

Micro Jumps, Macro Humps:

monetary policy and business cycles in an estimated HANK model

Adrien Auclert, Matt Rognlie and Ludwig Straub

Banque de France, December 2019

This paper matches the micro and macro of monetary policy

Q: How should we model the effects of monetary policy?


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“Macro time-series” approach

[CEE, ACEL, Maćkowiak-Wiederholt, Smets-Wouters...]

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
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This paper unifies the two:

- match *both* humps and jumps
- revisit
 - mon. transmission mechanism
 - sources of business cycles

HA + inattention can match micro & macro

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Estimate to IRFs of mon. pol. shock:

[Rotemberg-Woodford, CEE, ACEL, MW, ...]

- **hump-shaped impulse responses**
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1. **Investment** is key for **monetary transmission**

- $I \uparrow \rightarrow Y \uparrow \rightarrow$ **amplified** by households' **MPCs**
- **state dependence**: mon. pol. \sim **85% less powerful** if I is constrained

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
2. **Investment** is key for **business cycles** [over and above findings from existing studies]

Representative agent, no I




Monetary transmission

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


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


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


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


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


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


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In HA: mon. pol. transmission operates through I

Any shocks that move I , comove with & are amplified by C

Our paper brings together **three literatures**

1. **HA / tractable HA models** (with nominal rigidities)

- **mon. policy:** Gornemann-Kuester-Nakajima 2012, McKay-Nakamura-Steinsson 2016, Werning 2016, Ravn Sterk 2018, Kaplan-Moll-Violante 2018, Auclert 2019, Luetticke 2019, ...
- **others:** McKay-Reis 2016, Guerrieri-Lorenzoni 2018, Auclert-Rognlie-Straub 2018, Acharya Dogra 2018, Bilbiie 2019, Hagedorn-Manovskii-Mitman 2019, ...

2. **Estimation of RA models**

- **limited info:** Rotemberg-Woodford 1997, Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans 2005, Altig-Christiano-Eichenbaum-Linde 2011, ...
- **full info:** Ireland 2004, Smets-Wouters 2007, An-Schorfheide 2007, Justiniano-Primiceri-Tambalotti 2010, 2011, Fernández-Villaverde et al 2016

3. **Deviations from rational expectations and monetary policy**

- **cognitive discounting** (Gabaix 2018), **lack of common knowledge** (Woodford 2003, Angeletos-Lian 2018), **rational inattention** (Sims 2002, Maćkowiak-Wiederholt 2009, 2015, Zorn 2018), **k-level thinking** (García-Schmidt-Woodford 2019, Farhi-Werning 2018)
- **sticky information** (Gabaix-Laibson 2001, Mankiw-Reis 2002, 2006, Carroll et al 2018...)

- 1 How we match micro jumps & macro humps
- 2 Inattentive HA model
- 3 Estimation
- 4 Result 1: Investment is the transmission mechanism
- 5 Result 2: Investment drives business cycles
- 6 Conclusion

How we match micro jumps & macro humps

Heterogeneous-agent models can match (i)MPCs

Standard **heterogeneous-agent** model in s.s.:

$$\begin{aligned} V(a, s) &= \max_{c, a'} u(c) + \beta \mathbb{E} [V(a', s') | s] \\ c + a' &\leq (1 + r)a + ye(s) \\ a' &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

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→ **intertemporal MPCs**

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
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
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
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
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
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Inattention preserves (i)MPCs but introduces sluggishness

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- Our approach to humps: **sticky expectations**

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Inattentive HA model

- Discrete time with aggregate shocks
- **Heterogeneous-agent** household side
 - two assets + **sticky expectations**
- Standard **New-Keynesian** supply side
 - investment adjustment costs + nominal rigidities + indexation
 - fiscal rule changing labor taxes, monetary policy follows Taylor rule

- Total wealth held by **competitive & attentive “mutual fund”**, two liabilities:
 - liquid assets (deposits) a_t : short-term, pay rate $r_t^{\text{liq}} = r_t - \xi$
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Households & mutual fund

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- Households are inattentive also w.r.t. value of a_t^{illiq} . Thus:

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- Allow for six household groups to capture heterogeneity in illiquid assets

Estimation


Two-step estimation procedure

- Split parameters into two categories:
 1. Steady-state relevant parameters [income process, share of liquid assets, ...]
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- Today: match **impulse responses to monetary policy shocks**
 - data on $\{Y_t, C_t, I_t, N_t, P_t, W_t, r_t\}$

- Monetary impulse response [Ramey 2016]
- Jordà method using Romer-Romer shocks in original sample (69m3–96m12)



How do we simulate HA + info friction?

- Complicated model! HA + **sticky expectations** ...
- Expand “**sequence-space Jacobian**” method [Auclert-Bardóczy-Rognlie-Straub 2019]

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
- With sticky expectations: **manipulate the rational expectation Jacobian!**


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
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
- With sticky expectations: **manipulate the rational expectation Jacobian!**







The estimated impulse responses




Estimates point to significant inattention

| Estimated parameters | | Value | std. dev. |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|
| Parameter | | | |
| θ | Stickiness of household expectations | 0.888 | (0.016) |
| ϕ | Investment adjustment cost | 7.487 | (2.076) |
| ζ^p | Calvo price stickiness | 0.933 | (0.015) |
| ζ^w | Calvo wage stickiness | 0.920 | (0.018) |
| σ^m | Standard deviation of monetary shock | 0.047 | (0.005) |
| ρ^m | Persistence of monetary shock | 0.903 | (0.012) |

- Comparable to Coibion Gorodnichenko (2012)
 - find 0.80, 0.86-0.89 for inflation expectations of households, prof. forecasters

- Sticky expectations are crucial for the hump shape!



Inattention informs the **composition** of consumption

Decompose [Auclert 2019, Kaplan-Moll-Violante 2018, ...]

$$dC_t = \underbrace{\sum_s \frac{\partial C_t}{\partial r_s} dr_s}_{\text{direct}} + \underbrace{\sum_s \frac{\partial C_t}{\partial Y_s} dY_s}_{\text{indirect}} + \dots$$

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Indirect effects largely driven by **MPCs**

→ mostly **unaffected by inattention!**

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Direct effects strongly **dampened by inattention**

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

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

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Indirect effects largely driven by **MPCs**

→ mostly **unaffected by inattention!**

Direct effects strongly **dampened by inattention**

→ intertemporal substitution \simeq irrelevant for C!




Result 1: Investment is the
transmission mechanism

How is monetary policy transmitted in this model?


r

Y

How is monetary policy transmitted in this model?




How is monetary policy transmitted in this model?




Direct channels

How is monetary policy transmitted in this model?




Direct channels & **indirect channels**

Switching off investment entirely...



...dampens HA output by 85% and consumption by 70% !


Switching off investment entirely...




...but has no effect on **RA** consumption!

In **RA**, Y is mostly driven by direct response of C !

Representative agent



Heterogeneous agents




In **HA** Y is driven by investment!

Result 2: Investment drives business cycles

- Enrich our model to include **7 standard shocks** [Smets Wouters 2007, JPT 2010, 2011, ...]
 - supply: TFP, W markup, P markup
 - demand: monetary policy, G_t , C_t , I_t
 - different: discount factor shock for C_t , risk premium shock for I_t
 - Use **same model parameters ...**
- ... but **estimate all shock parameters** to 7 standard series
- To compare: apply same procedure to **RA with habit**

Consider baseline RA model


- Decompose forecast error variances $\text{Var}_t(Y_{t+h})$ at business cycle horizons:



In this estimated **RA**: it's about **markup and TFP shocks** [as in Smets Wouters 2007]


Endogenous cov(C, I) in HA \rightarrow investment shocks matter much more!

- Decompose forecast error variances $\text{Var}_t(Y_{t+h})$ at business cycle horizons:



Replace **RA** with **HA: investment shocks** matter a lot more!

- Salient feature of the data: **comovement** of $\text{Cov}_t(C_{t+h}, I_{t+h})$ [Barro-King 1984]




In **HA** investment shocks generate **endogenous** comovement between *C* and *I*


Conclusion

heterogeneity
(micro jumps) + **inattention**
(macro humps) \Rightarrow **investment** $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{drives monetary transmission} \\ \text{drives business cycles} \end{array} \right.$


Extra slides




- **TA** model (share of hand to mouth = 20%) is relatively close to **RA**



- Without inattention, **investment much less important!**



- With long-term bonds, much less of a windfall from lower r_t
 - precise fiscal rule less crucial than with short-term bonds



- Stock market goes up, sluggish transmission to C
 - shape & magnitude as in Chodorow-Reich Nenov Simsek (2019)