



# **Global Capital Flows in the COVID-19 Pandemic**

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
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# Emerging markets (EMs) experienced unprecedented portfolio outflows by non-residents in Q1:2020


The Covid-19 sell-off saw more than \$90 bn of outflows with the speed of the reversal being the most notable since GFC (even after adjusting for GDP)



Sources: Bloomberg, IIF, IMF WEO

# The portfolio flow reversal by non-residents was short-lived, though recovery remains uneven across EMs


The unprecedented portfolio outflows in March stabilized in June. Uncertainty due to US elections, and post COVID-19 recovery path marked the mixed dynamics of flows in September



Source: IIF, IMF MCM Capital Flows Tracker

# However, aggregate non-resident inflows continued to decline in Q2:2020...


Nonresident flows declined sharply in Q2, to 0.4% of GDP, vs 1.6% in Q1 and average of 4.4% in the last decade.



Source: Haver, National Authorities, IMF MCM Capital Flows Tracker

# ...due to weakness in FDI and banking inflows


While non-resident portfolio inflows improved from Q1 levels driven by debt flows, FDI flows declined to historical lows, and other investment flows declined sharply as well.



Source: Haver, National Authorities, IMF MCM Capital Flows Tracker

# Resident outflows played a stabilizing role


Resident outflows were 3.6% of GDP in Q1 2020, a sharp decline from 4.6% in 2019 Q1, and fell further to 0.7% of GDP in Q2 2020



Source: Haver, National Authorities, IMF MCM Capital Flows Tracker

# Therefore, despite the sharp decline in nonresident flows, net flows improved in Q2 2020


Despite the sharp decline in nonresident flows, net flows improved sequentially from -2% in Q1 to -0.3% in Q2



Source: Haver, National Authorities, IMF MCM Capital Flows Tracker

# The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing vulnerabilities, which are likely to remain elevated

Evolution of Sovereign Debt and External Financing Requirements for EMS  
(Percentile Rank since 1990)




Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report



# Market access for many EMs – especially frontier and lower-rated EMs has been materially impacted

External Debt Service through the End of 2021  
(Share of foreign reserves, percent, as of July 2020)




Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; World Bank Debtor Reporting System; IMF Global Financial Stability Report

# Many countries have seen ratings downgrades

Net downgrades continued in all regions since April with 8 Sub-Saharan African countries downgraded by one or more rating agencies.


**Net Rating Downgrades by Region**  
(Number on LHS; as a percent of total rated countries on RHS; Positive bars imply net downgrade, while negative bars are net upgrades)



Source: Bloomberg, IMF MCM EM Ratings Monitor

# Sovereign ratings tend to remain depressed for years after a crisis, irrespective of whether outflow controls are used

Average Rating of Countries with and without Outflow Controls Introduced in Crisis Year  $t^2$




<sup>1</sup> Panel shows the average S&P sovereign debt foreign currency rating (ranging from 1 for default to 22 for AAA), rebased at value 10 the year before the crisis year  $t$ .

Source: Bouis et al. (forthcoming)

# The outlook for portfolio inflows remains challenging, with nearly 25 percent probability of outflows next year

Capital Flows at Risk: Near-term Portfolio Flow<sup>1</sup> Forecast Densities (Probability Density)



<sup>1</sup> denotes net nonresident portfolio (debt and equity) flows.

Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report; Bloomberg; IMF WEO

# EMs used a range of policies to mitigate stress

- To mitigate stress in local bond and currency markets, many emerging market central banks:
  - ▶ lowered policy rates,
  - ▶ Released macroprudential buffers
  - ▶ used FX interventions and,
  - ▶ for the first time, asset purchases
- Despite exceptionally large capital outflows, the COVID-19 crisis did not trigger a wide-spread introduction of capital controls.
  - ▶ However, some EMs liberalized inflow controls

# Uncoordinated responses to global shock can lead to spillovers

- Spillovers from Foreign Exchange Intervention (FXI) that are well-crafted to improve financial conditions— are likely to be on the net, benign
  - ▶ However, FXI used to resist warranted exchange rate depreciation, may be a precursor to protectionist policies and could delay the global recovery.
- For EMDEs with underdeveloped financial systems, outflow CFMs could help stabilize their economies, and on balance, be helpful to trading partners
- However, the use of outflow CFMs by a major economy could potentially trigger capital outflows from other economies
- Widespread adoption of CFMs could impede global recovery

# Multilateral cooperation can improve global outcomes

- Multilateral cooperation can reduce the need to use FXI or impose CFMs and, in the recovery, the need to accumulate foreign exchange reserves
- Swap lines by the Federal Reserve and other major central banks
- The expansion of existing and creation of new [IMF lending facilities](#):
  - ▶ Doubled access to Rapid Credit Financing and Rapid Financing Instruments facilities
  - ▶ Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL): a new, revolving and renewable backstop for member countries with very strong policies
  - ▶ Approvals under Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL)
- Debt relief under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT)
- Calls for bilateral debt relief
- Multilateral cooperation on allocation of SDRs and coordinated debt-service suspension by the private sector could also improve global outcomes

**Thank you!**