Severance Payment, Tenure, and Efficiency
Unexplored Dimensions of EPL

Tito Boeri, Pietro Garibaldi and Espen R. Moen

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EPL is perhaps the most widely investigated institution in the LM. Many features of EPL have not been taken into account.

1. Severance payments and worker’s tenure. Large cross-country variation in the tenure profile of severance. Why? Does it Matter?

2. In all countries compensation to workers distinguish between *disciplinary* and *economic* dismissals. Why is important?

3. Most countries distinguish also between compensation for *fair* or *unfair* dismissal

4. Most countries allow for reductions of severance for small firms. Why?
Severance Payments, Disciplinary and Economic Dismissals

- Severance Payments (SP) are mandatory transfers for firm initiated job separation.
- Disciplinary dismissals are related to worker misconduct.
- Economic dismissals refer to technological or firms’ productivity related issues.
- Each type of dismissal can be defined as fair or unfair with different compensation schemes.
- It is very difficult to distinguish between ”fair” or ”unfair” dismissal. Ultimately, it is a court ruling.
### Table 2: Compensation in different cases of dismissal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic Unfair maximum compensation</th>
<th>Economic Fair compensation at 20 years of tenure</th>
<th>Disciplinary Unfair maximum compensation</th>
<th>Disciplinary Fair compensation at 20 years of tenure</th>
<th>S Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>207.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>207.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>27.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>7.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>166.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>166.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>19.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index of Dispersion

\[ S = \sqrt{(C_U^E - C_F^E)^2 + (C_U^D - C_F^D)^2 \over \bar{C}} \]

Where

- \( C \) refers to weeks of statutory compensation
- subscripts \( U \) and \( F \) to the unfair or fair nature of the dismissal
- superscript \( E \) and \( D \) to the economic or disciplinary nature of the dismissal
- \( \bar{C} \) is the average of the 4 costs
Severance Payments and Tenure

• Mandatory Severance Payments (SP) vary with tenure.
• We calculate the elasticity of SP to tenure at different periods
• The elasticity of SP to tenure varies across countries.
Severance Payments and Tenure

Motivations

Basic Economics and Results

Two Periods Model of Specific Investment

Three Periods

Severance Payments and Tenure
GR Index and Severance

Table 1: GR Index, 2005; minimum and maximum severance, in months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>average elasticity</th>
<th>minimum value</th>
<th>maximum value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>elasticity</td>
<td>period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>9m, 1y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep.</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Severance and wages elasticities
Exemptions for Small Firms

Most countries allow for lower severance for small firms in case of unfair dismissals.

- Italy: art.18 does not apply in firms with less than 15 employees.
- Germany: reinstatement in case of unfair dismissal cannot be imposed by the judge in firms with less than 5 employees.
- Australia: no redundancy has to be paid by enterprises with fewer than 15 employees.
- Luxembourg: firms with less than 15 employees can choose additional notice in lieu of severance payments.
The Economics

- Whenever there are wage differential and productivity shocks, firms initiated dismissals for senior workers may be inefficient.
- Workers undertake a costly (private) investment with uncertain return to the firm.
- Distinction between disciplinary and economic very relevant.
- **Economic Dismissal**: firms will always fire when productivity is too low, even when the worker invests. Firms cannot commit ”not to fire”.
- **Disciplinary Dismissal**: shirking workers (those who do not invest) can be dismissed without severance payments (fair economic dismissal).
- Moral Hazard: A fair disciplinary dismissal must be proved in court and a shirking worker ”can get away with it”.

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Baseline Results

- When there are wage differentials, severance payments can indeed prevent inefficient firing for senior workers.
- In the baseline model with moral hazard in disciplinary dismissals, firing is ex-post too high vis-a-vis efficient separations.
- Severance Payments are not neutral, can reduce firing and induce workers investment.
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Results on Contratto Unico

- Models with 3 periods:
  - If workers need to repeatedly invest on the job
  - Severance payments increasing over time are efficient

- Policy proposal for Contratto Unico (SP increasing with tenure to reduce dualism) should be taken seriously!
This Paper

1. Introduction and Empirical Motivation
2. Wage Differentials, Severance and Tenure
3. Basic Two periods Model on Efficient SP
4. Multi periods and Contratto Unico
5. Policy Implications
Some References

- Neutrality of Severance Payments (Lazear, 1990)
- Stochastic Firing (Garibaldi 1998). Severance and wages in search (Garibaldi Violante 2005)
- Optimal Severance Payments in search economies with risk aversion (Veracierto, 2008)
- Severance Payments and Moral Hazard in a Model of Unemployment (Guell, 2002)
Exogenous Wage Differential, Tenure and Severance Payments
Assume \( w_2 > y_2^l > b \)

Firms can fire conditional on the realization of \( y_2^l \). Firing requires a severance payment \( T \geq 0 \)

\[
\Pi = y_1 - w_1 + (1 - \delta)[y_2^l - w_2] + \delta \max[y_2^l - w_2 : -T]
\]

Since \( y_2^l > b \) the joint surplus is positive in the second period and for efficiency reasons production should take place

If \( T = 0 \) firms always fire conditional on a adverse shock

\[
y_2^l - w_2 \geq -T
\]

**Remark** A severance payment \( T^* \geq w_2 - y_2^l \) prevents inefficient separation.

**Proposition**

*When there are wage differals, a severance payment can prevent inefficient separation for senior workers*
Basic Set up with Endogenous Wage Differals

- Partial equilibrium: One worker and one firm (risk neutral) with a two periods job No discounting
- Baseline productivity on the job is $y > b$ (worker’s outside option) in every period
- Wages are unilaterally set by the firm with full commitment and no renegotiation $w_i, i = \{1, 2\}$
- In period 1 the worker faces a specific investment opportunity $s = \{0, 1\}$. at costs to the worker $C$ in the first period. $s$ is worker’s private information.
- Conditional on $s = 1$, productivity in the second period will be $y + \varepsilon$, with $\varepsilon$ stochastic from $F(\varepsilon)$; support $\varepsilon \in [\varepsilon_l, \varepsilon_u]$ with $\varepsilon_l < 0$.
- Wages can not be contingent on productivity.
- Conditional on $\varepsilon$, the firm can unilaterally fire the worker.
Disciplinary versus Economic Dismissal

- **Disciplinary Dismissal.** A firm is entitled to freely dismiss a shirking worker that did not invest. In principle no severance payment is due.
- **Economic Dismissal.** In period 2, Dismissing a worker that did invest in period 1 requires a compensation/severance equal to $T$.

The severance payment $T$ is set by the government and is a pure transfer. The firm can not commit to a severance payment.

Disciplinary dismissal must be proved in court.
  - With probability $1 - q$ the court observes shirking. no $T$ is due.
  - With probability $q$ a shirking worker ”gets away with it” and receives $T$.
  - $q$ is observed after the firm has fired the worker. The expected severance to a shirking worker is $qT$. 

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Severance Payment, Tenure, and Efficiency
Firm learns worker investment and decide **disciplinary** dismissal. Pays $T$ with prob. $q$

$? is drawn and observed$

Firm decides on **economic dismissal**, and pays $T$ if fires with prob. $1$

Wage $w_2$ is paid and production takes place

**2nd Period**
Definition

The equilibrium is a set of wages $w_1$, $w_2$, an investment decision $s$ of the worker and a firing policy $\epsilon_d$ that satisfy

- Firm optimal firing in period 2 (Reservation productivity $\epsilon_d$)
- Incentive compatible wage in period 2
- Worker’s participation constraint
Baseline Value Functions

- PDV Worker that does not invest and shirks

\[ W_{(s=0)} = w_1 + b + qT \]

- PDV Worker that invest

\[ W_{(s=1)} = w_1 - C + (1 - F(\epsilon_d))w_2 + F(\epsilon_d)[b + T] \]

where \( F(\epsilon_d) \) is the dismissal probability

- Firms expected profits if the worker invest are

\[ \Pi_{1(s=1)} = y - w_1 + \int_x \text{Max}[y + x - w_2; -T]dF(x) \]
Reservation Productivity

\[ \Pi_2(\varepsilon) = \text{Max}[y + \varepsilon - w_2; -T]. \]

\[ \varepsilon_d = w_2 - y - T \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Firing increases with wages while it decreases with productivity and severance payment.
Efficient Separation

When joint surplus is zero

\[ S_2 = [w_2 - (b + T)] + [y + \varepsilon - w_2 - (-T)] \]
\[ = y + \varepsilon - b \]

where both wages and severance payments do not enter in the joint surplus. Efficient separation \( \varepsilon^* \)

\[ S_2(\varepsilon^*) = 0 \]
\[ \varepsilon^* = b - y \] (2)
Optimal Contract

\[(1 - F(\varepsilon_d))w_2 + F(\varepsilon_d)(b + T) - C \geq b + qT \quad \text{(IC)}\]

\[w_2 = b + \frac{C + [q - F(\varepsilon_d)]T}{1 - F(\varepsilon_d)} \quad \text{(3)}\]

\[W(s = 1) = w_1 - C + w_2(1 - F(\varepsilon_d)) + F(\varepsilon_d)(b + T) \geq 2b \quad \text{(PC)}\]

\[\varepsilon_d = w_2 - y - T \quad \text{(Reservation Rule)}\]
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Too much firing in period 2

In general

\[ \varepsilon_d = b - y + \frac{C + [q - F(\varepsilon_d)]T}{1 - F(\varepsilon_d)} \]

**Proposition**

**RESULT:** If there are no severance payment \((T = 0)\) Firing is too high in the second period

\[ \varepsilon_d(T=0) = b - y + \frac{C}{1 - F(\varepsilon_d)} > \varepsilon^* = b - y \]
Perfect Monitoring ($q = 0$): Worker Never gets away with Shirking

With $q = 0$ shirking is perfectly detected.

$$w_{2(q=0)} - b = \frac{C - F(\varepsilon_d)T}{1 - F(\varepsilon_d)}$$

*Severance as a discipline device (you get it only if you do not shirk).*

Severance payments reduce senior wages
Severance payment always paid ($q=1$):

*severance payments increase senior wages but are neutral* from the allocative standpoint

\[
w_2(q=1) - b = \frac{C}{1 - F(\varepsilon_d)} + T
\]  

(5)

\[
\varepsilon_d(q=1) = b - y + \frac{C}{1 - F(\varepsilon_d)}
\]

SP affects the wage profile (they make it steeper)
SP and in the two periods model

**Proposition**

a) If there are no severance payment \((T = 0)\), the firm fires workers too frequently \((\varepsilon_d \text{ is too high})\)

b) In case of perfect court monitoring \((q = 0)\), severance payment \(T\) reduces \(w_2\) and hence reduces firing. In other words, severance payments act as discipline device

c) If workers always get severance payment \((q = 1)\), the severance payment increases \(w_2\) but they are neutral in terms of dismissal. It only influences the wage profile by making it steeper (Lazear, 1990).
Optimal Severance Payment

The optimal $T$ should restore efficient separation

$$
\varepsilon_d(T) = \varepsilon^*
$$

$$
T = w_2(\varepsilon_d) - b
$$

i.e., is equal to the wedge between the inside and the outside wage.

$$
T^* = \frac{C + [q - F(\varepsilon^*)] T^*}{1 - F(\varepsilon^*)} \quad q < 1
$$

Solving this for $T^*$ gives

$$
T^* = \frac{C}{1 - q} \quad q < 1
$$
To Sum Up on Efficiency:

Proposition

i) If \( q = 1 \) (shirkers always get severance pay) the optimal severance pay is undefined and there is no welfare loss of setting \( T = 0 \).

ii) For all other values of \( q \), the optimal severance pay is strictly positive and given by

\[
T^* = \frac{C}{1 - q} > 0
\]
Monitoring workers behavior is easier in small firms; thus, getting away with it is easier in large firm \((q_{\text{small firms}} < q_{\text{large firms}})\).

Larger \(q\) requires larger severance payments.

Hence, SP should be larger in larger firms.
Extensions to 3 Periods:

- Workers invest only in period 1
- Workers invest in period 1 and Period 2, and further $C_2 > C_1$ and $q_2 > q_1$
No Investment in Period 2....No Contratto Unico

t = 3 but workers only invest t = 1. Then the following is true

- The severance pay in period 2, \( T_2 \), is
  \[
  T_2 \geq \frac{C}{1 - q}
  \]

- Optimal firing decisions in period 3 requires that \( T_3 = w_3 - b \)

- The PC gives a constraint on \( w_2 + w_3 \), but not on the wage-tenure profile. The severance pay \( T_2 \) is independent of the wage-tenure profile (as long as the participation constraint of the worker is satisfied).

- If \( w_2 \geq b \), then \( T_2 > T_3 \) (unfortunately)
Worker has to provide effort in both periods.
Suppose further that the probability of getting away with shirking is higher for senior workers \((q_2 > q_1)\) and that there is an increasing marginal cost of effort \((C_2 > C_1)\). Then the following holds:

- The severance pay is increasing with tenure
- Wages are increasing in tenure, \(w_2 < w_3\). If \(q_2\) is close to \(q\), then we know for sure that also \(w_1 < w_2\).
Policy Implications and Conclusions

Contratto Unico and Reality

- With wage differals, SP can reduce inefficient firing of senior worker
- With workers’ moral hazard, SP can act as a worker’s discipline device
- Severance Payments Increasing with tenure should be taken seriously
- Rationalize why SP should be smaller in smaller firms