Banks as Patient Lenders: Evidence from a Tax Reform

Elena Carletti
Bocconi University

Filippo De Marco
Bocconi University

Vasso Ioannidou
Lancaster University

Enrico Sette
Banca d’Italia

“Investment in the new monetary and financial environment”
Banque de France - July 5, 2018

The views of this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of Banca d’Italia or of the Eurosystem.
Motivation

2007-08 financial crisis: a “modern” bank run (Gorton and Metrick, 2012; ...)
Banks with high reliance on short-term, uninsured funding reduced lending → negative real effects on firms’ investment (Iyer et al., 2014; Cingano et al., 2016)

→ composition of bank funding is important for bank credit allocation

Post-crisis regulation (Basel III, NSFR): stable funding to support long-term assets

Special role attributed to retail deposits, regarded as stable during crises episodes

Understanding how a greater reliance on retail deposits may influence banks’ lending policies, especially during crisis periods, is essential
Banks’ funding structure is endogenous to their lending policies.

Moreover, investors behind different funding sources are also typically different.

Difficult to distinguish between the intrinsic characteristics—embedded in the contract and the institutional framework—and investor differences (e.g., retail vs. institutional).
This paper

Banks’ funding structure is endogenous to their lending policies.

Moreover, investors behind different funding sources are also typically different.

Difficult to distinguish between the intrinsic characteristics—embedded in the contract and the institutional framework—and investor differences (e.g., retail vs. institutional).

• **THIS PAPER:** tax reform changed banks’ funding mix within the same class of investors (retail): deposits ↑ & bonds ↓

• What are the effects on bank credit allocation (maturity and risk)?
This paper

Deposits & bonds are **not perfect substitutes**, even when investors are the same.
This paper

Deposits & bonds are not perfect substitutes, even when investors are the same

- Deposits are demandable. Bonds are not: banks’ funding is secured till maturity. The threat of runs should discipline banks (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991)
This paper

Deposits & bonds are **not perfect substitutes**, even when investors are the same

- **Deposits are demandable. Bonds are not: banks’ funding is secured till maturity.** The threat of runs should discipline banks (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991)

- **Deposits enjoy stronger government guarantees than bonds.** If deposits are stable and “sleepy”, banks may instead act as “patient” investors holding illiquid, long-term loans (Hanson, Shleifer, Stein and Vishny, 2015)
Deposits & bonds are **not perfect substitutes**, even when investors are the same

- **Deposits are demandable. Bonds are not: banks’ funding is secured till maturity.** The threat of runs should discipline banks (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991)

- **Deposits enjoy stronger government guarantees than bonds.** If deposits are stable and “sleepy”, banks may instead act as “patient” investors holding illiquid, long-term loans (Hanson, Shleifer, Stein and Vishny, 2015)

→ credit availability ↓ ↑ loans to riskier firms ↓ ↑ loan maturities ↓ ↑

*Ex ante unclear* how a shift from bond to deposits may impact banks’ lending policies
Results

Our findings are consistent with both CK (1991) and HSSV (2015)

We find that banks more exposed to the reform (i.e., higher increases in deposits):

- **did not increase overall credit supply**
- **became more prudent** (i.e., less credit to riskier firms)
  - In particularly if they experienced large increases in share of large, uninsured deposits
- **lent more in long-term loans**
  - but only if they increase more stable deposits
Results

Our findings are consistent with both CK (1991) and HSSV (2015)

We find that banks more exposed to the reform (i.e., higher increases in deposits):
• did not increase overall credit supply
• became more prudent (i.e., less credit to riskier firms)
  • In particularly if they experienced large increases in share of large, uninsured deposits
• lent more in long-term loans
  • but only if they increase more stable deposits

Overall, the deposit contract disciplines banks as long as the threat of withdrawals is credible
Their ability to act as “patient lenders” emanates instead from the lack of this threat
Contribution to recent empirical literature

  • Our paper: threat of runs and its effects on bank asset side
Contribution to recent empirical literature

  • **Our paper**: threat of runs and its effects on bank asset side

• **Deposit funding and other liquidity shocks**: Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan (2016); Bustos, Garber and Ponticelli (2017); Khawja and Mian (2008); Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian (2011); Schnabl (2012)
  • **Our paper**: shock to the composition of retail funding
Contribution to recent empirical literature

  - **Our paper**: threat of runs and its effects on bank asset side

- **Deposit funding and other liquidity shocks**: Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan (2016); Bustos, Garber and Ponticelli (2017); Khawja and Mian (2008); Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian (2011); Schnabl (2012)
  - **Our paper**: shock to the *composition of retail funding*

- **Deposits and monetary policy**: Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl (2017, 2018); Hoffmann, Langfield, Pierobon and Vuillemey (2018), Heider, Saidi and Schepens, (2017)
  - **Our paper**: small retail deposits have long *effective* duration and fund long-term loans
**Contribution to recent empirical literature**

  - **Our paper**: threat of runs and its effects on bank asset side

- **Deposit funding and other liquidity shocks**: Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan (2016); Bustos, Garber and Ponticelli (2017); Khawja and Mian (2008); Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian (2011); Schnabl (2012)
  - **Our paper**: shock to the *composition of retail funding*

- **Deposits and monetary policy**: Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl (2017, 2018); Hoffmann, Langfield, Pierobon and Vuilleumey (2018), Heider, Saidi and Schepens, (2017)
  - **Our paper**: small retail deposits have long *effective* duration and fund long-term loans

- **Tax shocks on bank lending**: Schepens (2016), Célérier, Kick and Ongena (2017)
  - **Our paper**: small changes in taxation can have large effects on bank funding
The 2011 tax reform

Announced: August 2011; Approved: September 2011; In effect: 1 January 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax rate on returns on financial assets held by households</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector securities</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign bonds</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reform makes deposits (bank bonds) more (less) attractive for households [Figure 1]

Italian banks retail funding 55% of assets on average:

- Deposits 32%, bonds 23% [Descriptive stats].
- Retail bank bonds are unusual, and legacy of a prior 1996 tax reform [Figure 2]
The 2011 tax reform: Term deposits increase
The 2011 tax reform: Term deposits increase

• This is not observed in other European countries under similar stress
Household Term Deposits in Europe
Data

The analysis combines three detailed micro-level datasets:

- **Deposits**: data on deposit volumes at the bank-province level
- **Bonds**: information on bank bonds held by households at the security-level from the Securities Holding Statistics (SHS) & Centralized Securities Database (CSDB)
- **Credit**: information bank-firm credit from the Italian Credit Register

All three datasets are held at the *Bank of Italy*
Identification: Deposits
Identification: Deposits

Diff-in-diff exploiting within bank-time variation in pre-existing geographical heterogeneity in bank presence and household portfolio holdings

Key identifying assumption: banks with branches in provinces where households held more bank bonds prior to the reform experienced larger supply shocks to their deposits

Important to control for alternative contemporaneous factors: crisis, ECB LTRO funding
Identification: Deposits

Diff-in-diff exploiting within bank-time variation in pre-existing geographical heterogeneity in bank presence and household portfolio holdings

Key identifying assumption: banks with branches in provinces where households held more bank bonds prior to the reform experienced larger supply shocks to their deposits

Important to control for alternative contemporaneous factors: crisis, ECB LTRO funding

\[ \Delta \log(\text{Dep})_{b,p,t} = \beta BB_{p,2009} \times Post_t + \alpha_p + \alpha_{b,t} + \epsilon_{b,p,t} \]

- \( BB_{p,2009} \) is the share of bank bonds held by households in province \( p \) as of 2009 [see map]
A visual inspection: Term Deposits
A visual inspection: Demand and Total Deposits
## Results: Deposits, bonds and total funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\Delta \log \text{Total Deposits}$</th>
<th>$\Delta \log \text{Demand Deposits}$</th>
<th>$\Delta \log \text{Term Deposits}$</th>
<th>$\Delta \log \text{Bonds}$</th>
<th>$\Delta \log (\text{Bonds+Term Dep})$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>$BB_{p,2009} \times \text{Post}_t$</strong></td>
<td>0.138**</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.253***</td>
<td>-0.204***</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(6.15)</td>
<td>(-4.39)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank - time</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>40103</td>
<td>38418</td>
<td>23236</td>
<td>16004</td>
<td>12193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of provinces (clusters)</strong></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of banks</strong></td>
<td>525</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
More on funding...

• Placebo on firm deposits: not affected by the reform, yields no effects

• Bond maturity: only bonds maturing in 2012 are reinvested in term deposits

• Bond seniority: no difference in tax treatment, no difference in effects

• Bank heterogeneity: Riskier banks (banks with lower capital and worse credit portfolios) were able to increase their deposits more
Identification: Credit

We now want to study the impact of the reform on banks’ credit allocation

Do this at bank-level: banks use branch network to reallocate liquidity (Gilje et al., 2016)

\[ Exp_{BBb} = \sum_p w_{b,p,2009} \times BB_{p,2009} \]

\[ w_{b,p,2009} = \frac{Dep_{b,p,2009}}{\sum_p Dep_{b,p,2009}} \]

No longer a comparison across provinces, but across banks differentially exposed
A visual inspection: Term Deposits

Parallell trends in other bank characteristics
Identification: Credit

\[ \Delta Y_{b,f} = \gamma \cdot \text{Exp	extunderscore BB}_b + \delta \cdot \text{Controls}_{b,2009} + \alpha_f + \varepsilon_{b,f} \]

\( \Delta Y_{b,f} \) is:

- \( \Delta \log(\text{Credit }_{b,f}) \) is the \( \Delta \) in credit by bank \( b \) to firm \( f \) before and after the reform
- \( \Delta(Maturity > 5Y)_{b,f} \) change in the share of long-term loans (>5years)
  - Both measures for either high or low risk firms (Altman z-score ≥7)

- \( \alpha_f \) is firm fixed-effect to control for credit demand (Khwaja and Mian, 2008)
  - Comparing lending to the same firm by banks with different funding mix
Results: Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Δ log(Credit)</th>
<th>Δ Maturity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exp_BB_b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Firms</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp_BB_b</td>
<td>0.0686</td>
<td>0.165**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fixed Effects
Firm Y
Bank-size Y

Observations 343145
No of firms 104215
No of banks 487

For a 1 std.dev increase in exposure to the reform (+1.3%) Growth rate of credit decreases by 0.87 pct.points (≈5% compared to average) and share of long-term loans to all firms increases by 0.22 pct points (+1.2% compared to average).
## Results: Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Firms (1)</th>
<th>Low Risk (2)</th>
<th>High Risk (3)</th>
<th>High vs. Low (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exp_BB_b</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Δ log(Credit)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0686</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>-0.675*</td>
<td>-0.885***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(-1.83)</td>
<td>(-3.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Firms (1)</th>
<th>Low Risk (2)</th>
<th>High Risk (3)</th>
<th>High vs. Low (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exp_BB_b</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Δ Maturity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.165**</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
<td>0.205*</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>(2.26)</td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fixed Effects

- Firm: Y Y Y Y
- Bank-size: Y Y Y Y

Observations: 343145 289467 53678
No of firms: 104215 87399 16816
No of banks: 487 486 457

For a 1 std.dev increase in exposure to the reform (+1.3%)

Growth rate of credit decreases by 0.87 pct.points (-5% compared to average)

and share of long-term loans to all firms increases by 0.22 pct points (+1.2% compared to average)
## Results: Credit

### \( \Delta \log(\text{Credit}) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Firms</th>
<th>Low Risk</th>
<th>High Risk</th>
<th>High vs. Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exp_{BB_b}</td>
<td>0.0686</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>-0.675*</td>
<td>-0.885***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(-1.83)</td>
<td>(-3.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a 1 std.dev increase in exposure to the reform (+1.3%)

### \( \Delta \text{Maturity} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exp_{BB_b}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.165**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Growth rate of credit decreases by 0.87 pct.points (-5% compared to average)

and share of long-term loans to all firms increases by 0.22 pct points (+1.2% compared to average)

### Fixed Effects

- Firm: \( Y \) \( Y \) \( Y \) \( Y \) \( Y \)
- Bank-size: \( Y \) \( Y \) \( Y \) \( Y \) \( Y \)

### Observations

- Observations: 343145, 289467, 53678
- No of firms: 104215, 87399, 16816
- No of banks: 487, 486, 457

\[ \rightarrow \text{Placebo in 2010 yields no significant effect of Exp_BB neither on credit, nor maturity} \]
Stability of deposits

Previous results consistent with both CK (1991) (i.e., less lending to risky firms) and HSSV (2015) (i.e., longer maturity)

• Can deposit stability explain these results?

We interact $Exp_{BB_b,2009}$ with:

• $ΔShare250K_b$ — a dummy variable that equals one if a bank experienced an above median increase in the share of deposits above €250,000 in 2012

Deposits >€250,000 are less “sleepy”: uninsured and more sophisticated households

• Unfortunately data around €100,000 (Italian deposit insurance limit) not available
• Most banks experience increases in large deposits, so we use above the median dummy
• Median increase is 4 percentage points (12.5% of pre-reform level)
# Results - “Sleepy depositors”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Firms</th>
<th>Low Risk</th>
<th>High Risk</th>
<th>High vs. Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \log(\text{Credit})$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Exp_{BB_b}$</td>
<td>1.287*</td>
<td>1.522**</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>-1.472***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.94)</td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(-5.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Exp_{BB_b} \times \Delta Share250K_b$</td>
<td>-1.476**</td>
<td>-1.512**</td>
<td>-0.936**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.14)</td>
<td>(-2.09)</td>
<td>(-2.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test: $Exp_{BB_b} + Exp_{BB_b} \times \Delta Share250K_b$</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.887*</td>
<td>-0.897**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.63)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(-1.94)</td>
<td>(-2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank-size</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>343145</td>
<td>289467</td>
<td>53678</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of firms</td>
<td>104215</td>
<td>87399</td>
<td>16816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of banks</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only banks with large increases in large, uninsured deposits decrease lending to risky firms.
### Results - “Sleepy depositors”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exp_BB_b</th>
<th>Exp_BB_b \times ΔShare_250K_b</th>
<th>Test: Exp_BB_b + Exp_BB_b \times ΔShare_250K_b</th>
<th>Δ Maturity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.548***</td>
<td>0.551***</td>
<td>0.727***</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.08)</td>
<td>(4.23)</td>
<td>(3.39)</td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.509</td>
<td>-0.521***</td>
<td>-0.706*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.76)</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td>(-1.70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effects</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Bank-size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>343145</td>
<td>289467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of firms</td>
<td>104215</td>
<td>87399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of banks</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only banks with increases in “sleepy” deposits increase maturity
Conclusions

The demandability of deposits acts as a disciplinary device on banks.

This mechanism is effective when the threat of deposit withdrawals is credible.

Instead, the ability of banks to act as “patient” investors is stronger when the threat of withdrawals is not credible.

More broadly, results also suggest that changes in taxation can prompt substantial changes in banks’ funding structures and lending policies.

• See also Schepens (2016) and Célérier, Kick and Ongena (2017)
BACK-UP SLIDES
Figure 1 – banking sector-level

- Within 2 years from the reform, deposits (bond) funding went up (down) by about €100 billion.
Figure 2 – The 1996 tax reform
Bank Bonds: $BB_{p,2009}$

Not just a North vs South story:

Robustness: include $Region_p \times Reform_t$ fixed-effects

$BB_{p,2009} \times Reform_t$ still significant
Bank Bonds: $BB_{p,2009}$ & $GDP_{p,2009}$

Robustness include $GDP_{p,2009} \times Reform_t$:

$BB_{p,2009} \times Reform_t$ still significant

$\rho_{BB,GDP} = 0.89$
Dynamic impact of the reform over time

This figure plots the β coefficients and associated 95% confidence interval from the following regression:

\[
\Delta \log(\text{TermDep})_{b,p,t} = \beta_{t} BB_{p,2009} + \alpha_{p} + \alpha_{b,t} + \varepsilon_{b,p,t}
\]
Fig. 2A: HH Term Deposit Rates and Sovereign yields
Fig. 1A: HH Deposit Rates and Monetary Policy
# Descriptive Stats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std.Dev</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Pre-reform Household Deposits and Bonds, in € million (bank-province level)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Dep</td>
<td>9192</td>
<td>54.89</td>
<td>341.05</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>13,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Dep</td>
<td>9123</td>
<td>47.73</td>
<td>319.92</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>13,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Dep</td>
<td>6776</td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>46.73</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>9192</td>
<td>36.74</td>
<td>199.16</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>8,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Bank Characteristics as of 2009, in % (bank level)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Dep/Assets</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>32.39</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>30.19</td>
<td>77.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Dep/Assets</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>36.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep&lt;50K/Total Dep</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>34.28</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>24.26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep&gt;250K/Total Dep</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>32.09</td>
<td>24.12</td>
<td>36.40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Bonds/Assets</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>22.54</td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>24.26</td>
<td>45.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assets (€ million)</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>6790</td>
<td>63470</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>1261000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>