and net wages are compulsory payslip items under French law) and it corresponds in almost all cases to the actual payments made by employers to their workers’ bank accounts until 2019. Unfortunately, information about the precise occupation of workers is missing from the 2013 and 2017 files. This explains the temporal “hole” in our dataset in 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 mentioned in footnote 18. The acronym stands for “Chèques-Emploi Services Universels”. Note that overtime that is sufficiently regular across months are not problematic in our setting. Overall, as explained in greater detail in Section 4 below, the panel structure of our data is short but sufficient to clean out differences between the two concepts that are stable across time. Therefore, if the cyclicality of overtime, or the calendar and magnitude of wage increases are relatively stable across surveyed years, then our analyses will not be affected. Monthly bonuses are either incorporated into wages, or reported separately (PRIM).
net of bonuses. Instead, we rely on the information about bonuses provided by the LFS in order to net these components out of the fiscal wage when necessary (i.e. when self-reported wages are declared to be net of such bonuses). Ultimately, we focus on workers whose resulting fiscal wage ranges between €1,000 and €4,000 in order to avoid cases that are too atypical, both at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution.

Elicitation of the behavioral parameters in the LFS (survey) data. As will be explained in detail in Section 4, the econometric comparison between fiscal and self-reported wages will enable us to measure the worker-level uncertainty parameter $\sigma_m$ and the corresponding level of attention $m$, both overall and at different dates in the calendar month. At this stage, it is important to note that workers who are requested to report their wage in the LFS are not incentivized to do so accurately in any way. In addition, the interviews during which this survey item is requested are typically short: the INSEE methodological document states that the first interview, which is performed face to face, typically takes less than 17 minutes for a limited number of questions. This means that answers are given off the top of the head, relatively quickly and that the quantitative items are not checked accurately by respondents. The sixth interview also occurs face to face, and only takes 7 minutes on average. In these circumstances, we should not expect workers to make any particular effort in responding to the survey. The response strategy, which is least costly to them, is probably to report amounts spontaneously, off the top of their heads, thus providing a direct measure of uncertainty at the date of the interview and which is not affected by any artefact or experimental incentive. However, as explained in Section 2, we do expect that the overall incentive to pay attention to their wage may be differentiated across populations of workers with different magnitudes of liquidity constraints, and that it might fluctuate over time within the population of the most liquidity constrained workers. The fact that the LFS is neutral in terms of incentives will enable us to more accurately elicit this heterogeneity and these fluctuations.

3.3 Description of the Estimation Sample

As explained above, fiscal wages can be converted to the relevant wage concept, i.e. the wage concept of the LFS for only a sub-sample of workers. In future years, the French legal framework may enable wider matching of the LFS data with a greater variety of administrative sources, which would make this selection process useless. At this stage, however, our estimation sample has to be restricted to the most “stable”, full-time workers, in the sense that their work history should not crate large divergences between the wages reported in the LFS and in the fiscal forms. Our sample contains 19,045 observations spanning the period from 2005 to 2015. The underlying population of workers is described in Table 2. First, the sampling weights

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29 Note that they have also no incentive to report trustfully - but our econometric strategy will allow us to measure the corresponding biases and purge their impact on the estimates of our main parameter of interest, $\sigma_m$.

30 The actual number depends on the status on the respondent: employed, unemployed, out of the labor market, etc.

31 The almost ideal data exist for French workers (and have been constructed within the French Institute of Statistics), but our administrative efforts so far to gain access to the matched files remain unsuccessful.
of the ERFS show that our sample is representative of around 2.5 million workers, which represent roughly 20% of the overall population of French workers aged 15 to 64 with at least one spell of employment within periods of 6 quarters, and 30% of those who are continuously employed. Appendix Table 7 checks that these rates are stable across survey years. Second, this selection implies that the workers in our sample are, on average, somewhat older than the population of continuously employed workers. They are more educated and have longer tenure. Importantly, the ratio of female to male workers is significantly lower in the population of workers which we focus on than in the general population of employed workers, mainly because of our selection of full-time workers.\footnote{In France, part-time workers are disproportionately female workers.} Lastly, Panel (B) in Table 2 shows that the distribution of wages is slightly shifted to the right, which is unsurprising given that the workers in our sample are selected according to tenure. These differences are, however, limited, and our filters tend not to select very specific profiles of workers (except for the specific occupations that are discarde): instead, they select specific and stable periods of their career paths and mainly discard workers with recent important “breaks.”

Ultimately, roughly three-quarters of our sample observations correspond to male workers, and more than two-thirds are between 35 and 54 years old. Half of the sample have a high school degree or higher diploma. A similar proportion are in occupations which correspond to intermediate or higher managers, while 34% are blue-collar workers and 20% are low-skilled white-collar workers. Finally, the average tenure is 179 months (15 years), thus exceeding by our selection threshold of 15 months a large amount.

Appendix Table 8 describes in detail which step of our selection procedure is the most stringent, and what is the impact in terms of the composition of the sample. Unsurprisingly, it is the criterion related to tenure which mainly selects more experienced workers. This also means a selection of slightly older workers, together with our criterion selecting wages ranging between €1,000 and €4,000. The criterion related to full-time workers has the main (downward) impact on the ratio of female workers. Lastly, Table 8 shows that our sample size is mainly limited by non-responses to the wage items rather than by the different filters we apply to harmonize self-reported and fiscal wages. Appendix Table 9 further verifies that worker characteristics are not correlated with the specific day of their interview (within the month), a feature which is ensured by the sampling design of our data set.

As expected, the benefit of our sample selection procedure is that it allows us to remove a significant share of the divergence between self-reported and fiscal wages. Denoting by $w_{it}^r$ and $w_{it}^f$ the logarithm of the self-reported and fiscal wages respectively, we obtain that relative gaps $|w_{it}^r - w_{it}^f|$ decrease on average from 15% to 10% when we eliminate the most unstable workers. In the empirical analyses which follow, we consider that the remaining 10% divergence between self-reported and fiscal wages is mainly driven by workers’ recall and response behavior, of which roughly half (5.2%) is stable across time and half (4.8%) is time varying.
Table 2: Estimation Sample: Representativeness

(A) Overall Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample Unweighted</th>
<th>Sample Weighted</th>
<th>Labor market aged 15 to 64 All workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(mil. workers)</td>
<td>(mil. workers)</td>
<td>(mil. workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No diploma (low)</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than high school (low)</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school degree (high)</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than high school (high)</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.215</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers/professionals</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate occupations</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-skilled white-collars</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collars</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tenure:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (months)</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev.</td>
<td>(122)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,045</td>
<td>22,896</td>
<td>116,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per annual wave</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>12,892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B) Wages and Wage Errors (Ln-pts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample (weighted)</th>
<th>Labor market: Emp. t/t+1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal wage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wage ≤ €1,200</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,200 &lt; wage ≤ €1,300</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,300 &lt; wage ≤ €1,400</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,400 &lt; wage ≤ €1,500</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,500 &lt; wage ≤ €1,600</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,600 &lt; wage ≤ €1,700</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,700 &lt; wage ≤ €1,800</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,800 &lt; wage ≤ €1,900</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,900 &lt; wage ≤ €2,000</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€2,000 &lt; wage</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting errors:</td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Average, ln-pt)</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ERFS survey, 2005 to 2015. In Panel (A), Columns 2 to 4, observations are weighted by their ERFS sampling weights to provide an estimate of the considered population, in million workers. As a reminder, the fiscal wages of our sample observations are restricted to the range €1,000 to €4,000 while those of the general population of workers who are employed both at t and t+1 (i.e. at the 2 waves of the LFS) are unrestricted. See Section 3.2 and Appendix C for a complete description of our sample selection.
3.4 Wage Distributions

We now turn to the description of our two main variables of interest and start with their distributions. Chart (A) in Figure 1 depicts the distribution of wages that are self-reported by workers in the LFS for the years 2005 to 2015, while Chart (B) depicts the distribution of fiscal wages. As a reminder, both distributions relate to the same (harmonized) concept and to the exact same population of workers.

Figure 1: Wage Distributions: Self-Reported vs. Fiscal Data

(A) Wages reported in the LFS (B) Wages in the fiscal data

Notes: Chart (A) shows the histogram distribution of wages as self-reported by workers in the LFS, by bins of €1. Chart (B) plots in black the histogram distribution of fiscal wages, also by bins of €1, overlaid with the distribution of LFS wages in light gray for comparison. Note that the scales of y-axes differ between Charts (A) and (B). Source: ERFS (2005-2015).

As in Biscourp et al. (2005), we find that the distribution of wages reported by workers differs significantly from the distribution of their fiscal counterpart. The support of the two distributions is broadly similar but, while the fiscal data exhibit a rather continuous density function, the distribution of self-reported wages instead resembles a mixture of several overlaid discrete distributions: a the first with discrete mass points by steps of €500, the second with discrete mass points by steps of €100 and the third with discrete mass points by steps of €50. This contrast between the two distributions is clear evidence of the fact that a significant share of self-reported wages are rounded with a mixture of different levels of “coarsening” of the underlying continuous wage information. This creates “bunching”, or more precisely, mass points at each salient value of the corresponding discrete scales (Kleven, 2016).

33Note that the French administrative wage data are in this respect different from the US administrative wage data, and do not feature bunching at multiples of €10 even when delineating in terms of net or gross wage per hour rather than by month (Dube et al., 2018).
Figure 2: Correspondence between Self-Reported and Fiscal Wages

(A) Raw Data

(B) Quartiles of Self-Reported Wages by Bins of €5 of Fiscal Wages

Notes: This figure plots the wage reported in the Labor Force Survey against the fiscal wage available from the income tax files over the interval €1,000 to €4,000. Source: ERFS (2005-2015).

The discrepancies between self-reported and fiscal wages can be further investigated by looking at the direct correspondence between the two variables. The results are reported in Figure 2 and are particularly insightful. Chart (A) shows that the relationship between fiscal and self-reported wages is not a simple 45 degree line. First, an unstructured “cloud” of data emerges and appears to be much thicker than a line. Second, a rather complex pattern of horizontal lines emerges and overlays this first unstructured “cloud”. The resulting grid indicates who the rounders are in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows, for example, that workers who reports a wage of €2,000 in the LFS have a fiscal wage ranging between €1,000 and €3,500. With such a scatterplot, it is, however, difficult to assess where the mass of observations is located. Therefore, Chart (B) in Figure 2 provides the main quantiles of the distribution of self-reported wages that are associated with a given value of the fiscal wage. These quantiles almost always coincide with round numbers, due to the prevalence of rounders in our population of workers. The interquantile range increases significantly as the fiscal wage increases, and the distribution of self-reported wages shifts significantly below the 45 degree line. This pattern is confirmed by the estimated correlation between self-reported and fiscal wages, which is significantly lower than 1 (0.87) and thus indicative of some forms of under-reporting.

Prevalence of rounding. So far, our data clearly indicate that our sample is a mixture of different populations of rounders and non-rounders,\(^\text{34}\) with potentially different reporting behaviors. Figure 3 and

\(^\text{34}\)As explained below, a worker who reports a rounded value is not necessarily a rounder. Our econometric approach addresses this issue rigorously via a mixture model.
Table 3 provide a first descriptive investigation of this point. Specifically, Figure 3 breaks down Figure 2 across non-rounders (in Chart A) and workers reporting values that are multiples of €100 (in Chart B). This exercise provides first evidence that non-rounders tend to be characterized by a lower fiscal wage, while workers reporting values that are multiples of €100 are distributed over the entire support of the wage distribution. Second, “rounders” tend to under-report a little more, but not by much, as the correlation between self-reported and fiscal wages is 0.87 across rounders but only slightly higher, at 0.90, across non-rounders. Interestingly, we also find that the $R^2$ of the regressions of the self-reported wage against the fiscal wage is not higher, and even 10 percentage points lower across non-rounders, which implies that their guesses are not necessarily more accurate than those of rounders. Our econometric analyses below confirm this finding and suggest that, in our setting, rounding seems to be more correlated with workers’ wage levels and education (i.e. most likely reflecting that being more financially literate enables workers to better evaluate the uncertainty around their own guesses) than with a lower accuracy.

Figure 3: Correspondence between Self-Reported and Fiscal Wages

(A) Self-reported wages that are not multiples of €5

(B) Self-reported wages that are multiples of €100

Notes: This figure plots for each bin of €5 in terms fiscal wage the quartiles of the self-reported wages. Sources: ERFS (2005-2015).

Table 3 complements these descriptive statistics by providing a comprehensive description of the frequency and stability of workers’ rounding behavior for all possible classes of rounding. It shows that in each wave of the LFS, 80% to 88% of workers report values that are multiples of €10, and the vast majority of them (73%) consistently report multiples of €10 in both of the survey interviews. In contrast, fewer than 1% of our sample observations are associated with fiscal wage values that are multiples of €10, as was already clear from the fact that the distribution of the fiscal wage in Figure 1 does not feature bunching. Again, more than 60% of workers report values that are multiples of €100 in either wave of the LFS, and 48% of them consistently
report multiples of €100 in both waves. These numbers confirm that rounding is actually pervasive, and they show that rounding appears to be rather stable at the worker level across waves of the LFS.

Table 3: Rounded Values in Self-Reported vs. Fiscal Wages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiples of:</th>
<th>LFS at t</th>
<th>Fiscal files at t</th>
<th>LFS at t+1</th>
<th>Fiscal files at t+1</th>
<th>LFS at t and t+1</th>
<th>Fiscal files at t and t+1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>€1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€10</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€50</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€100</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€500</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1,000</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table describes the frequency of wage values that are multiples of, respectively, 10, 50, 100, 500 and 1,000, either in the LFS (self-reported wages) or in the fiscal data. Sources: ERFS (2005-2015).

Distribution of “errors”. Lastly, Figure 4 provides a detailed description of the “errors”, defined as the difference between the logarithm of self-reported wages and the logarithm of their fiscal counterparts. These errors capture the attention effort of workers (the higher the effort, the lower these “errors”), such that they are our empirical object of main interest. At this stage, we leave aside the measurement problems posed by rounding behavior and simply show in Chart (A) that their distribution is very close to a Gaussian distributions, which is almost centred on zero but features non-negligible dispersion, as the estimated standard deviation is 0.082. Chart (B) also documents that the “mistakes” that workers make are highly positively correlated across waves of the LFS, whether they are positive or negative, thus suggesting that the magnitude and direction of these mistakes are rather stable over time. In addition, the data cloud is conical, which signals some form of heteroscedasticity in the time correlations of the “errors.” In particular, this feature of the data may be driven by the fact that our population of workers is composed of a mixture of rounders and non-rounders, with potentially different reporting behaviors. The empirical setting laid out in Section 4 addresses all these potential sources of concern.

4 Empirical Framework

4.1 Baseline Variance Analysis Setting

Analyzing the amount of attention that workers allocate to their wage involves estimating the variance of their guesses compared with the correct value of their wage. As documented in Section 3, our dataset accurately enables for a comparison of two different wage proxies: the value that is self-reported by workers in the LFS and the “correct” value indicated in the fiscal files. The difference between both, adjusted for rounding, provides an estimate of the variance parameter $\sigma_m$ in Section 2. Overall, the empirical exercise described in this section boils down to a variance analysis exercise, which in our data is complicated by the prevalence
Figure 4: (ln) Differences between Self-Reported and Fiscal Wages

(A) Cross-sectional distribution
(B) Correlation across Years
(Waves 1 and 2 of the LFS)

Notes: Chart (A) describes the distribution of \( w_r^{it} - w_f^{it} \), where \( w_r^{it} \) denotes the logarithm of self-reported wages and \( w_f^{it} \) denotes the logarithm of the fiscal wage. The Gaussian fit of the obtained distribution has mean parameter 0.023 and standard deviation 0.082. Chart (B) plots the temporal correlations across waves of the LFS, i.e. \( w_r^{it} - w_f^{it} \) against \( w_r^{i,t+1} - w_f^{i,t+1} \). The obtained correlation is 0.43. Source: ERFS (2005-2015).

of rounding and of potential additional reporting biases. The psychology literature actually documents that survey questions about earnings are often perceived as particularly intrusive and tend to generate large reporting biases (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007), which are of no interest to our research question and should be filtered out. To that end, we take advantage of the fact that the wage of each worker is surveyed twice and that our data therefore feature a short panel dimension. This allows us to estimate the following random effect model:

\[
\begin{align*}
    w_r^{it} &= w_f^{it} + a_i + v_{it}, \\
\end{align*}
\]

where \( w_r^{it} \) denotes the logarithm of the latent variable corresponding to the reported wage, \( w_f^{it} \) is the logarithm of the fiscal wage, \( a_i \) denotes a random effect component\(^{35}\) at the worker level, and \( v_{it} \) denotes the residual term. The \( a_i \) term typically captures and filters out the stable determinants of reporting behavior which may be driven by the interviewing conditions of the LFS or by any environmental or worker-level characteristics. On the other hand, the residual term \( v_{it} \) captures the time-varying discrepancy between \( w_r^{it} \) and \( w_f^{it} \), i.e. the ignorance or mistakes of workers. The variance of \( v \) can be interpreted as the overall measure of uncertainty at the worker level, coinciding with the variance parameter \( \sigma^2_{m} \) introduced in Section 2.

\(^{35}\)The specification with random effects rather than fixed effects is constrained by the short panel dimension of our data, and by the fact that a significant share of workers report rounded values, thus transforming our estimation problem into a limited dependent variable problem (see below) where fixed-effect estimators are biased at finite distance.
Our central exercise of variance analysis is performed under the assumptions that $a_i$ and $v_{it}$ are orthogonal and normally distributed, which is consistent with Section 2 and the suggestive descriptive statistics in Section 3:

$$a_i \sim N \left( \mu_a, \sigma_a^2 \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

$$v_{it} \sim N \left( 0, \sigma_m^2 \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

$$\text{Corr} \left( a_i, v_{it} \right) = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

A last difficulty of our setting is that Equation 15 cannot be directly estimated in the data as a significant proportion of workers report rounded values (see Section 3). There are several ways of introducing workers’ rounding behavior in our framework. Our baseline specification simply assumes that some workers implement standard, symmetric rounding, thus changing the Equation 15 model to a latent class model with limited dependent variables:

$$\tilde{W}_{it} = N_i \left\lfloor \frac{e^{w_{it}} e^{a_i} e^{v_{it}}}{N_i} + 0.5 \right\rfloor = N_i \left\lfloor \frac{e^{w_{it} e^{a_i} e^{v_{it}}}}{N_i} + 0.5 \right\rfloor, \ t \in \{1, 2\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

In this equation, $\tilde{W}_{it}$ corresponds to the actual wage value reported by workers in the LFS form (while $w_{it}$ is the corresponding log-latent variable) and $N_i \in N \equiv \{1, 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000\}$ denotes the class of rounding. Workers with $N_i = 1$ correspond to non-rounders, while $N_i \in \{10, 50, 100, 500, 1000\}$ corresponds to the five main classes of rounded values that are documented in Section 3 for the self-reported wage. In robustness checks, we also estimate a variant of Equation 19 which allows for left-digit bias, as in Busse et al. (2013) or Lacetera et al. (2012), which simply involves removing the normalizing constant 0.5 in the squared brackets in Equation 19. It is also important to keep in mind that the precise level of rounding of each worker is not fully observed, as a worker reporting a multiple of 100 might actually be a non-rounder if the quantity $e^{w_{it} e^{a_i} e^{v_{it}}}$ appears to be a multiple of 100 or a rounder of lower class (e.g. 10 or 50). The estimation procedure described in Section 4.3 takes account of the unobserved mixture problem of our estimation problem and addresses this difficulty. Furthermore, we estimate one set of parameters $\{\mu_a^N, (\sigma_a^N)^2, (\sigma_v^N)^2\}$ by class of rounding $N_i$ thus allowing for any correlation between rounding and worker-level random effects $a_i$ or uncertainty $v_{it}$.

36 The notation $\lfloor y \rfloor$ corresponds to the largest integer which does not exceed $y$.
37 Our methodology allows, in principle, an arbitrarily large number of classes, provided sample size is sufficiently large.
38 Our setting allows, in principle, for an even more flexible specification where the normalizing constant could be estimated. However, our results show that the baseline specification which assumes “correct” rounding actually fits the data better. Therefore, we only report the specifications with left-digit bias for comparison with the literature.
39 This flexibility of our specification also eases estimation computationally, as it splits the different models associated with each class of rounding into independent sub-problems, which can be optimized separately at each iteration of the EM algorithm.
4.2 Discussion of the Specification

The empirical framework set out in Section 4.1 is fully flexible in the sense that it does not take a stand about the precise cognitive or reporting processes which lead to rounding and, overall, to the values that are self-reported by workers in the LFS. For example, it is possible that employees first make a continuous guess, then potentially introduce reporting biases \( a_i \), and finally decide to only report a rounded value of the resulting index to blurr the information that is ultimately made public.\(^{40}\) Alternatively, the worker-level biases \( a_i \) and/or rounding could be behavioral, i.e. could reflect distortions of workers’ information sets rather than simply being features of their reporting strategy in the interaction with the LFS interviewer. While it is impossible to credibly identify from our data which of these two alternative stories is most relevant for the interpretation of \( a_i \) or rounding, it seems more credible to relate the volatility premium term \( \sigma^2_m \) to an actual behavioral characteristic. Indeed, it seems unlikely that this time-varying component could be affected by the interaction between survey respondents and interviewers or manipulated by workers. It is therefore of particular interest as it corresponds to a volatility premium whose magnitude may result from conscious efforts of memorization (“attention”), as formalized in Section 2, and may tap the “mental bandwith” of workers, as suggested by a growing literature (Mani et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2018; Schilbach et al., 2016).

This intuition that keeping an accurate record of wages induces a larger cognitive load also derives from the experimental literature, in which a standard method to manipulate the cognitive load of agents in the lab is to require them to remember a 7-or-more digit number or letter sequence (Miller, 1956) while making choices or taking tests such as Raven’s matrices. In our setting, monthly wages are in the order of magnitude of 1,000 to 4,000 euros and are therefore typically coded in 4 digits, while potential additional bonuses or overtime typically involve remembering 3 more digits. If workers were required (or incentivized) to report truthful and accurate values of these two components, then the exercise would really resemble these standard experimental methods. By mapping experimentally controlled incentives to measures of performance in terms of attention, we are able to estimate the cost function of attention in an experimentally controlled environment. In contrast, in our “real-life” setting, workers are not experimentally incentivized to answer the survey, thus allowing us to measure the real life heterogeneity and fluctuations in the amount of attention allocated to keeping track of their wage (as a proxy of their budget constraint). To that end, our econometric methodology involves filtering out workers’ pure reporting biases in order to recover the best possible proxy of the actual information they have in mind. For example, workers who allocate cognitive resources to retain accurately the seven required digits in each LFS interview will feature \( \nu_{i1} = \nu_{i2} = 0 \).\(^{41}\) In our data, this corresponds to a worker numerically exhibiting the exact same error term in the two LFS interviews. The

\(^{40}\)Workers are also given the opportunity to report binned values. However, the bins are predefined in the survey and do not contain any information about worker-level uncertainty, \( \sigma_m \). This is why we have to discard the corresponding observations reported as “missing wage information” in Appendix Table 8.

\(^{41}\)To be precise, it will be strictly 0 if they do not round. Otherwise, our mixture model will allocate to these workers a (small) probability for them to be non-rounders (despite the value being “round”) but approximate.
experimental literature suggests that low $\nu$ (and low $\sigma_m$) can be safely associated with a high cognitive load (Mani et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2018; Schilbach et al., 2016). Conversely, workers who only have fewer digits in mind will necessarily feature higher absolute values of $\nu$ (and $\sigma_m$), which according to the literature should be equated with a lower cognitive load.

### 4.3 Estimation Strategy

Estimating Equation 19 is not entirely straightforward. To better understand the structure of the estimation problem, we introduce more compact notations. Let $\Omega_i$ denote the logarithm of the wages $\{w_{1i}, w_{2i}\}$ reported by worker $i$ in the first and second waves of the LFS, $X_i$ denote the logarithm of the fiscal wages $w_{1i}^f, w_{2i}^f$, $(\theta^n) = \{(\mu^n_a), (\sigma^n_a), (\sigma^n_m)\}$ denote the sub-set of parameters to be estimated which determine worker-level reporting biases and uncertainty and $(\pi_n)_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ the set of parameters controlling the probabilities of rounding. Under the assumptions described in Section 4.1, the contribution of an observation $i$ to the ln-likelihood can be written as:

$$l(\Omega_i, N_i | X_i, \theta, (\pi_n)) = \ln \left( \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \pi_n P(\Omega_i | N_i = n, X_i, \theta^n) \right)$$

(20)

The structure of the latent class mixture model embodied in Equation 20 is made up of two different sets of parameters:

1. The six probabilities $\pi_n$ for $n \in \mathbb{N} \equiv \{1, 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000\}$ that worker $i$ rounds their wage by bins of width $n$. These probabilities add up to one, such that there are only 5 parameters to be estimated.

2. The six conditional probabilities $P(\Omega_i | N_i, X_i, \theta^n)$ to observe $\Omega_i$ conditionally on $N_i$, $X_i$, and $\theta^n$.

   These conditional probabilities are simply 0 whenever $e^{w_{1i}}$ or $e^{w_{2i}}$ are not multiples of $n$. In the alternative case where both quantities are actually multiples of $n$ (i.e. $n | e^{w_{1i}}, 2$), estimating them involves a standard model of limited dependent variables with Gaussian random effects.

Appendix B provides the full details of the estimation strategy. The maximization of Equation 20 is performed using an EM algorithm (Train, 2003). Within each iteration, we approximate the conditional probabilities $P(\Omega_i | N_i = n, X_i, \theta^n)$ using Gaussian quadrature.

### 4.4 Identification

The identification of the various parameters underlying Equation 19 is relatively straightforward. First, the distribution of $a_i$ is identified from the empirical distribution of workers’ logarithmic differences between self-reported and fiscal wages $(w_{1i} - w_{2i})$, as in Figure 4 but averaged over the two waves of the LFS. Second, the distribution of $\nu_i$ is identified from the subsequent empirical distribution of the residuals that are obtained in the log space once $w_{1i}$ has been purged from $a_i$. To be precise, the worker-level measure of uncertainty embodied in the residual term $\nu_{it}$ is identified from the time variations of discrepancies between reported values

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42We estimate one set of parameters $\theta^n = \{\mu^n_a, \sigma^n_a, \sigma^n_m\}$ per class of rounding $n$. 

---

25
war and targets $w^f$, once controlled for $a_i$. Such variations reflect variations in the information sets of workers and can therefore be safely related to a measure of attention at the worker level, as further explained in Section 4.5 below. Lastly, the probabilities of rounding at different levels $N_i \in \mathcal{N} \equiv \{1, 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000\}$ are broadly identified from the empirical frequencies of rounded values previously reported in Table 3, adjusted (i.e. dampened) for the probability of making large mistakes, either persistently or idiosyncratically. Indeed, large values of $a_i$ and $\nu_i$ are both associated with lower values of the likelihood function.43

We apply our estimation procedure firstly, on the pooled sample of the ERFS and, secondly, by sub-populations defined in terms of broad socio-demographic characteristics. This allows us to document heterogeneity in terms of rounding, reporting biases $a_i$ and, most importantly, uncertainty $\sigma_m$ across different populations of workers defined in terms of wage, gender, tenure, and education. Importantly, we also estimate our structural parameters of interest by sub-populations defined in terms of day of LFS interview. Unfortunately, workers are almost never interviewed on the same day in their first and second LFS interviews. To overcome this difficulty, we widen the window and isolate samples of workers who are interviewed within an identical time window of ten days, both in their first and second LFS interviews. This enables us to retrieve estimates of $\sigma_m$, $\mu_a$ and $\sigma$ by rolling windows of ten consecutive days. Using a simple matrix inversion procedure described in Appendix B.3, we ultimately retrieve the daily estimates of all parameters of interest, most importantly $\sigma_m$ (which is required to test the empirical predictions of Section 2).

4.5 Estimates of $w^d$ and Attention

Our empirical framework so far amounts to an analysis of the variance of LFS self-reported wages. To our knowledge, it is one of the first large-scale analyses of workers’ response behavior and of the potential behavioral biases that can be identified from this source. As discussed in Section 4.2, the volatility premium associated with workers’ perceptions $\sigma_m^2$ is of particular interest as it measures an actual premium in terms of wage (or income) volatility that could result from conscious efforts of memorization (“attention”), as formalized in Section 2.

A first challenge is to assess whether our estimates of this volatility premium $\sigma_m^2$ are large or small. Ideally, it would be useful to know what was the volatility $\sigma^2$ of the prior $w^d$ and to compare it to the ex-post estimated volatility $\sigma_m^2$ and infer attention $m$ as in Equation 10 of Section 2. In order to take a stand on this question, we simply propose to equate $w^d$ and $\sigma^2$ with familiar benchmarks: respectively, the wage prediction and volatility that would be estimated by an econometrician using standard fiscal wage data. Our estimating equation takes the following form (Delaney and Devereux, 2019):

43In Section 4.1, we also introduced specifications with left-digit bias as opposed to “correct” rounding. The prevalence of left-digit bias is identified from the frequency of discontinuities in the reporting of rounded values which occur “too late” (as in Lacetera et al. (2012)) while allowing for a lower value of $a_i$ and a higher value of the likelihood function).
where, as previously, $w_{it}^f$ denotes the logarithm of fiscal wages and $\hat{w}_{it}^d$ is the estimated “default” (worker’s prior), in logarithm. The specification in Equation 21 contains aggregate time dummies, $\delta_t$, controls, $X_{it}\beta$, for gender, age, detailed occupation, detailed information about tenure (in years), firm industry ($\delta_j$) at the one-digit level, dummies for regions ($\delta_g$), as well as worker-level fixed effects ($\delta_i$). Econometrician guesses, i.e. out-of-sample log-wage predictions constructed from these estimated models will make errors that will be distributed as Gaussian random variables, centered on the correct value with standard deviation $\hat{\sigma}$. Equation 21 is estimated on eight different samples, each with a different end year (ranging from 2005 to 2010 and 2014 to 2015, as in our main ERFS sample) and up to 10 years of retrospective data, depending on each worker’s labor market trajectory. We compute estimates of $\sigma^2$ by retrieving the series of residuals $\eta_{it}$ and constructing indices of volatility at the worker level from their standard deviation over their respective wage data history. Of course, our baseline ERFS data lack a sufficient panel dimension which would enable us to properly estimate Equation 21. We adopt a pseudo-panel approach and instead estimate this equation using a complementary, much wider dataset (the DADS panel) which contains administrative information about wages that is very similar to fiscal wages, for one-fourth of the French population of workers. Finally, we simply match the obtained estimates to our main ERFS sample of workers according to year of interview, all the selection criteria in Section 3.2 (and Appendix Table 8) and the following further detailed worker characteristics: gender, age, detailed occupation, education level (high/low) and tenure (short/long). This procedure also provides indices of attention $m$ for different populations of interest via Equation 10; the standard deviation associated with the resulting “hybrid” parameter is computed by bootstrap (50 replications).
### Table 4: Baseline Estimation Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>Specifications (A) Probabilities of rounding, $\pi$</th>
<th>Specifications (B) Uncertainty parameter, $\sigma_m$</th>
<th>Specifications (C) Mean of bias, $\mu_a$</th>
<th>Specifications (D) Standard deviation of bias, $\sigma_a$</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probability of rounding, $\pi$</td>
<td>Coarsening</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 class</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.482,023</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 classes</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 classes</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 classes</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
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<td>5 classes</td>
<td>0.280</td>
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<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
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<td>6 classes</td>
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<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the estimation results of our main specification. Each specification (containing 1 to 6 classes of rounding or implementing “left-digit bias”) is estimated on the same sample of 19,045 workers spanning the 2005 to 2015 period (see Section 3). All estimation details are reported in Appendix B.
5 Results

5.1 Pooled Variance Analysis

Table 4 first reports the results from our pooled estimation sample. Each specification is estimated on the entire estimation sample, but incorporates different sets of classes of rounding. The first specification is the most parsimonious and introduces only one class - which is equivalent to neglecting rounding. The second specification reports the best 2-class model in terms of minimization of the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria: this involves allowing some workers to round at €100. The third specification introduces the €50 class, the fourth and fifth introduce the €10 and €500 classes, respectively, while the most comprehensive specification introduces the €1,000 class. This sequential exercise shows that the specification which best fits the data is the most detailed specification, incorporating six classes of rounding, as all likelihood ratio tests, AIC or BIC criteria reject the more parsimonious models. Moreover, Table 4 is informative of the cost of neglecting rounding in terms of bias for the estimation of our main parameters of interest. These costs are negligible in terms of average biases ($\mu_a$), but are statistically and economically significant in terms of our two parameters of variance. To be precise, comparing the results from our first and sixth specifications shows that neglecting rounding in the estimation procedure overstates the standard deviation of the uncertainty parameter $\sigma_m$ by around 5%, which means that the corresponding “volatility premium” $\sigma_m^2$ is overstated by 8%. Similarly, specifications which neglect rounding overstate the standard deviation $\sigma_a$ of time-invariant biases by 2.5%, which in terms of variance amounts to 5%.

The last row of Table 4 proposes a specification incorporating 6 classes of rounding, but with the additional assumption that workers feature left-digit biases, as in Busse et al. (2013) and Lacetera et al. (2012). Interestingly, the various selection criteria (AIC, BIC, Log-likelihood ratio) lead us to reject this assumption.\textsuperscript{48} This result is unsurprising as our setting is very different from the environment described in Busse et al. (2013) and Lacetera et al. (2012). In particular, in their setting, prospective used car buyers are under time pressure when collecting and processing information about car characteristics in multiple simultaneous auctions. In contrast, and as explained in details in Section 3, our workers are not subject to time pressure. Their problem

\textsuperscript{44}Information about education is only available on too small a sub-sample. We therefore proxy this information with detailed fixed effects for occupations at the 2-digit level.
\textsuperscript{45}As explained below, we estimate this wage volatility using a companion dataset, the DADS panel, which allows us to track the wage history of one-fourth of the labor market population over time, whatever the nature of their employment or unemployment spells.
\textsuperscript{46}The DADS provide us with detailed wage information and a rich set of worker-level information for just under 8% (1/12) of the French labor force since 2002, and 1/25 since 1976. See e.g. Cahuc et al. (2018) and Schmutz and Sidibé (2018) (among many others) for recent papers based on the DADS panel data. The DADS wage information is an annual aggregate that is directly reported by employers to compute social security contributions, as in the pre-filled fiscal files, which makes this source very similar to fiscal wages.
\textsuperscript{47}It is not possible to include the same detailed set of controls as in Equation 21 because, despite the larger scale of the DADS panel dataset, some of the rare combinations of characteristics in our ERFS sample are also rare in the DADS and do not match a sufficient number of DADS workers.
\textsuperscript{48}Our specification contains a worker-level random effect $a_i$ which may capture most of the biases that are stable across time, although these terms do not enter exactly the same way as the “left digit” shifter in Equation 19 and are therefore, in principle, separately identified in the data.
is, rather, to provide the best estimate of their current wage, usually without being able (or willing) to access accurate sources of information about it. There is no particular reason why they would keep truncated values in mind, or why their estimates would suffer from left-digit bias, as the sequence of relevant digits is much more limited than for mileages of different second-hand cars. In the remainder of the paper, we therefore safely focus on the specification with six classes of rounding and standard, symmetric rounding.

Our estimates in Table 4 show that around 72% of workers report rounded values of their wage, 37% report values rounded to the nearest hundred, while 18% and 12% report values rounded to fifty or ten, respectively. The remaining 5% of workers round to €500 or €1,000. These figures are broadly consistent with the gross observation counts in Table 3, but the more rigorous estimation of the mixture model tends to inflate the €500 category and deflate the €100 and €1,000 categories.

More importantly for our analyses, Panel (B) in Table 4 shows that the parameter governing the uncertainty premium perceived by workers, $\sigma_m$, is estimated to range between 4.6% and 12.2% of the fiscal wage, depending on the class of rounding. The estimated average across all classes of rounding is 10.1%, a value that is just below the number attained in the most populated classes of rounding (€1 and €100). Strikingly, this uncertainty parameter is highest in the class of non-rounders, and there is no monotonic correlation between this uncertainty measure and the class of rounding. This implies that in our setting, and in contrast to the findings of Ruud et al. (2014) and Binder (2017), the prevalence of rounding does not signal higher levels of uncertainty at the worker level. We return to this puzzle in Section 5.2, where we refine the analysis by controlling for education (as a proxy for financial literacy).

The distributions of the random effects $a_i$ also appear to be somewhat differentiated across classes of rounding, in a more monotonic fashion. First, we find that the average of reporting biases $\mu_a$ tend to be positive and significant for non-rounders or for workers reporting values that are rounded at €10. The sign switches and becomes significantly negative for coarser classes of rounding: €100 and €500. As a result, the estimated average of parameter $\mu_a$ over all classes of rounding is estimated to be only 1%. Second, we find that the dispersion of the random effects $a_i$ increases as the class of rounding becomes coarser. While the estimated standard deviation for $a_i$ is only around 7% for non-rounders, it reaches 11% among workers reporting values rounded at €100 or €500. Ultimately, the total variance of the discrepancy between self-reported and fiscal wages ($\sigma_a^2 + \sigma_m^2$) is higher in coarser classes of rounding, but this result is mainly driven by the time-invariant parameter $\sigma_a^2$, rather than by the time-varying uncertainty parameter, $\sigma_m^2$. In other words, workers’ rounding behavior is more correlated with their time-invariant errors or biases than with the time-varying volatility term $\sigma_m^2$.

\footnote{In Section 5.2, we will document that this pattern is driven by a composition effect: coarser classes of rounding are populated by workers who earn higher wages and tend to under-report their wages.}
In Appendix D, we check the robustness of our results to even more flexible specifications. There, we investigate whether the implicit assumption in Table 4 that all our parameters of interest are stable across time at the worker level actually hold. The main take-aways of these experiments are that the profile of rounding captured by the probabilities $\pi$ appears to be stable across time. Likewise, the parameter measuring mean biases $\mu_a$ is also stable across time, with none of the estimated values being statistically different in the first and second interviews of the LFS. The only parameters which increase slightly across time are the volatility parameters $\sigma_m$ and $\sigma_a$. This pattern is, however, qualitatively and quantitatively very limited. Overall, allowing our structural parameters of interest to vary in the first and second interviews of the LFS provides little insight of the cost of a significant loss of statistical power, such that the 6-class specification in Table 4 remains our central baseline specification in the remainder of the paper.

5.2 Heterogeneity Across Different Populations of Workers

Table 5 summarizes the results of a second set of estimates which documents parameter heterogeneity in different sub-populations of workers. We first investigate whether our data feature heterogeneity between high- and low-wage earners, and simply split our sample in half at the median (€1,665). As explained in detail in Section 2, the rationale is that low-income workers are likely to face tighter financing constraints and pay more attention overall to their labor income. Furthermore, the rounding behavior of workers may be different at low vs. high levels of the wage distribution, as the relative amounts implied by rounding approximations are different. We also investigate whether tenure impacts workers’ assessment of their own wage and further split the samples at the median (13 years). We hypothesize that workers with low tenure have less time to accumulate wealth as an additional safety buffer, such that they might exhibit higher financing constraints, all else equal. Furthermore, these workers are likely to be less informed about bonuses, payment of overtime, and other dimensions of their employer’s wage policy. This means that the volatility of their default prior $\sigma_0$ is likely to be high, thus amplifying the expected costs associated with the risk of exceeding their budget constraints. Lastly, we introduce two characteristics which the previous literature has shown to be associated with differentiated degrees of risk aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) or processes of anticipation formation (e.g. D’Haultfoeuille et al., 2018) and which are therefore also good potential sources of heterogeneity in our setting: education (as a proxy for numerical literacy) and gender.

To assess the impact of these four different dimensions of heterogeneity on our different parameters of interest, and in the absence of precise guidance on how they will affect them, we adopt a non-parametric approach and simply estimate one set of parameters per sub-sample of workers defined in terms of gender (male vs. female), education (lower than high school vs. higher than high school); tenure (higher vs. lower than the sample median) and wage (lower vs. higher than the sample median). All but one of the resulting 16 sub-samples are sufficiently populated to allow for such a separate estimation of the parameters.
Our estimates first highlight that the probabilities of rounding feature some heterogeneity and range between 62% and 79% depending on the sub-population of workers considered. Similarly, average coarsening, i.e. the average class of rounding in each sub-sample, ranges between €38 and €119. The measure of worker-level uncertainty $\sigma_m$ ranges between 8.2% and 12.4% while $\sigma_a$ ranges between 6.3% and 10.1%. Lastly, the average bias parameter $\mu_a$ ranges between -4.3% and 5.0%. All these differences are statistically significant.

To better gauge the orders of magnitude and relative contributions of all these parameters to overall sample heterogeneity, it is useful to apply the König-Huyghens formula to the sub-populations in Table 5, which under the identifying assumptions of Section 4 results in the following variance decomposition equation:

$$V(a_i + v_{it}) = \sum_p s_h p \sigma_{a,p}^2 + \sum_p s_h p \sigma_{v,p}^2 + \sum_p s_h p (\mu_{a,p} - \mu_a)^2$$  \hfill (22)

where $p$ indexes the different sub-populations, $s_h p$ represents the share of our sample observations that are allocated to each of them, $(\sigma_{a,p}, \sigma_{v,p}, \mu_{a,p})$ denote the associated parameters and $\mu_a$ denotes the full sample mean of residuals, i.e. the weighted average of the set of $(\mu_{a,p})$ parameters. Our estimates in Table 5 imply that the first term contributes to 40% of the total variance, while the second term contributes to 55% and the last term to only 5%. In other words, the heterogeneity in average biases $\mu_{a,p}$ is small relative to the overall order of magnitude of variance parameters $\sigma_{a,p}^2$ and $\sigma_{v,p}^2$, which contribute roughly equally to the overall variance. Interestingly, a closer look at the contribution of each sub-population to the overall variance reveals that all sub-populations of female workers contribute less than their observation weights, while 5 out of the 8 sub-populations of male workers contribute significantly more.

Table 5 also proposes an estimate of the implied attention parameter $m$ along the lines of Section 4.5. As a reminder, the computation of this parameter requires an estimate of some proxy of “prior” (i.e., pre-attention effort) uncertainty, $\sigma$, which we estimate on a companion (DADS) dataset which features a longer panel dimension. The comparison of the estimated $\sigma_m$ with this benchmark implies attention parameters ranging between 0.288 and 0.840 depending on the sub-population, with the mass of estimates lying in the 0.4 to 0.8 range. Interestingly, these orders of magnitude and the amount of heterogeneity in the attention parameter $m$ which we find almost perfectly match the results of the previous literature which was surveyed in Gabaix (2019). He notes that in studies where the importance of the opaque attribute ranges between 0.07 and 0.24 (which corresponds to $\sigma$ and ranges between 0.13 and 0.24 in our setting), measures of attention typically range between 0.25 and 0.69 (Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, 2017; Chetty et al., 2009; Lacetera et al., 2012; Hossain and Morgan, 2006).

\footnote{For example, Chetty et al. (2009) find that the attention allocated to the sales taxes of grocery store items is equivalent to 35%, while the magnitude of this tax is typically 7% of the total price. Similarly, in Lacetera et al. (2012), the attention index to the mileage of used cars sold at auction attains 69%, while the magnitude of the error implied by left-digit bias is 10% of the total mileage.}

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### Table 5: Estimates by Detailed Sub-Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample definition</th>
<th>Parameters (averages across classes)</th>
<th>Proba.</th>
<th>Coarsening</th>
<th>$\sigma_m$</th>
<th>$\mu_a$</th>
<th>$\sigma_a$</th>
<th>m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage Gender</td>
<td>ERFS DADS</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.635</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>(H. Sch.)</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERFS DADS rounding</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fem.)</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H. Sch.)</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERFS DADS rounding</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0/1</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(H. Sch.)</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports estimates obtained for each of the sub-populations indicated in the "sample definition" columns. The standard deviations of all structural parameters are computed via the BHHH estimator described in Appendix B, except for $\sigma$ and $m$, for which we rely on bootstrap (50 replications). Sources: ERFS (2005-2015) for $\sigma$ and $m$, and DADS (1995-2015) for $\sigma$ and $m$. SOURCES: ERFS (2005-2015) for parameters $\sigma_m$, $\mu_a$, $\sigma_a$, rounding (1 - $\pi$) and coarsening; and DADS (1995-2015) for $\sigma$ and $m$.
Table 6: Wage Volatility $\sigma$ and Main Structural Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>Rounding</th>
<th>Coarsening</th>
<th>$\sigma_m$</th>
<th>$\mu_a$</th>
<th>$\sigma_a$</th>
<th>$m$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Correlations with Worker-Level Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage: high</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>53.261***</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.054***</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(1.519)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td>-0.041***</td>
<td>-13.243***</td>
<td>-0.015***</td>
<td>-0.012*</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.604)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.015*</td>
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<td>0.011**</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td>0.078</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.011*</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.104**</td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.990)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Net Correlations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
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<td>-0.354***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(61.141)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.627)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>52.587***</td>
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<td>-0.050***</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(3.272)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-0.046***</td>
<td>-14.365***</td>
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<td>-0.006***</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(2.523)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(3.289)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $\sigma_m$, $\mu_a$, and $\sigma_a$ are estimated in Section 5. Sources: ERFS (2005-2015) for parameters $\sigma_m$, $\mu_a$, $\sigma_a$, rounding and coarsening and DADS (1995-2015) for $\sigma$ and $m$. All observations are weighted by the inverse of the variance estimated for the dependent variable (with observations with higher variance being given a lower weight). In Panel (B), all standard deviations are computed by bootstrap (50 replications) to take account of the fact that $\sigma$ is a generated regressor.

Finally, Table 6 adopts a more synthetic approach and correlates the heterogeneity of our estimated parameters with the four characteristics that we have introduced: the level of wage, tenure, gender and education. Panel (A) first investigates the gross correlations with all parameters of interest. The first column checks that the “prior” wage uncertainty estimated from a Mincerian equation, $\sigma$, is higher for higher wages (by 1.6 percentage points), female workers (by 1.8 ppt), more-educated workers (by 1.2 ppt) and those with shorter tenure (4.0 ppt). The following two columns describe workers’ rounding behavior via the share of rounders on one hand and average coarsening on the other. Both appear to be positively correlated with the wage level: workers earning more than the sample median round 10 ppt more often and report coarser values (by €53) than workers earning less than the sample median. Similarly, we find that women round significantly less often overall (by 4.1 ppt) and, all else equal, rely on finer classes of rounding such that their average coarsening is lower (by €13), as in the case of workers with shorter tenure. Moreover and all else equal, the probability of rounding is only weakly correlated with education, but we find that when rounding occurs, more educated workers tend to use coarser scales, all else equal.

The fourth column collects the correlations with our main parameter of interest, the measure of uncertainty $\sigma_m$. We find that women exhibit a lower actual uncertainty parameter $\sigma_m$ (by 1.5 ppt), which is associated with a significantly higher attention parameter $m$ in the last column (by 16 ppt). In contrast, workers with
shorter tenure feature a significantly higher uncertainty parameter $\sigma_m$ (by 1.0 ppt), but this is mainly driven by their higher “prior” $\sigma$ such that their underlying attention $m$ is not lower but is in fact higher than the attention parameter of workers with longer tenure, by 10 ppt. Interestingly, we do not find any correlation between education and the uncertainty parameter $\sigma_m$, but, given that the baseline wage volatility $\sigma$ of highly educated workers is high, this ends up in a slightly positive, though statistically insignificant, correlation between education and attention $m$. Overall, more-educated workers tend to exhibit an attention index that is higher by 7.8 ppt, i.e. 12% higher than the population average (63.3).

Lastly, Columns 5 and 6 report the correlations between worker characteristics and time-invariant biases $a$. Interestingly, high-wage workers tend to under-report by 5.4% and feature a higher dispersion of time-invariant biases. All else equal, women also tend to under-report on average by 1.2% but are a population which features a low dispersion of time-invariant biases. In contrast, both educated and shorter-tenured workers tend to over-report, all else equal, by around 1.1 ppt. However, while educated workers feature a low dispersion of time-invariant biases, the opposite is the case for workers with a shorter tenure.

One limitation of the correlations in Panel (A) is that they do not account for the fact that the various populations of workers actually face different levels of ex ante uncertainty, $\sigma$. Panel (B) therefore simply proposes specifications where this indicator is introduced as an additional control. As this regressor is generated, inference now requires a comprehensive bootstrap procedure. The results are as follows. All else equal, $\sigma$ only correlates significantly with average biases $\mu_a$ and attention $m$: we find, in particular, that workers featuring higher $\sigma$ tend to under-report their wage, a result that is consistent with some forms of risk aversion. This negative correlation with $\sigma$ attenuates the correlation with gender and with the wage level, while it amplifies the positive correlations with education and tenure. Secondly, we find that workers featuring higher $\sigma$ exhibit higher subsequent attention indices, which attenuates the associated excess volatility and results in no significant difference in terms of actual uncertainty $\sigma_m$. The correlation between attention and gender remains positive and highly significant, while the correlation with tenure disappears. For the other indicators (rounding, $\sigma_m$ and $\sigma_a$), the correlations with wage level, gender, education and tenure are basically unaltered by the introduction of the additional control.

In particular, as a previous literature (Ruud et al., 2014; Binder, 2017) suggested that rounding may be associated with higher uncertainty in a variety of settings, we clarify that this is not always the case and that, in particular, the LFS data feature no correlation between rounding and any of our indicators of uncertainty ($\sigma$, shorter tenure). Moreover, we find that the main characteristics of workers who round more (mostly higher-wage workers) are different from the main characteristics of workers facing higher uncertainty in terms of $\sigma$ or $\sigma_m$ (workers with shorter tenure).
5.3 Payday and the Monthly Cycle of Attention

In this section, we document the fluctuations of attention over time. Through the lens of Section 2, this exercise is particularly useful as varying the “distance” to payday amounts to varying the perceived financial constraint, as in Mani et al. (2013) or Carvalho et al. (2016), thus allowing us to document the correlations between the magnitude of this constraint and the level of attention that workers allocate to monitoring their main source of income.

Payday is not strictly regulated in France. Labor laws (Article L. 3242-1 of the Labor Code) only set the maximum interval between two successive paydays: one month for workers on monthly contracts. For employees who are not on monthly contract (seasonal or temporary workers, etc.), payment must be made at least twice a month, at a maximum interval of 16 days. However, there are two additional reasons why the vast majority of French employers actually pay wages during the last or first days of the month. The first reason is that this is the convention that prevails among French civil servants, who represent roughly 20% of the total workforce (and of our sample): this component of the workforce is consistently paid on the third working day before the end of the month. The second reason is that payroll taxes for a given month are due on the fifth day of the following month, which means that all computations should be ready in the last days of the working period or in the first few days of the next. Payments to workers and to the fiscal administration often occur quasi-simultaneously.

Using our data, it is unfortunately impossible to directly investigate how our structural parameters of interest vary as the distance to payday increases by estimating separate models for each day between the 1st and 31st. This would require us to restrict our sample to workers who appear to be interviewed on the same day both in their first and second LFS interviews, and there are too few such cases. A simple way to overcome this difficulty is to perform separate estimations by successive “rolling” windows, which we set to 10 days. This threshold is convenient, as the series of time windows indexed by \((d/d + 9, d + 10/d + 19, d + 20/d + 29)\) also constitute rolling partitions of the month and can therefore be interpreted as simple estimations performed over successive, non-overlapping periods of 10 days. The resulting sub-samples of workers are described in Table 9 in Appendix C. Since the date of the interview is orthogonal to workers’ characteristics (as documented in Section 1), we find that these sub-samples exhibit the same structure of characteristics as the full estimation sample. However, the workers in our initial estimation sample who were interviewed more than 10 days apart in their first and second LFS interviews have to be discarded, thus slightly reducing the statistical power of this exercise.

**Main results.** The results are reported in Figure 5, where we plot the estimates obtained for each time window of 10 days and we outline a specific set of three non-overlapping estimates covering the first, middle...
Figure 5: Evolution of the Structural Parameters During the Month
Low vs. High-Wage Workers

(A) Rounding \((1 - \pi_1)\)
(B) Coarsening

(C) \(\mu_a\)
(D) \(\sigma_a\)

(E) \(\sigma_m\)
(F) Attention \((100.m)\)

Notes: These figures show the estimates of each structural parameter of interest that are obtained over (rolling) windows of ten consecutive days. The center of the 10-day window is reported on the x-axis, while the value of the considered estimate is reported on the y-axis. These specifications are estimated separately on the sub-populations of workers earning a fiscal wage that is either lower than €1,500 (point estimates as triangle, thick confidence intervals) or strictly higher than €1,500 (point estimates as crosses, thin confidence intervals). In each panel, we also outline a specific set of three estimates covering, respectively, the first, middle and last 10 days of a given month. These time periods are materialized by horizontal bars and form a (non-overlapping) partition of the month into three sub-periods. Sources: ERFS (2005-2015) for parameters \(\sigma_m, \mu_a, \sigma_a,\) rounding and coarsening and ERFS (2005-2015)/DADS (1995-2015) for \(m\). The reported standard deviations rely on the BHHH estimator except for the indicator of attention, which requires bootstrap (50 replications).
and last 10 days respectively of a given month. Figure 5 documents the results for the full (i.e. maximal) population of workers and splits the estimates between those earning less than €1,500 and strictly more than €1,500, respectively. The first take-away from Panels (A) to (D) in Figure 5 is that our estimates of the parameters describing workers’ rounding behavior (the probability to round $1 - \pi_1$ or average coarsening) and their time-invariant biases ($\mu_a$ and $\sigma_a$) appear to be stable over time, both in the population of high- and low-wage workers. For example, the share of rounders fluctuates between 74% and 78% among high-wage workers, while it fluctuates between 59% and 65% among low-wage workers. This represents roughly 5% and 10% of the overall average, respectively. Similarly, workers earning more than €1,500 coarsen their wage by €58 to €62, which represents a very limited scope, while workers earning less than €1,500 round on average by bins of €36 to €40. Again, these fluctuations are limited in magnitude and statistically insignificant. In terms of the average bias $\mu_a$, Panel (C) in Table 5 confirms the previous results in Table 6 that better-off workers tend to under-report relative to less well-off workers, and adds to the evidence that this difference is strikingly stable over the month. Overall, high-wage workers tend to under-report their wage by around 1% to 2%, while workers earning lower wages tend to over-report by 5% to 6%. The results are similar, although a bit more volatile, in terms of $\sigma_a$: the dispersion of the time-invariant biases of better-off workers is consistently higher than the corresponding parameter estimated for less well-off workers. None of these fluctuations are statistically significant.

Ultimately, the only parameters which exhibit a statistically significant fluctuation over the month are those capturing uncertainty, $\sigma_m$ and attention, $m$. This is striking, as it implies that attention is uncorrelated with bias, whether it is a feature of workers’ information sets or simply of their reporting behavior. In other words, increased attention does not seem to able to generate a mechanism which leads to de-biasing (see footnote 15 in Section 2). Through the lens of the model in Section 2, the fluctuations of $\sigma_m$ and $m$ are meaningful: in the case of low-wage workers, it features a clear cyclical pattern whereby uncertainty drops and attention rises in the last 10 days before payday. The magnitude of this end-of-month pattern is large: -1.7 ppt in terms of uncertainty $\sigma_m$ and +6.3 ppt in terms of the attention index $m$. This corresponds to a statistically significant drop in uncertainty $\sigma_m$ of 20%. The timing of this pattern suggests that it is driven by the tightening of budget constraints in the last 10 days of the month, when the previous payday is already some distance in the past and the next is still some time away. In contrast, workers earning more than €1,500 do not exhibit any pattern, and their level of attention is on average lower - approximately at the monthly minimum of low-wage workers. This suggests that in everyday life, better-off workers do not need to remember a precise record of their wage, because their budget constraints are not tight. Overall, the results shown in Panels (E) and (F) in Figure 5 are consistent with the first two predictions in Section 2.

51I.e. with the likely exception of when they have to take discretionary investment decisions.
Figure 6: Daily Estimates

(A) Uncertainty Index ($\sigma_m$)  (B) Attention Index (100.m)

Notes: These figures complement Panels (E) and (F) in Figure 5 by providing daily estimates of the uncertainty ($\sigma_m$) and attention (100.m) parameters, by sub-populations of workers earning, respectively, (in terms of their fiscal wage): less than €1,500 and more than €1,500. The precise methodology underlying these estimates is described in Appendix B.3. The confidence intervals are computed by bootstrap (35 iterations) but are too wide to be meaningfully reported (see text). Sources: ERFS (2005-2015)/DADS (1995-2015).

Robustness and extensions. One limitation of Figure 5 is that the estimates that are reported only correspond (approximately) to moving averages of our main parameters of interest over 10 days. The width of this time window has the benefit of securing a sufficient number of observations for the estimation, but it prevents us from accurately tracking the daily variation of uncertainty and attention. In Appendix B.3, we detail a methodology which enables us to retrieve the daily estimates of our parameters of interest, up to simple matrix manipulations. The results of this procedure are reported in Figure 6. Unfortunately, our estimation sample is not large enough to obtain accurate estimates as we are left with too few observations per day (and even sometimes no observations at all, as explained in Appendix B.3). As a consequence, the (unreported) confidence intervals are wide and none of the monthly evolutions are statistically significant.

Despite this limitation, this exercise allows us to refine the timing of the end-of-month drop in uncertainty $\sigma_m$ and of the associated rise in attention $m$. Figure 5 clearly shows that for low-wage workers, attention starts increasing on the 17th day of the month and rises until the 28th day approximately, which corresponds more or less to payday for most workers. Unsurprisingly, the pattern for the uncertainty index $\sigma_m$ is symmetric. The magnitude is of the same order as the previous "moving average/sub-period" estimates, i.e. approximately 15%. Equally interestingly, attention appears to drop immediately once payday is reached and, symmetrically, uncertainty immediately starts to rise. Importantly, this feature of the cyclical evolution of attention is not compatible with a purely passive informational story which could provide an alternative to the mechanism outlined in Section 2, whereby workers would be measured as more “attentive” simply because

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52We are unable to identify 9 out of the 31 daily estimates in the case of low-wage workers, because of the lack of observations.
they are more informed. Indeed, such a story would predict that attention should reach a peak on payday, but it should then decrease steadily until the next payday and jump discretely to a maximum instead of increasing steadily during the last 10 days of the month. Conversely, the pattern exhibited by the data is well rationalized by the liquidity constraint story in Section 2. Furthermore, through the lens of this theory, the increase in attention until payday, i.e. until the relaxation of the liquidity constraint, is informative of the shape of the underlying costs associated with paying more attention. It first reveals that the cost of maintaining attention over time is high and convex in duration (i.e. the $h$ function in Section 2 is convex). This increase is steep in the sense that it is large in magnitude and concentrated over a very limited period of time. This suggests that the cost of maintaining attention is actually high relative to the utility gain it would generate in terms of consumption smoothing. Similarly, this increasing pattern reveals that the cost of achieving high attention levels is necessarily nontrivial (i.e., the $K$ function is either convex or not too concave), otherwise it would be optimal to discretely jump to the highest possible attention levels in the middle of the month rather than gradually reaching those levels a few days before payday. Once again, this shows that the cost of reaching high attention levels continuously for 10 days is larger than the benefit it would bring in terms of smoothing consumption over that same 10-day period. Conversely, it shows that the cost of achieving high levels of attention is small compared to the financial costs that are avoided.

![Figure 7: Estimates by “Narrow” Bins of Wages](image)

(A) Uncertainty Index ($\sigma_m$)  
(B) Attention Index ($100.m$)

Notes: These figures complement Panels (E) and (F) in Figure 5 by providing estimates of the uncertainty ($\sigma_m$) and attention ($100.m$) parameters by sub-populations of workers earning, respectively, (in terms of their fiscal wage): less than €1,400, between €1,400 and €1,700, between €1,700 and €2,000, and more than €2,000. The precise methodology underlying these estimates is described in Appendix B.3. The confidence intervals are computed via the BHHH estimator in the case of $\sigma_m$, and by bootstrap (50 iterations) in the case of the attention index $m$. They are only reported for workers earning less than €1,400 only (see text). Sources: ERFS (2005-2015)/DADS (1995-2015).

In Figure 7, we propose a complementary exercise where we rely on the same methodology to compute estimates of our parameters of interest over narrow wage bins rather than narrow time periods. Once again,
the size of our estimation sample limits the statistical power of our estimation procedure and prevents us from going too far in this direction, but we are able to separately describe the behavior of workers earning, respectively: less than €1,400, between €1,400 and €1,700, between €1,700 and €2,000, and more than €2,000. The benefit of this exercise is that we are more accurately able to identify which population of workers is likely to be subject to financing constraints by checking whether they exhibit a cyclical pattern of attention. As Figure 5 showed that workers earning less than €1,500 were on average likely to face financing constraints, we unsurprisingly find that this is also the case for workers earning less than €1,400. Yet, there is still some uncertainty about whether the threshold of €1,500 is a good proxy of the upper limit beyond which workers no longer face financial constraints. In the more detailed estimates in Figure 7, we actually find that workers in the €1,400 to €1,700 bin still exhibit a light pattern of an end-of-month increase in attention which is suggestive of financing constraints, but not workers earning more than €1,700. We conclude that the relevant threshold which splits the population of workers into those who are (highly likely to be) financially constrained and those who are not is strictly above €1,400, and strictly below €1,700, such that €1,400 or €1,500 are reasonable orders of magnitude. According to the percentiles of the wage distribution reported in Table 2, this implies that 27% to 34% of our population of employed workers face financing constraints in the form described in Section 2, which is sizeable.

**Heterogeneity across different populations of workers.** Finally, Figures 8 and 9 investigate whether the monthly pattern of evolution of attention is associated with specific worker-level characteristics. To that end, we further split our sub-period estimation samples according to the dimensions introduced above in Section 5.2: gender, tenure and education.

Considering first the comparison between women and men, Panels (A) and (B) in Figures 8 and 9 show that the end-of-month decrease in uncertainty $\sigma_m$ and the corresponding increase in attention $m$ is mainly driven by male workers. Overall, this pattern is highly attenuated across women, who appear to continuously maintain levels of uncertainty that are lower than the minimum attained in the sample of male workers and, symmetrically, levels of attention that are higher than those of men. Through the lens of our model, this behavior may be driven by the fact that women face such high financing constraints that they need to maintain a high level of attention throughout the month. In other words, the cost for them of maintaining a high level of attention could be lower than the gain, in terms of their own (or household level...) consumption smoothing.

Panels (C) and (D) in Figures 8 and 9 compare workers with short and long tenure. Our estimations show that the cyclical pattern of attention is disproportionately driven by workers with shorter tenure and that, in addition, these workers continuously exhibit higher levels of attention than those with longer tenure. Again, these results are consistent with the empirical predictions in Section 2. They can be rationalized by the fact that workers with shorter tenure are likely to have accumulated a lower buffer of wealth. Furthermore,
Figure 8: Evolution of the Variance Parameter $\sigma_m$ During the Month Across Different Sub-Populations of Workers

(A) Female

(B) Male

(C) Short Tenure

(D) Long Tenure

(E) High Education

(F) Low Education

Notes: These figures complement Panel (E) in Figure 5 by providing estimates of the uncertainty parameter ($\sigma_m$) obtained across the month for different sub-populations of workers: women in Panel (A), men in Panel (B), workers with shorter or longer than median tenure in Panels (C) and (D) respectively, more educated workers in Panel (E) and less educated workers in Panel (F). Sources: ERFS (2005-2015). All standard errors are computed via the BHHH methodology.
Figure 9: Evolution of the Attention Parameter 100.m During the Month Across Different Sub-Populations of Workers

(A) Female

(B) Male

(C) Short Tenure

(D) Long Tenure

(E) High Education

(F) Low Education

Notes: These figures complement Panel (F) in Figure 5 by providing the estimates of attention (100.m) obtained across the month for different sub-populations of workers: women in Panel (A), men in Panel (B), workers with shorter or longer than median tenure in Panels (C) and (D) respectively, more educated workers in Panel (E) and less educated workers in Panel (F). Sources: ERFS (2005-2015)/DADS (1995-2015). All standard deviations are computed by bootstrap (50 replications).
in France, they are more at risk as, in the case of an economic downturn, labor laws stipulate a type of seniority-based rules regarding dismissals (i.e. last in, first out). This feature of the French labor market is likely to create higher financing constraints, thus rationalizing both the higher overall level of attention and the additional increase in the days preceding payday among shorter-tenure workers.

Lastly, Panels (E) and (F) in Figures 8 and 9 contrast the results for workers with different education levels. Interestingly, we find that the pattern of an end-of-month increase in attention is somewhat more pronounced for low-wage workers with lower education levels than for low-wage workers with higher education levels, but not by much: the increase is 16.3 ppt (27% of the base level) for the former and 13.1 ppt (17% of the base level) for the second. This suggests that neither education nor financial literacy seem to play a large role in shaping the monthly patterns of attention.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we take advantage of a unique dataset (ERFS) which combines the values of wages that are self-reported by workers in the French Labor Force Survey together with corresponding fiscal items. This is a unique setting where both the reported answer and an accurate proxy of the correct response are known at the worker level and with a short panel dimension. This information allows us to provide a detailed description of workers’ reporting behavior, which we interpret as a cognition test which provides rich insights about the prevalence of “real-life” (behavioral) biases and most importantly, about workers’ attention to their own wage and budget constraints. We propose a structural mixture model which allows for heterogeneity at the worker level and which addresses the issues raised by perception or reporting biases and rounding. We estimate the model using standard ML/EM techniques, which enables us to quantify attention at the worker level.

We find that over our period of study (2005 to 2015) workers tended to perceive their own wages with a degree of uncertainty of around 10%. Through the lens of a simple rational signal extraction model, this amounts to estimates of workers’ attention ranging between 30% and 84% depending on their wage level, education, tenure or gender. Secondly, we use a feature of the sampling scheme of the French Labor Force Surveys which makes the date of interview, and critically, its distance to payday, orthogonal to workers’ characteristics and prevents any selection issues. This enables us to show that low-wage workers who are most likely to experience a difficult “end of month”, actually exhibit suggestive patterns of cyclicality. Their attention is minimal in the middle of the month and increases steadily until payday, suggesting that their budget constraints become increasingly tight over this final period of the month and require more monitoring. Equally interestingly, attention drops immediately once payday is reached. This feature of the cyclical evolution of attention is not compatible with a pure informational story, whereby workers are measured as being more “attentive” simply because they are more informed. Conversely, this feature is well rationalized
by a mechanism of credit constraints with costly budget constraint monitoring.

As a last comparison, attention exhibits no cyclical pattern across high-wage workers and is, on average, lower - at approximately the minimum monthly level of attention reached by low-wage workers. This suggests that in everyday life, i.e. except when they have to take discretionary investment decisions, better-off workers do not need to remember a precise record of their wage, because their budget constraints are not tight. Overall, these results are indicative of the fact that less well-off workers have a greater mental burden (Mani et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2018; Schilbach et al., 2016). According to our estimates, the bottom 30% of French workers in the wage distribution are subject to these cycles and can be considered as financially (liquidity) constrained.

Overall, our contribution shows through real-world data that the fluctuation of mental burden is pervasive and easily detectable across less well-off workers. Our methodology could be adapted and implemented in other settings where correct information can be compared with data that are self-reported by agents, thus providing measures of their attention to different aspects of their economic environment (prices, characteristics of goods, etc.). One of our other results requires further scrutiny using richer data. We show that worker-level biases are stable across time (Stango and Zinman, 2020) and therefore generally unrelated to their level of attention. This result, if confirmed, is interesting, as it suggests that nudges which increase attention are not likely to have an impact on behavioral biases. The implications are potentially important for strategies for fighting fake news, “echo chambers” in social media or political polarization.
References


Appendix

A Proof and Derivations of Section 2

To simplify the derivations, let us rewrite Equations 11 and 13 in terms of $\tilde{C}$, $\sigma_m = \sigma.(1 - m)^{1/2}$ and $\tau$ rather than $\bar{C}$, $m$ and $\tau$. We get:

\[
\begin{align*}
  u' \left( \tilde{C} + \frac{\tau(\tilde{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau} \right) &= R_A + R_B. \Phi \left( \frac{\ln \tilde{C} - \omega'}{\sigma_m} \right) \\
  K'(\sigma_m).h'(1 - \tau) &= u \left( \tilde{C} + \frac{\tau(\tilde{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau} \right) - u(\bar{C}) - \tilde{C} - \bar{C} - u'. \tilde{C} + \frac{\tau(\tilde{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau}
\end{align*}
\]  

where $K$ is defined as $K(\sigma_m) = K \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\omega'}{\sigma_m} \right)^2 \right)$. Therefore $K'(\sigma_m) = -2 \frac{\omega'}{\sigma_m^3}. K' \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\omega'}{\sigma_m} \right)^2 \right) < 0$ and $K''(\sigma_m) = 2 \left( \frac{\omega'}{\sigma_m} \right)^2.K''(m) - K'(m)$.

Differentiating the two equations, we get:

\[
\begin{align*}
  d\tilde{C} &= -\frac{\bar{C} - \tilde{C}}{1 - \tau} u'' \left( \frac{\tilde{C} + \tau(\tilde{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau} \right) \sigma_m d\tau - \frac{\ln \tilde{C} - \omega'}{\sigma_m} \frac{R_B. \phi}{R_A} \frac{\ln \bar{C} - \omega'}{\sigma_m} \sigma_m d\sigma_m \\
  d\bar{C} &= -\frac{1}{1 - \tau} d\tau + \frac{h''(1 - \tau).K(\sigma_m)}{(\tilde{C} - \bar{C}) (1 - \tau)^2} u'' \left( \frac{\tilde{C} + \tau(\tilde{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau} \right) \sigma_m d\tau - \frac{h'(1 - \tau).K'(\sigma_m)}{(\tilde{C} - \bar{C}) (1 - \tau)^2} u'' \left( \frac{\tilde{C} + \tau(\tilde{C} - \bar{C})}{1 - \tau} \right) \sigma_m d\sigma_m
\end{align*}
\]

We focus now on workers who are marginally financially constrained (as our data are restricted to workers who are continuously employed and earning more than €1,000), such that the magnitude of their adjustment in consumption is limited: $\tilde{C} \approx \bar{C}$. For such workers, the terms denoted by a star are large relative to the others, which implies:

\[
\begin{align*}
  \frac{d\sigma_m}{d\tau} &\approx \frac{h''(1 - \tau).K(\sigma_m)}{h'(1 - \tau).K'(\sigma_m)} \iff \frac{dm}{d\tau} \approx \frac{h''(1 - \tau).K(m)}{h'(1 - \tau).K'(m)}
\end{align*}
\]

which is in line with the results reported in the main text.

To simplify the derivations, let us rewrite Equations 11 and 12 in terms of $x = \frac{\ln \tilde{C} - \omega'}{\sigma_m}, \sigma_m = \sigma.(1 - m)^{1/2}$ and $\tau$ rather than $\tilde{C}, m$ and $\tau$. We get:

\[
\begin{align*}
  u' \left( e^{w' . \tilde{C}/\sigma_m} \frac{\sigma_m.x}{1 - \tau} \right) &= R_A + R_B. \Phi \left( x \right) \\
  K'(\sigma_m).h(1 - \tau) &= e^{w' . \omega'/\sigma_m} \cdot (\sigma_m.R_A + \sigma_m.R_B. \Phi(x - \sigma_m) - R_B. \phi(x - \sigma_m))
\end{align*}
\]

\[53^3\text{In the derivations, we make intensive use of the following result: } \frac{w' . \omega'/\sigma_m}{\sigma_m} = \frac{\phi \left( \frac{\ln \tilde{C} - \omega'}{\sigma_m} \right)}{\phi \left( \frac{\ln \bar{C} - w'/\sigma_m}{\sigma_m} \right)}.
\]
Differentiating the two equations, we get:

\[
\frac{dx}{d\tau} = \frac{\bar{C} - \bar{C}_1}{(1 - \tau)R_B.\phi(x) - \sigma_m.\bar{C}.u''(\cdot)} \frac{d\tau}{(1 - \tau)R_B.\phi(x) - \sigma_m.\bar{C}.u''(\cdot)} + \frac{\bar{C}.x.u''(\cdot)}{(1 - \tau)R_B.\phi(x) - \sigma_m.\bar{C}.u''(\cdot)} \frac{d\sigma_m}{(1 - \tau)R_B.\phi(x) - \sigma_m.\bar{C}.u''(\cdot)}
\]

(30)

\[
\frac{dx}{d\tau} = -\frac{K'(\sigma_m).h'(1 - \tau)}{\bar{C}.x.\phi(x).R_B} \frac{d\tau}{\bar{C}.x.\phi(x).R_B} + \frac{(K''(\sigma_m) - \sigma_m.K'(\sigma_m))h(1 - \tau)}{\bar{C}.x.\phi(x).R_B} \frac{d\sigma_m}{\bar{C}.x.\phi(x).R_B}
\]

(31)

For \( \bar{C} \approx \bar{C} \), the term denoted by a star is small relative to the others. This implies:

\[
\frac{d\sigma_m}{d\tau} \approx \frac{B}{D - A + \frac{(K''(\sigma_m) - \sigma_m.K'(\sigma_m))h(1 - \tau)}{\bar{C}.x.\phi(x).R_B}}
\]

(32)

Whenever \( x < 0 \), i.e. whenever consumption is sustainable (i.e. below guessed wage: see footnote 11 for this to hold in expectation), term \( A \) is positive (as \( u'' < 0 \)), term \( B \) is positive (as \( K' < 0 \), term \( D \) is negative and term \( E \) is positive.\(^{54}\) The data show that \( \frac{d\sigma_m}{d\tau} \leq 0 \). This implies that \( K''(\sigma_m) \geq 0 \) or that it is negative but \( (K''(\sigma_m) - \sigma_m.K'(\sigma_m)) \) remains sufficiently large (above \( E.(A - D) \)). Given the relations between \( K \) and \( K' \) indicated above, the same qualitative statements hold true for \( K \).

\(^{54}\)Given the complexity of Equations 30 and 31, no general result holds without imposing much stronger restrictions on \( u, K \) and \( h \). However, whenever these functions are continuously differentiable, the empirical counterparts of terms \( x, A, B, D \) and \( E \) converge in large samples to quantities that are signed as indicated in the text, as well as their combination in Equation 32.
B Details of the Estimation Strategy

This Appendix provides full details of the estimation strategy set out in Section 4.3. Maximizing Equation 20 is performed using an EM algorithm. Within each iteration, we approximate the conditional probabilities using Gaussian quadrature.

B.1 Gaussian Quadrature (Section 4.3)

We begin with the estimation method for the conditional probabilities \( P(\Omega_i|N_i, X_i, \theta) \). A standard way to proceed is to introduce a conditioning on the random effect \( a_i \):

\[
P(\Omega_i|N_i = n, X_i, \theta) = \begin{cases} 
\int_a \prod_{t=1}^{2} \left\{ \Phi \left( \frac{\ln(e^{w_n^t} + \frac{a_n^t}{\sigma_n^2} - w_n^t - a_n^t)}{\sqrt{2}} \right) - \Phi \left( \frac{\ln(e^{w_n^t} - \frac{a_n^t}{\sigma_n^2} - w_n^t - a_n^t)}{\sqrt{2}} \right) \right\} \varphi(a) \, da & \text{if both } e^{w_n^1} \text{ and } e^{w_n^2} \text{ are multiples of } N_i = n \text{ (i.e. } n|e^{w_n^1}, 2) \\
0 & \text{if not.}
\end{cases}
\]

(33)

Taking advantage of the fact that \( a \) is assumed to be drawn from a Gaussian distribution, these conditional probabilities can be approximated by Gauss-Hermite quadrature methods. Formally, for \( K \) quadrature points, we get:

\[
P(\Omega_i|N_i = n, X_i, \theta^n) \approx \sum_{k=1}^{K} \psi_k \prod_{t=1}^{2} \left\{ \Phi \left( \frac{\ln(e^{w_n^t} + \frac{a_n^t}{\sigma_n^2} - w_n^t - a_n^t)}{\sqrt{2}} \right) - \Phi \left( \frac{\ln(e^{w_n^t} - \frac{a_n^t}{\sigma_n^2} - w_n^t - a_n^t)}{\sqrt{2}} \right) \right\}
\]

(34)

where the \( z_k \)'s are the roots of the Hermite polynomial of order \( K \) and the \( \psi_k \) are the associated weights.

These quantities can be maximized separately in each class of rounding \( N \) and then plugged into Equation 20. Our different sets of parameters of interest are estimated using an EM algorithm to achieve convergence.

B.2 Implementation of the EM Algorithm (Section 4.3)

The full log-likelihood of our model is obtained by summing Equation 20 over all sample observations:

\[
l(\Omega, N|X, (\theta^n), (\pi_n)) = \sum_i \ln \left( \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} \pi_n P(\Omega_i|N_i = n, X_i, \theta^n) \right)
\]

(35)

Maximizing this formula is not straightforward. The main difficulty arises from the summation across classes of rounding within the log function in Equation 35, which makes optimization numerically difficult. A robust way to address this problem is to implement an EM algorithm.\(^{55}\) The principle of this algorithm is intuitive. Considering any set of distributions \( Q_i \) that are potentially worker specific and defined over \( \mathcal{N} \), we

\(^{55}\)Our main references here are Train (2003) and lecture notes by Andrew Ng which are available online from his website.
The principle of the EM algorithm is to construct a convenient $Q_i$ allowing to approximate the log-likelihood $l(\Omega, N|X, \theta, (\pi_n))$ closely and to maximize the right-hand side of Equation 38. In particular, for:

$$Q_i(N_i = n) = \frac{\pi_n P(\Omega_i|N_i = n, X_i, \theta^n)}{\sum_k \pi_k P(\Omega_i|N_i = k, X_i, \theta^n)} = Q(N_i = n|\Omega_i, X_i, \theta, (\pi_n))$$  \hspace{1cm} (39)

we get that the ratio $\frac{\pi_n P(\Omega_i|N_i = n, X_i, \theta^n)}{Q_i(N_i)}$ on the right-hand side of Equation 38 is constant, such that Equation 38 holds with equality. For such choice of $Q_i$ and true values of parameters, maximizing the right-hand side of Equation 38 is therefore equivalent to maximizing the log-likelihood $l(\Omega, N|X, \theta, (\pi_n))$.\footnote{Another important property of $Q_i$ as defined in Equation 39 is that it coincides with the posterior probability that worker $i$ rounds at level $n$, conditionally on all observables $(X_i, \Omega_i)$:}

$$Q_i(N_i = n) = \frac{\pi_n P(\Omega_i|N_i = n, X_i, \theta)}{\sum_k \pi_k P(\Omega_i|N_i = k, X_i, \theta)} = \frac{P(\Omega_i, N_i = n|X_i, \theta)}{\sum_k P(\Omega_i, N_i = k|X_i, \Omega_i, \theta, (\pi_n))} \quad \text{arg max}_{(\theta^n), (\pi_n)} E ((\theta^n), (\pi_n))$$

Equation 41 shows that the maximization problem described in Equation 42 can be split into two independent sub-problems:\footnote{Note that the third term in Equation 41 is simply a constant.}

1. The first sub-problem, embodied in the first term of Equation 41, involves $(\pi_n)$ only and is easily solved.
as: \( \pi_{n+1} = \sum_i Q_i(X_i, (\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n)) \), where \( I \) is the number of workers in the estimation sample.

2. The second sub-problem is embodied in the second term of Equation 41 and involves \( \theta \) only. As the problem is also additively separable, it is easily solved class of rounding by class of rounding using the methodology described in Section B.1.

Finally, the algorithm is initiated for all classes of rounding at the following starting values: \( \mu_0 = 0, \sigma_0 = 0.1, \varphi_0 = 0.1 \) and \( \pi_n = \frac{1}{\text{card}(N)} \) for all \( n \in \mathcal{N} \). Once convergence is reached, all standard errors are computed using the Berndt–Hall–Hall–Hausman (BHHH) estimator (Berndt et al., 1974). To that end, we take advantage of the fact that the score is easily evaluated in our setting as (Train, 2003):

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\ell(\Omega, N| X, (\theta^n), (\pi_n))}{d\theta} \bigg|_{(\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n)} & = \frac{d\varepsilon ((\theta^n), (\pi_n) | (\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n))}{d\theta} \\
\frac{d\ell(\Omega, N| X, (\theta^n), (\pi_n))}{d\pi_n} \bigg|_{(\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n)} & = \frac{d\varepsilon ((\theta^n), (\pi_n) | (\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n))}{d\pi_n}
\end{align*}
\]

**Derivation of the score.** In order to improve the accuracy of our estimates (and most importantly the estimated standard errors associated with the estimators of the main parameters of interest), we inserted the analytical expression of the score into our algorithm. To simplify notation, let us define the following parameters:

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha_{nk}^n & \equiv \ln \left( e^{w_{n,t}^f + \frac{n}{2}} - \sqrt{\sigma_n^m \zeta_k} - \mu_n^m \right) \\
\beta_{nk}^n & \equiv \ln \left( e^{w_{n,t}^f - \frac{n}{2}} - \sqrt{\sigma_n^m \zeta_k} - \mu_n^m \right)
\end{align*}
\]

This allows us to re-write Equation 34 in a more compact form as:

\[
P(\Omega_i | N_i = n, X_i, \theta^n) \approx \begin{cases} \\
\frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k \prod_{t=1,2} \left( \Phi(\alpha_{nk}^n) - \Phi(\beta_{nk}^n) \right) & \text{if } n | e^{w_{1,2}} \\
0 & \text{if not.}
\end{cases}
\]

For each class of rounding \( n \),\(^58\) the vector of scores (at the worker level) can be computed from the derivatives of the second term of Equation 41 with respect to \( \mu_n^m, \sigma_n^m \) and \( \sigma_m^m \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\ell}{d\mu_n^m} \bigg|_{(\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n)} & = -Q_i(N_i) \sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k \left( \frac{\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2})}{\sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k (\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2}))} + \frac{\phi(\tau_{ik2}) - \phi(\tau_{ik3})}{\sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k (\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2}))} \right) \\
\frac{d\ell}{d\sigma_n^m} \bigg|_{(\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n)} & = -Q_i(N_i) \sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k \left( \frac{\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2})}{\sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k (\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2}))} + \frac{\phi(\tau_{ik2}) - \phi(\tau_{ik3})}{\sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k (\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2}))} \right) \\
\frac{d\ell}{d\sigma_m^m} \bigg|_{(\theta^{n,i}), (\tau^i_n)} & = -Q_i(N_i) \sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k \left( \frac{\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2})}{\sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k (\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2}))} + \frac{\phi(\tau_{ik2}) - \phi(\tau_{ik3})}{\sum_{k=1}^K \psi_k (\phi(\tau_{ik1}) - \phi(\tau_{ik2}))} \right)
\end{align*}
\]

\(^58\)Recall that we estimate one set of parameters \( (\mu_n, \sigma_n, \sigma_m) \) by class of rounding, although this is not reflected in the notations in order to ease readability.
Lastly, the gradient with respect to the $\pi_n$'s can be computed from the first term of Equation 41 as:

$$\frac{d\ell(\Omega, N|X, (\theta^*), (\pi_n))}{d\pi_n} \bigg|_{q = r_j}(\pi_n) = \frac{Q_i(N_i)}{\pi_n}$$

**Inference for the parameter of attention, $m$.** As described in Section 4.5, the index of attention $m$ is estimated by a combination of two structural parameters, $\sigma_m$ and $\sigma$, which are estimated using two different datasets. The standard errors of our estimators of $\sigma$ and $m$ are both evaluated by bootstrap (50 replications).\(^59\)

**B.3 Daily Estimates of Attention; Estimates by Narrow Bins of Wages (Section 4.5)**

This Appendix describes the method which enables us to retrieve the daily estimates of our various structural parameters presented in Section 5.3. These estimates are based on a series of estimations of our baseline empirical model on a sequence of samples defined by date of interview. As mentioned in Section 4.4, workers are almost never interviewed on the same day (within a month) in their first and second LFS interviews, such that it is not possible to strictly divide our sample according to day of interview. To overcome this difficulty, we widen the window and isolate samples of workers interviewed within 10-day time window, both in their first and second LFS interviews. However, this does not correspond to a partition in the mathematical sense, as workers whose interview days are more than 10 days apart are excluded, while workers who are interviewed less than 10 days apart are inserted into up to 10 different such samples.

This structure is complex to handle, particularly because of the limited number of observations in our dataset compared to the large number of parameters that a full mixture model would require to estimate. In Section 5.3, we rely on the following approximation: we first compute a counterfactual daily partition which would have the same 10-day rolling window observation counts as the observed data. These approximate counts of daily observations $(n_d)_d$ and the actual observed sample size series $(n_{d/10})_d$ thus verify the following relationships:

$$\begin{pmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ldots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
1 \\
2 \\
3 \\
\vdots \\
30 \\
31
\end{pmatrix}
= 
\begin{pmatrix}
1/10 \\
2/11 \\
3/12 \\
\vdots \\
30/8 \\
31/9
\end{pmatrix}

(45)

^59 Note that the bootstrapped standard errors which we obtain for all other parameters are reassuringly numerically close (up to the third digit) to the baseline BHHH estimates that are reported in the main text. These robustness checks are available upon request.
As the matrix on the left is full rank, we can recover the \((n_d)_d\) via a simple matrix inversion. The difficulty for us is that matrix inversion ends up in low and even negative counterfactual observation counts. When this arises, we simply consider that the daily estimates of our structural parameters of interest are not identified in the data and remove these days from the subsequent computations.

The principle of the remainder of our estimation strategy is to implement a two-step minimum distance estimator (Chamberlain, 1987 or asymptotic least squares in the terminology of Gourieroux et al., 1985 and Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995) which allows us to retrieve our daily estimates of interest from our baseline sequence of 10-day rolling window estimations. Interpreting our sequence of samples of 10-day rolling windows as approximate “mixtures” of different sets of daily estimates, we get the following relationships between our “pooled” estimates and the daily contributions which we aim to recover:

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{\pi}_{1,d/d+9} &= \sum_{\tau=d}^{d+9} s_{\tau}^{d/d+9} \cdot \pi_{1,\tau} \\
\hat{\sigma}^2_{m,d/d+9} &= \sum_{\tau=d}^{d+9} s_{\tau}^{d/d+9} \cdot \sigma^2_{m,\tau} \\
\hat{m}^2_{d/d+9} &= \sum_{\tau=d}^{d+9} s_{\tau}^{d/d+9} \cdot m^2_{\tau} \\
\hat{\mu}_{a,d/d+9} &= \sum_{\tau=d}^{d+9} s_{\tau}^{d/d+9} \cdot \mu_{a,\tau} \\
\hat{\sigma}^2_{a,d/d+9} + \hat{\mu}_{a,d/d+9} &= \sum_{\tau=d}^{d+9} s_{\tau}^{d/d+9} \cdot \left( \sigma^2_{a,\tau} + \mu_{a,\tau}^2 \right),
\end{align*}
\]

where \(s_{\tau}^{d/d+9}\) denotes the share (in terms of observation counts) accounted for day \(\tau\) in the sample pooling days \(d\) to \(d + 9\).

Equations 46 to 49 can be treated independently to retrieve the daily contributions \(\pi_{1,\tau}, \sigma_{m,\tau}, m_{\tau}\) and \(\mu_{a,\tau}\), respectively. Introducing more compact matrix notations, we get:

\[
M \begin{pmatrix} \vdots \\ \pi_{1,\tau} \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \vdots \\ \hat{\pi}_{1,d/d+9} \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix} \iff \begin{pmatrix} \vdots \\ \pi_{1,\tau} \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix} = (M' M)^{-1} M' \begin{pmatrix} \vdots \\ \hat{\pi}_{1,d/d+9} \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix},
\]

and similarly for \(\sigma^2_{m,\tau}\) and \(\mu_{a,\tau}\). In Equation 51, \(M\) is simply the following (full rank) matrix:

---

60 As explained above, our rolling window strategy does not explicitly take account of the mixture model nature of our problem, as this problem would remain too complex (i.e. high-dimensional) in comparison with the number of our sample observations. As a consequence, Equations 46 to 50 only hold approximately, and \(\hat{\pi}_{1,d/d+9}, \hat{\sigma}^2_{a,d/d+9}, \hat{\sigma}^2_{m,d/d+9}\) and \(\hat{\mu}_{a,d/d+9}\) are likely to be biased estimators of the true parameters in the pooled sample. This prevents us from applying the standard estimates of the variance matrix that would have been available if our estimates had been unbiased (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995). As explained below, we instead evaluate this matrix by bootstrap.
Note that this matrix $M$ is no longer square (nor full rank!) once the unidentified daily parameters have been filtered out (see above). However, $M'M$ remains full rank.

The estimation of the $\sigma^2_{a,\tau}$ parameters is slightly less direct but remains simple. Once the $\mu_{a,\tau}$ have been computed from Equation 49, they can be plugged into Equation 50 to retrieve the $\sigma^2_{a,\tau}$ parameters in the same way as previously.

The variance of the resulting daily estimates are all evaluated by bootstrap.

Lastly, this methodology can be straightforwardly adapted to alternative partitions of our estimation sample. Specifically, we estimate sets of estimators $(\hat{\pi}^{(b)}_{1,d/d+9}, \hat{\sigma}^{(b)}_{m,d/d+9}, \hat{\mu}^{(b)}_{a,d/d+9}, \hat{\sigma}^{(b)}_{a,d/d+9})$ over sequential 10-day windows in populations of workers $b$ earning respectively: less than €1,400, strictly more than €1,400, less than €1,700, strictly more than €1,700, less than €2,000 and strictly more than €2,000. We simply adapt the matrices in Equations 45 and 51 in order to retrieve estimates of our parameters of interest for workers earning: less than €1,400, between €1,400 and €1,700, between €1,700 and €2,000, and strictly more than €2,000.
C Additional Descriptive Statistics

This Appendix complements the descriptive statistics in Section 3.3:

- Table 7 documents the representativity of our estimation sample year by year. It shows that the numbers in Table 2 that are computed on the pooled sample also hold in each cross-section.

- Table 8 describes the separate impact of each filter that is required to harmonize the two concepts of wage in the LFS and in the fiscal files. These filters are described and motivated in Section 3.2 and induce a selection of the most stable workers. Our sample workers are, on average, somewhat older than the population of continuously employed workers, more educated and have longer tenure. This is mainly driven by the selection on tenure (longer than 15 months). Importantly, the ratio of female to male workers is also significantly lower in the population of workers which we focus on than in the general population of employed workers, mostly because of our selection of full-time workers. Lastly, item non-response (i.e. missing information about self-reported wages) induces a large drop in the number of sample observations.

- Finally, Table 9 shows that the composition of our sample is stable across samples with different dates of interviews. This orthogonality between survey dates and worker-level characteristics simplifies our analysis of the monthly evolutions of $\sigma_m$ and attention, as discussed in Section 1.

### Table 7: Sample Representativeness Across Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Labor market aged 15 to 64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Un-weighted</td>
<td>Weighted (mil. workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nb workers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>2.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>2.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>1,791</td>
<td>2.666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>1,816</td>
<td>2.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td>2.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>2.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>2.583</td>
<td>2.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/2015</td>
<td>2.250</td>
<td>2.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/2016</td>
<td>2.283</td>
<td>2.555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Analysis of The Selection Criteria in the Pooled Estimation Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age:</th>
<th>Full time</th>
<th>Tenure ≥ 15 m.</th>
<th>Single employer</th>
<th>Non-missing wages</th>
<th>Non-missing net wages</th>
<th>Wage range (1-4 k€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Gender: Female    | 0.266     | 0.307          | 0.310           | 0.300             | 0.321                 | 0.278               |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No diploma (low)</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than high school (low)</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school degree (high)</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than high school (high)</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers/professionals</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate occupations</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-skilled white-collars</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collars</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure: Average (months)</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>164</th>
<th>146</th>
<th>153</th>
<th>152</th>
<th>158</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std dev.</td>
<td>(124)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(124)</td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(124)</td>
<td>(122)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations:</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>60,507</th>
<th>59,679</th>
<th>66,672</th>
<th>37,674</th>
<th>37,962</th>
<th>50,643</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(weighted) Per annual wave</td>
<td>6.723</td>
<td>6.631</td>
<td>7.408</td>
<td>4.186</td>
<td>4.218</td>
<td>5.627</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 9: Description of (Some of the) Sub-samples with Restricted Interviewing Days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age:</th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>Days 1 to 10</th>
<th>Days 5 to 14</th>
<th>Days 10 to 19</th>
<th>Days 15 to 24</th>
<th>Days 20 to 29</th>
<th>Days 25 to 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Gender: Female    | 0.239       | 0.229        | 0.243        | 0.224         | 0.242         | 0.239         | 0.223        |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No diploma (low)</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than high school (low)</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school degree (high)</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than high school (high)</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers/professionals</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate occupations</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-skilled white-collars</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collars</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure: Average (months)</th>
<th>179</th>
<th>179</th>
<th>180</th>
<th>183</th>
<th>178</th>
<th>179</th>
<th>181</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std dev.</td>
<td>(122)</td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(122)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>(124)</td>
<td>(121)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations:</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>19,045</th>
<th>3,193</th>
<th>3,193</th>
<th>3,194</th>
<th>3,142</th>
<th>2,329</th>
<th>2,076</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

D Robustness Checks: More Flexible Specifications

In a first series of complementary regressions, we check the robustness of our results in Section 5.1 to more flexible specifications. In particular, it is possible to allow for an even greater amount of heterogeneity in the parameters, although at the cost of a loss of statistical power. Table 10 allows the time-varying uncertainty parameter $\sigma_m$ to be different at the two dates workers are interviewed for the LFS. This leads to Equation 17 being split into two parts:

\begin{align}
\nu_{i1} &\sim N(0, \sigma_{m1}^2) \\
\nu_{i2} &\sim N(0, \sigma_{m2}^2)
\end{align}

(16a) (16b)

This augmented specification therefore allows for potential learning effects between the first and second interrogations.

The results show that the estimates of $\sigma_m$ obtained in the two different waves are close, though statistically different. If anything, this index of uncertainty is higher in the second interrogation than in the first one, especially for the most populated classes of rounding: non-rounders and rounders at €50, €100 or €1,000. The difference is limited in magnitude and attains 0.6 percentage points, or 5% of the baseline estimated standard deviation $\sigma_m$. In contrast, the difference is not statistically significant in the classes of rounders at €10 and €500. This finding goes against the assumption that there could be learning effects during the interrogation process of the LFS, as this would lead to the opposite result, i.e. to a lower volatility premium at the second interrogation. We also note that all other parameters are left broadly unchanged in this alternative specification.

Table 10: Allowing for Heterogeneous $\sigma_m$ Across Waves of the LFS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>€1</th>
<th>€10</th>
<th>€50</th>
<th>€100</th>
<th>€500</th>
<th>€1,000</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>78.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{m,1}$</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(1.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{m,2}$</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_a$</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_a$</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>19,045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln-Lik</td>
<td>-169.435</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the results obtained when constraining the rounding behavior to be stable across time, but allowing $\sigma_m$ to vary across waves of the LFS to allow for potential learning effects.

Table 11 proposes an even more drastic exercise, in which all parameters are allowed to vary by wave of
Table 11: Estimations in the Cross-Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>€1</th>
<th>€10</th>
<th>€50</th>
<th>€100</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First LFS Interrogation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>π</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>46.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σₘ + σₐ</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>µₐ</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>19,045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln-Lik</td>
<td>-95,092</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Second LFS Interrogation |       |       |       |       |         |
| π       | 0.305 | 0.120 | 0.250 | 0.325 | 46.484  |
|         | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.500) |
| σₘ + σₐ | 0.206 | 0.156 | 0.157 | 0.239 | 0.198  |
|         | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| µₐ      | 0.028 | 0.011 | (0.001) | -0.010 | 0.007  |
|         | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Obs.    | 19,045 |       |       |       |         |
| Ln-Lik  | -96,124 |       |       |       |         |

Notes: This table reports the results obtained when removing the panel dimension of our dataset. The LFS. In particular, we do not impose that workers consistently round at the same level, and we also allow worker-level biases µₐ to vary across interrogations. The specification becomes fully cross-sectional and no longer relies on the panel dimension of the data. As a result, parameters σₐ and σₘ are no longer separately identified (such that we only report the sum of σₐ and σₘ). A second difficulty is that the number of parameters to be estimated increases, and we do not manage to reach convergence of our algorithm when we insert the least populated classes of rounding, €500 and €1,000. Table 11 therefore only contains the bottom four classes of rounding.

The main take-away of the estimates in Table 11 is that the profile of rounding captured by the probabilities π appears to be very stable across time. Likewise, the parameter measuring mean biases µₐ is also stable across time, with none of the estimated values being statistically different in the first and second interviews of the LFS. The only parameter which evolves slightly across time is the overall volatility parameter, which increases by 0.4 percentage points, i.e. 2% of the baseline estimated standard deviation, σₘ + σₐ. This difference is statistically significant and confirms the picture in Table 10 both qualitatively and quantitatively, but is limited in terms of economic magnitude. Given this result, in all analyses in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 (where we investigate the heterogeneity of our structural estimates across sub-samples of limited size) we neglect the potential evolution of the σₗ across interviews in order to limit the number of parameters to estimate and preserve more statistical power.61

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61When allowing for heterogeneity in σₗ in these sub-sample analyses, the difference between the two estimated parameters quickly becomes insignificant as sample size drops.