The Impact of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs on Default Risk

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Abstract

Estimating the response of default risk indicators to the Federal Reserve’s announcements of Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs is complicated by the simultaneity of policy decisions and the fact that both interest rates of assets targeted by the programs and measures of default risk reacted to other common shocks during the recent financial crisis. This paper employs a heteroskedasticity-based approach to estimate the response of the market-based indicators of corporate default risk to declines in the benchmark safe interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements. The results indicate that the policy announcements led to a significant reduction in default risk—as measured by the CDX indexes—for both investment- and speculative-grade corporate credits. While the unconventional policy measures employed by the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy appeared to have lowered the overall level of credit risk in the economy, the policy actions had no measurable impact on the default risk specific to the financial sector.

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1 Introduction

The extraordinary turmoil that roiled global financial markets during the 2007–09 crisis and the subsequently sluggish pace of economic recovery led the Federal Reserve to take a number of unprecedented steps to improve market functioning and support economic activity. In terms of both sheer scale and prominence, the attempts to stimulate the economy by purchasing large quantities of government-backed securities in the secondary market—after the target federal funds rate was lowered to its effective zero lower bound at the end of 2008—have arguably been the most important unconventional policy measures employed by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in recent years; see D’Amico et al. [2012] for a thorough discussion of the role of asset purchases in the broader context of monetary policy strategy.

Conventionally referred to as the Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs, the purchases targeted debt obligations of the government-sponsored housing agencies (GSEs), mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by those agencies, and coupon securities issued by the United States Treasury. In addition to conducting two LSAP programs during the 2008–10 period, the FOMC in the autumn of 2011 also initiated a Maturity Extension Program (MEP) in an effort to put further downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and thereby provide additional stimulus to economic growth.

The economic rationale underlying the LSAPs hinges on a presumption that the relative prices of financial asset are to an important extent influenced by the quantity of assets available to investors. Implicit in this view is a departure from the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates and an appeal to theories of “imperfect asset substitution,” “portfolio choice,” or “preferred habitat,” theories that recently have received renewed attention and rigorous micro foundations in the work of Andrés et al. [2004] and Vayanos and Vila [2009]. Indeed, in their communication of the likely effects of LSAPs on longer-term interest rates, policymakers have repeatedly invoked the preferred-habitat models of interest rate determination, as the canonical arbitrage-free term structure framework leaves essentially no scope for the relative supply of deeply liquid financial assets—such as nominal Treasuries—to influence their prices (Kohn [2009] and Yellen [2011]).

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1 Under the MEP, which will come to an end by the end of June 2012, the Federal Reserve is selling shorter-term Treasury securities and using the proceeds to buy longer-term Treasury securities, thereby extending the average maturity of the securities in its portfolio.

2 As formalized by Vayanos and Vila [2009], the preferred habitat models rely on two important assumptions: (1) the existence of investors that exhibit preferences for assets of only certain maturities; and (2) prices of assets of a given maturity are determined by the confluence of demand and supply shocks specific to that maturity. Within this framework, supply effects matter because a negative supply shock to the stock of assets of a particular maturity—a large purchase of long-term Treasuries by the Federal Reserve, for example—creates a shortage of those assets, which at prevailing prices cannot be entirely offset by substitution of other securities. Examples of such preferred habitat investors include pension funds and insurance companies, a class of financial intermediaries that has an explicit preference for longer-term assets in order to match their long-duration liabilities. Short-term investors such as money market mutual funds, on the other hand, tend to hold Treasury bills and other short-dated claims to maintain a high degree of liquidity in their portfolios. Early treatment of these ideas can be found in Tobin [1961, 1963] and Modigliani and Sutch [1966, 1967].
Given the unprecedented nature of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional policy measures, a rapidly growing literature has emerged that tries to evaluate empirically the effects of the various asset purchase programs on financial asset prices. Perhaps not too surprisingly, the initial phase of this research has focused on the question of whether purchases of large quantities of Treasury coupon securities have altered the level of longer-term Treasury yields. Employing a high-frequency, event-style methodology [Gagnon et al. 2011, Swanson 2011, and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011] present compelling evidence that the Federal Reserve’s LSAP announcements had economically and statistically significant effects on Treasury yields. Consistent with this evidence, Greenwood and Vayanos 2010a, Gagnon et al. 2011, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011, and Hamilton and Wu 2012 also show that Treasury supply factors have important effects on Treasury yields and the associated term premiums at lower frequencies and over longer sample periods.

By cleverly exploiting the variation in prices across individual securities (CUSIPs) induced by the Federal Reserve’s purchases of Treasury coupon securities, D’Amico and King 2010, find strong evidence of localized supply effects in the Treasury market—that is, purchases of specific CUSIPs in the secondary market had economically and statistically significant effect on yields of both purchased securities and those at nearby maturities. Building on this type of micro-level analysis, D’Amico et al. 2012 attempt to further disentangle the transmission channels involved in LSAPs and find that a significant portion of the variation in local supply and aggregate duration of Treasury securities was transmitted to longer-term Treasury yields through the term-premium component.

Taking a different tack, Li and Wei 2012, develop and estimate an arbitrage-free term structure model of interest rates that, in addition to observable yield curve factors, incorporates variables involving the relative supply of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities. The inclusion of the Treasury-supply factor is motivated by the work of Vayanos and Vila 2009, while the inclusion of the MBS-supply factor reflects the market participants’ perception of agency MBS as “safe” assets—and therefore close substitutes for Treasuries—owing to their earlier implicit and later explicit government guarantee. Both of these supply factors affect the term structure of interest rates

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3 These findings are consistent with the work of Laubach 2009 and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012, who find that fluctuations in the total supply of Treasury debt—conditional on the standard yield curve factors—have appreciable explanatory power for movements in Treasury yields. Relatedly, Greenwood and Vayanos 2010a,b and Hamilton and Wu 2012 show that changes in the maturity structure of Treasury debt outstanding have a similar effect.

4 Using the micro-level approach of D’Amico and King 2010, Meaning and Zhu 2011 find similar effects for the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility. Using an event-style analysis, Click and Leduc 2011 present evidence that asset purchases by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England—in addition to lowering longer-term government bond yields—also lowered the exchange value of the dollar and the pound as well as exerted downward pressure on commodity prices.

5 According to their results, most of the decline in the overall term premium can be attributed to a reduction in the real term-premium component; the effect of LSAPs on the inflation risk premium, by contrast, was economically small and imprecisely estimated.

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primarily through the term-premium component, and according to Li and Wei [2012] estimates, the combined effect of the three LSAPs resulted in a significant reduction in long-term Treasury yields.

While economists have devoted the lion’s share of attention to evaluating the effects of LSAPs on Treasury yields, considerably less attention has been paid to the question of whether LSAPs had an effect on yields of riskier assets. As emphasized by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011], LSAPs can affect private yields through different channels. In this paper, we focus on one particular channel—the “default risk” channel. Specifically, we evaluate empirically the effects of the three asset purchase programs on corporate default risk, both in its broad economy-wide terms and on default risk specific to the financial sector.

The focus on the former is motivated by the fact that if LSAPs were successful in stimulating the economy, we should observe a reduction in expected defaults and, as a result, a decline in corporate borrowing costs. Moreover, as the economic recovery gains traction, some standard asset pricing models imply an associated reduction not only in the compensation demand by investors for expected defaults but also in the average price of bearing exposure to corporate credit risk, above and beyond the compensation for expected defaults—that is, a reduction in the default risk premium. This increase in investor risk appetite—by lowering the price of default risk—should put further downward pressure on corporate borrowing rates and thereby stimulate the cyclically-sensitive components of aggregate demand.

The focus on the default risk specific to the financial sector, on the other hand, is motivated by an influential recent theoretical literature that stresses the implications of the capital position of financial intermediaries for asset prices and macroeconomic stability; see, for example, He and Krishnamurthy [2012a,b] and Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2011]. The common thread running through these theories is that a deterioration in macroeconomic conditions, by depressing the capital base of financial intermediaries, induces a reduction in the risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector. To the extent that financial intermediaries are the marginal investors in asset markets,

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6In addition to the default risk channel, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] identify the following six channels through which LSAPs might affect market interest rates: (1) the “signalling” channel, according to which the unconventional monetary policy actions such as LSAPs exert downward pressure on long-term interest rates only if such actions credibly signal the commitment that the monetary authority will maintain the short-term policy rate below its equilibrium level even after the output returns to its potential; (2) the “duration risk” channel, in which purchases of Treasuries, agency debt, and agency MBS lower longer-term interest rates by reducing the amount of duration risk in the hands of preferred-habitat investors; (3) the “liquidity” channel, which posits that because the monetary authority finances its purchases of longer-term assets by increasing reserve balances of depository institutions, the resulting increase in the liquidity should lower liquidity premium on the most liquid assets; (4) the “safety” channel, a variation on the preferred habitat model, in which the preferred habitat applies to near zero default risk assets; (5) the “prepayment risk premium” channel, another variant on the preferred habitat theme that requires segmentation of the MBS market, and in which purchases of MBS reduce the amount of prepayment risk, thereby lowering MBS yields; and (6) the “inflation” channel, according to which LSAPs influence nominal interest rates through changes in inflation expectations and uncertainty over inflation outcomes. A somewhat more concise typology of the channels through which LSAPs might affect longer-term interest rates is outlined in D’Amico et al. [2012].
this effective increase in risk aversion causes a jump in the conditional volatility and correlation of asset prices and a sharp widening of credit spreads, a worsening of financial conditions that amplifies the effect of the initial shock on the macroeconomy.

Any empirical investigation of the effect of LSAPs on default risk confronts a serious econometric challenge. First, yields of assets targeted by the central bank purchases—typically safe assets—may be simultaneously influenced by the movements in prices of risky financial assets, resulting in a difficult endogeneity problem. Second, the identification of the responsiveness of default-risk indicators to such policy interventions is complicated by the fact that a number of other factors, including news about the economic outlook and “flight-to-quality” consideration, likely had an impact on both longer-term risk free rates and default risk during the period in which the LSAPs were implemented.

To address these issues, we employ the econometric approach developed by Rigobon [2003] and Rigobon and Sack [2004], in which the response of financial asset prices to policy interventions is identified vis-à-vis the shift in the variance of monetary policy shocks associated with policy announcements. In particular, we make a natural assumption that the volatility of monetary policy shocks increased on the days of the LSAP announcements, precisely because a larger portion of the news hitting financial markets was about monetary policy. This allows us to identify the parameter of interest—the coefficient measuring the responsiveness of various default-risk indicators to the declines in risk-free interest rates induced by the LSAP announcements—under a weaker set of assumptions than those employed in the event-style type of analysis. Indeed, our event-study analysis implies that the LSAPs had no impact on corporate credit risk. In contrast, the heteroskedasticity-based approach implies that the declines in risk-free interest rates induced by the LSAP announcements led to economically meaningful reductions in broad market-based indicators of default risk, especially for lower-rated corporate credits.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the LSAP announcement dates used in the analysis and present the necessary background evidence regarding the effect of those announcements on the key benchmark interest rates. Section 3 describes the construction of our default-risk indicators, both for the broad U.S. corporate sector and those pertaining to the financial sector. Section 4 contains our main results. It begins with an event-style analysis of the impact of the LSAP announcements on corporate credit risk and then shows why such an analysis may lead to a downward bias in the OLS estimator of the coefficient measuring the response of default-risk indicators to the changes in the benchmark safe interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements. To address this issue, it proposes a heteroskedasticity-based estimator of this effect and presents our key findings; to examine the robustness of our result, subsection 4.3 zeroes in on the five largest U.S. financial institutions, which play a key role in both the traditional bank-like credit intermediation process and in the arm’s length finance that takes place in securities.

Recent work by Adrian et al. [2010a, b] and Gilchrist and Zakræjk [2012] provides empirical evidence supporting these types of intermediary asset pricing theories.
markets. Section 5 offers a brief conclusion.

2 Asset Purchase Programs and Benchmark Interest Rates

In this section, we present evidence from an event study of major announcements associated with the Federal Reserve’s three asset purchase programs (LSAP-I, LSAP-II, and MEP). Gauging the effect of LSAP announcements on yields of assets purchased by the Federal Reserve—that is, Treasury coupon securities, agency MBS, and agency debt—provides the necessary backdrop against which to evaluate the effects of the three asset purchase programs on default risk.

To maintain comparability with previous studies, we focus on the event dates identified by [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011]]. Within the standard taxonomy of the Federal Reserve’s asset purchase programs, these event dates are as follows:

- The first asset purchase program (LSAP-I):¹
  1. Nov-25-2008: The initial announcement that the Federal Reserve would purchase up to $100 billion of agency debt and up to $500 billion of agency MBS.
  2. Dec-1-2008: Chairman Bernanke’s speech on the “Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis,” which suggested that the Federal Reserve could purchase longer-term Treasury securities in substantial quantities in order to stimulate the economy.
  3. Dec-16-2008: The FOMC statement that indicated “The Federal Reserve will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity.”
  4. Jan-28-2009: The FOMC statement that was interpreted by some market participants as disappointing because of its lack of concrete language regarding the possibility and timing of purchases of longer-term Treasuries in the secondary market.
  5. Mar-18-2009: The FOMC statement, which announced purchases of Treasury securities of up to $300 billion and increased the size of purchases of agency MBS and agency debt to up to $1.2 trillion and $200 billion, respectively.

- The second asset purchase programs (LSAP-II):
  1. Aug-10-2010: The FOMC statement that was interpreted as suggesting a more downbeat assessment of the economic outlook than expected because it stated “To help support economic recovery in the context of price stability, the Committee will keep the Federal

¹In their study of the first asset purchase program, [Gagnon et al. 2011] identified eight event dates, beginning with the Nov-25-2008 announcement and continuing through the autumn of 2009. Using intraday price and volume data, [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011]] showed that significant changes in Treasury yields occurred only on the first five of the eight event dates and, therefore, leave out the last three event dates associated with the LSAP-I.
Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury securities. The Committee will continue to roll over the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities as they mature.”

2. Sep-21-2010: The FOMC statement that indicated the Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings.

3. Nov-3-2010: The FOMC statement that indicated that in addition to maintaining the existing reinvestment policy, “[T]he Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month.”

- The maturity extension program (MEP):

1. Sep-21-2011: The FOMC statement that indicated “To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee decided today to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. The Committee intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less.”

To obtain an estimate of the effect of various LSAP announcements on benchmark interest rates, we run the following event-style regression:

$$
\Delta i_t = \theta_0 + \theta_1 \text{LSAP-I}_t + \theta_2 \text{LSAP-II}_t + \theta_3 \text{MEP}_t + \epsilon_t,
$$

(1)

$$\Delta i_t$$ denotes the daily change in the specified interest rate; LSAP-I\(_t\) is a 0/1-variable that equals on the five LSAP-I announcement days; LSAP-II\(_t\) is a 0/1-variable that equals on the three LSAP-II announcement days; and MEP\(_t\) is a 0/1-variable that equals on the MEP announcement day.\(^9\) This specification implies that the coefficients \(\theta_1\), \(\theta_2\), and \(\theta_3\) measure the average effect of each LSAP program on the specified interest rate. We estimate equation (1) by OLS over the period from Jan-02-2008 to Dec-30-2011.

Table 1 summarizes the average effects of the program-specific LSAP announcements on yields of assets targeted by the three purchase programs.\(^10\) According to the entries in the table, the effect

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\(^9\)In this type of event-style analysis, it is entirely possible that there are other “true” events that have been omitted. As discussed by [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2011], failing to include potentially relevant dates into the analysis could result in an upward or a downward bias to the estimate of the overall effect of LSAPs on interest rates; importantly, the direction of the bias depends on how the events on the omitted dates affected the market participants’ perception of the likelihood and magnitude of the purchase program. As a robustness check, we also considered a number of other potential event dates—especially those pertaining to the LSAP-II—but the inclusion of those additional event dates had no discernible effect on any of the results reported in the paper.

\(^10\)All Treasury yields are derived from the smoothed Treasury yield curve estimated by [Gürkaynak et al., 2007];
Table 1: LSAP Announcements and Selected Interest Rates
(Event-Style Regression Analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
<th>LSAP-I^a</th>
<th></th>
<th>LSAP-II^b</th>
<th></th>
<th>MEP^c</th>
<th></th>
<th>R^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Yield (1y)</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Yield (5y)</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Yield (10y)</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency MBS Yield (30y)</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Debt Yield (1y–3y)</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Debt Yield (3y–5y)</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Debt Yield (gt. 5y)</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample period: daily data from Jan-02-2008 to Dec-30-2011. The dependent variable in each regression is the 1-day change in the specified interest rate. Entries under the heading Coef. denote estimates of the average effect (in percentage points) of LSAP-I, LSAP-II, and MEP announcements (see text for details), while entries under the heading S.E. denote the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors.


^b LSAP-II is a 0/1-variable that equals one on the following three announcement days: Aug-10-2010, Sep-21-2010, and Nov-03-2010.

^c MEP is 0/1-variable that equals one on the announcement date of Sep-21-2011.

of the first purchase program (LSAP-I) on longer-term interest rates was substantial in economic terms: The average decline in longer-term Treasury yields induced by the five announcements was about 20 basis points, while yields on agency MBS and longer-term agency debt fell almost 25 basis points, on average; as indicated by the associated standard errors, these declines are all statistically significant at conventional levels. The effects of the second purchase program (LSAP-II) on interest rates were also economically important, though not as widespread as those of the LSAP-I. According to our estimates, the average decline in the 5-year Treasury yield in response to the three LSAP-II announcements was about 7 basis points, while yields on medium-term (3–5 years) agency debt fell 4 basis points.

The last program undertaken by the Federal Reserve during our sample period (MEP) also had predictable effects, as the declines in interest rates were concentrated at the longer-end of the maturity spectrum. Indeed, as envisioned by the FOMC, the MEP significantly flattened the Treasury yield curve, both by depressing the long end and by inducing a small rise at the short and intermediate end of the yield curve. All told, these results are consistent with the recent work of D’Amico and King [2010], Gagnon et al [2011], Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011], and D’Amico et al [2012], who document that asset purchase programs had significantly altered the agency MBS yield corresponds to the Fannie Mae 30-year current coupon MBS rate obtained from Barclays; and agency debt yields correspond to yield indexes based on individual senior unsecured bonds issued by Fannie Mae that are calculated internally at the Federal Reserve Board. We are grateful to Diana Hancock for providing us with the agency debt yield indexes.
level of longer-term government bond yields. They are also consistent with the event-style evidence presented by [Swanson 2011], who shows that the Federal Reserve’s large purchases of longer-term Treasury securities during the 1961 Operation Twist had a major effect on financial markets.

3 Measuring Default Risk

This section describes the construction of default-risk indicators used in our main analysis. In all instances, the indicators are based on financial derivatives on credit risk—that is, (single-name) credit default swaps (CDS)—instruments used extensively by investors for hedging of and investing in credit risk. A CDS is simply an insurance contract between two parties: a protection buyer, who makes fixed, periodic payments; and a protection seller, who collects these premiums in exchange for making the protection buyer whole in case of default. Although akin to insurance, CDS are not regulated by insurance regulators—they are over-the-counter (OTC) transactions—and unlike standard insurance contracts, it is not necessary to own the underlying debt in order to buy protection using CDS. In general, CDS trades take place between institutional investors and dealers, with the legal framework for trading governed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).

Using CDS contracts to measure default risk has a number of advantages over other commonly-used indicators of default risk such corporate bond credit spreads. First, it is far easier to buy credit protection than to short corporate bonds. As a result, CDS are a natural vehicle for shorting default risk, which allows investors to take a specific view on the outlook for credit quality of a specific company. Second, the use of CDS contracts allows users to avoid triggering tax or accounting implications that arise from sales of actual bonds. Third, CDS contracts offer easy access to hard to find credits, reflecting a limited supply of bonds in many instances. And lastly, investors can more easily tailor their credit exposure to maturity requirements and desired seniority in the firm’s capital structure. It should be noted that although CDS are available at various maturities, the 5-year contract is by far the most commonly traded and liquid segment of the market.

3.1 Overall Default Risk

We rely on credit derivative indexes owned and managed by Markit as a proxy for default risk at the broad, economy-wide level. Compared with other commonly-referenced financial indexes, such as indexes of corporate bond yields and spreads or equity indexes, credit derivative indexes are tradable products. Buying and selling of the credit derivative index is comparable to buying and selling portfolios of corporate cash instruments: By buying the index the investor takes on

\footnote{CDS contracts generally trade based on a spread, which represents the cost a protection buyer has to pay the protection seller (i.e., the premium paid for protection). For the protection buyer, the value of the CDS contract rises if the spread increases; for example, a protection buyer paying a spread of 100 basis points, when the current spread is 150 basis points, would be able to unwind the position at a higher spread level.}
the credit exposure—is exposed to defaults—a position similar to that of buying a portfolio of bonds; by selling the index, the credit exposure is passed on to another party. As a result, investors can take positions directly in the indexes without having to trade a large number of underlying components—in fact, index trading is often thought to lead single-name CDS trading.

To capture the full spectrum of credit quality in the U.S. corporate market, we consider two indexes: the (North American) 5-year CDX investment-grade index; and the (North American) 5-year CDX speculative-grade index. The investment-grade CDX index references 125 CDS on firms that have an investment-grade rating from both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s at the time the index starts trading, while the speculative-grade CDX index references 100 CDS on firms that have a “junk” rating from at least one rating agency. Importantly, the component firms must have highly liquid single-name CDS trading in their name, and the composition of both indexes—which is determined by a dealer poll—reflects the composition of the U.S. corporate sector.

All firms in the indexes are equally weighted, and the composition of both indexes is fixed once the indexes start trading. However, new vintages of the indexes are introduced every six months, and the new vintages may have different components than the old vintages. When a new vintage is introduced, it becomes the “on-the-run” vintage; previous versions of the indexes continue trading as “off-the-run” vintages. To ensure the maximum liquidity for our broad indicators of default risk, we spliced together the on-the-run vintages for both the investment- and speculative-grade CDX indexes.

Figure 1 shows the two default-risk indicators over the 2007–11 period. According to these two measures, default risk in the U.S. corporate sector increased noticeably with the onset of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007, likely reflecting the rapidly deteriorating outlook for the housing sector and associated concerns about the possible spill-over effects on financial institutions and the broader economy. Both indicators were exceptionally volatile during the subsequent recession and spiked sharply at critical events of the crisis: the collapse of Bear Stearns investment bank in March 2008; the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008; and in early 2009, when continued pressures on already-strained balance sheets of financial intermediaries threatened the viability of some of the institutions, a situation that was greatly exacerbated by the lingering effects of the deep economic contraction that materialized in the second half of 2008.

Indeed, as shown by the thin vertical lines, the first round of asset purchases (LSAP-I) was

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12 Because the indexes are equally weighted, in the event of a default of one index component, the notional value of the contract is reduced by $1/n$, where $n$ is the number of firms in the index; the index will then continue trading with $n-1$ remaining firms—that is, there is no replacement for the defaulted firm.

13 As noted above, the composition of each index vintage is determined by a dealer poll, starting from the composition of the previous index. Typically, firms that became illiquid in the single-name CDS market or that have been downgraded/upgraded by one or more rating agencies are removed from the index and replaced with new firms.

14 While this approach minimizes, to the extent possible, the role of liquidity effects in our indicators of default risk, it does introduce the compositional changes in the CDX index that occur every six months when a new vintage is launched. These compositional effects, however, appear to be fairly small, reflecting the relatively small number of component changes from one vintage to another. As a robustness check, we re-did the analysis using the off-the-run CDX indexes, and the results were essentially the same.
launched in response to these adverse economic developments and to help stimulate economic growth. The flare-up in CDX spreads in the spring of 2010, which was part of a deterioration in broad financial conditions, largely reflected investors’ concerns about European sovereign debt and banking issues as well as concerns about the durability of the global recovery. Although financial market conditions improved somewhat early in the second half of 2010—partly as investors increasingly priced in further monetary policy accommodation—the Federal Reserve initiated LSAP-II in the second half of the year, in response to indications of a slowing pace of economic recovery and persistent disinflationary pressures.

Financial markets were buffeted again over the second half of 2011 by changes in investors’ assessments of the ongoing European crisis as well as in their evaluation of the U.S. economic outlook. As a result, the credit outlook for the corporate sector deteriorated markedly. With economic activity expanding only at a slow pace and with labor market conditions remaining weak, the FOMC launched the MEP with the intent to put further downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and to help make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
3.2 Financial Sector Default Risk

We now turn to the construction of indicators of default risk for the financial sector. In light of the above discussion, the most natural such indicator would be a credit derivative index, with its components referencing CDS contracts of a broad array of U.S. financial institutions. Such an index, unfortunately, does not exist. As an alternative, we use the single-name (North American) 5-year CDS contracts to construct simple indexes of default risk for two types of financial institutions: commercial banks and securities broker-dealers.

Our focus on these two types of financial intermediaries is motivated by the fact that a significant portion of the credit extended to businesses and households—both on- and off-balance-sheet—is through the commercial banking sector (Bassett et al. [2011]). Thus, our commercial bank CDS index captures the market-based assessment of the default risk for the traditional class of financial intermediaries. In contrast, securities broker-dealers, a class of highly leveraged financial intermediaries, buy and sell a large array of securities for a fee, hold an inventory of securities for resale, and differ from other types of institutional investors by their active pro-cyclical management of leverage. As documented by Adrian and Shin [2010], expansions in broker-dealer assets are associated with increases in leverage as broker-dealers take advantage of greater balance sheet capacity; conversely, contractions in their assets are associated with de-leveraging of their balance sheets. Reflecting their role as a “marginal investor,” broker-dealers play an important role in most financial markets, and, as shown by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek [2012], changes in their creditworthiness—as measured by the movements in their CDS spreads—are closely related to fluctuations in the effective risk-bearing of the broader financial sector.

To construct these default-risk indicators, we selected from the Markit’s single-name database the daily 5-year CDS quotes for a sample of 26 U.S. commercial banks and nine U.S. broker-dealers. In terms of the triggering events, we focus on the contracts with the Modified Restructuring (MR) clause, which, in addition to an outright default, considers any change in the nature of a company’s financial liabilities in the absence of default as a credit event. Using these micro-level data, we calculate CDS indexes for the portfolios of both commercial banks and broker-dealers as simple (unweighted) cross-sectional averages of the available spreads at each day.

Restructuring without an outright default could include a reduction in interest rate or principal; postponement or deferral of payment; a change in the priority of an obligation; or a change in the composition of a principal or interest payment. On April 8, 2008, ISDA implemented the so-called Big Bang Protocol in order to increase standardization to single-name CDS contracts and trading conventions. For our purposes, the most important change was a move toward “XR” contracts, which do not include restructuring as a credit event. Historically, the market convention has been for (North American) investment-grade names—the segment of the credit quality spectrum that is relevant for the financial sector—to trade with an MR clause and (North American) speculative-grade names to trade with an XR clause. The Big Bang made XR contracts the standard convention for all names. All else equal, CDS contracts with an MR clause should trade at a premium to XR contracts because they provide the protection buyer with coverage for an additional type of credit event; moreover, there is some evidence suggesting that since the Big Bang, XR contracts have become the most liquid segment of the market. As a robustness check, we re-did the analysis using CDS spreads based on the XR contracts, but this change had a minimal effect on our results. (Results of this sensitivity analysis are available from the authors upon request.)
As shown in Figure 2, the behavior of these portfolio default-risk indicators over the recent crisis closely mimics that of the broader investment-grade U.S. corporate sector—financial firms are rated almost exclusively as investment grade by the major rating agencies. One problem with the construction of these indexes is that the underlying micro-level panels are of unbalanced nature, as smaller and less prominent institutions have frequent gaps in their CDS series. The lack of reliable CDS quotes for certain institutions on certain days most likely reflects the occasional impairment in the functioning of the credit derivatives market, especially during the most acute phases of the financial crisis. While the cross-sectional average of the component quotes provides an unbiased estimate of the average level of CDS spreads at any given point in time, our formal analysis relies on the changes in the default-risk indicators. Because of potential changes in the composition of the indexes between two periods, taking first difference of the indexes shown in Figure 2 would, consequently, introduce a significant amount of noise in the differenced series, thereby complicating the interpretation of the results.

To deal with this problem, we first difference the CDS spreads for each component of the

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**Figure 2: Measures of Default Risk in the U.S. Financial Sector**

*NOTE: The solid line depicts the average (5-year) CDS index for a sample of 26 U.S. commercial banks, while the dotted line depicts the average (5-year) CDS index for a sample of nine U.S. broker-dealers (see text for details). The shaded vertical bar represents the 2007-09 NBER-dated recession. LSAP-I announcement days are Nov-25-2008, Dec-01-2008, Dec-16-2008, Jan-28-2009, and Mar-18-2009; LSAP-II announcement days are Aug-10-2010, Sep-21-2010, and Nov-03-2010; and the MEP announcement date is Sep-21-2011.*
two indexes and then compute the cross-sectional averages for the two portfolios of financial firms. When calculating the cross-sectional averages of the 1-day changes in CDS spreads, we use trimmed means, which delete the smallest and the largest changes in CDS spreads from the sample at each point in time. By using such a robust estimator of the population mean, we mitigate the effects of extreme values that might arise from abrupt changes in the liquidity of the single-name CDS market.\footnote{As an additional sensitivity check, we also computed winsorized means of the underlying CDS changes and obtained essentially the same results; see Maronna et al.\cite{Maronna2006} for a useful exposition of robust estimators.}

### 4 Asset Purchase Programs and Default Risk

To examine the effect of LSAP announcements on default risk more, we first re-estimate the event-style regression specification (1), using the changes in our default-risk indicators as dependent variables. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 2. According to these results, the announcement effects of the first two asset purchase programs (LSAP-I and LSAP-II) had no statistically discernible effect on the broad indicators of default risk or on the CDS premiums of commercial banks and broker-dealers. In contrast, the MEP announcement is associated with a statistically significant increase in all four default-risk indicators, with the effect being most pronounced for the speculative-grade CDX index (33 basis points) and for the CDS spreads of broker-dealers (17 basis points). These sizable increases in the CDS spreads induced by the MEP announcement are likely due to the fact that the announced size of the program was somewhat

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{LSAP Announcements and Selected Default Risk Indicators (Event-Style Regression Analysis)}
\begin{tabular}{|l|cc|cc|cc|c|}
\hline
\multirow{2}{*}{Default Risk Indicator} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{LSAP-I$^a$} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{LSAP-II$^b$} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{MEP$^c$} & \\
& Coef. & S.E. & Coef. & S.E. & Coef. & S.E. & $R^2$
\hline
CDX: investment grade & -0.049 & 0.068 & 0.011 & 0.009 & 0.063 & 0.002 & 0.005 \\
CDX: speculative grade & -0.237 & 0.257 & 0.030 & 0.054 & 0.331 & 0.008 & 0.007 \\
CDS: commercial banks & -0.022 & 0.021 & 0.001 & 0.021 & 0.071 & 0.001 & 0.000 \\
CDS: broker-dealers & -0.013 & 0.026 & -0.014 & 0.027 & 0.170 & 0.003 & 0.004 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\footnote{As an additional sensitivity check, we also computed winsorized means of the underlying CDS changes and obtained essentially the same results; see Maronna et al.\cite{Maronna2006} for a useful exposition of robust estimators.}

**Note**: Sample period: daily data from Jan-02-2008 to Dec-30-2011. The dependent variable in each regression is the 1-day change in the specified default risk indicator. Entries under the heading *Coef.* denote estimates of the average effect (in percentage points) of LSAP-I, LSAP-II, and MEP announcements (see text for details), while entries under the heading *S.E.* denote the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors.

\(a\) LSAP-I is a 0/1-variable that equals one on the following five announcement days: Nov-25-2008, Dec-01-2008, Dec-16-2008, Jan-28-2009, and Mar-18-2009.

\(b\) LSAP-II is a 0/1-variable that equals one on the following three announcement days: Aug-10-2010, Sep-21-2010, and Nov-03-2010.

\(c\) MEP is 0/1-variable that equals one on the announcement date of Sep-21-2011.
Table 3: Default Risk and Selected Interest Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Default Risk Indicator</th>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasury(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agency MBS(^b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agency Debt(^c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: investment grade</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: speculative grade</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.106</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>-0.435</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>-0.714</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS: commercial banks</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.173</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS: broker-dealers</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.409</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample period: daily data from Jan-02-2008 to Dec-30-2011. The dependent variable in each regression is the 1-day change in the specified default risk indicator. Entries under the heading \textit{Coeff.} denote OLS estimates of the coefficients associated with the 1-day change in the specified interest rate; entries under the heading \textit{S.E.} denote the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors. All specifications include a constant (not reported).

\(^a\) 5-year Treasury yield.
\(^b\) 30-year agency MBS yield.
\(^c\) Long-term (gt. 5y) agency debt yield.

less than than markets had originally anticipated. In combination, the results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that while LSAP announcements led to significant declines in Treasury, agency, and MBS yields, they had no obvious effect on expected default risk as measured by the changes in CDS spreads.

To understand the lack of response of CDS spreads to LSAP announcements, it is instructive to examine the relationship between the changes in default risk and the changes in interest rates during the 2008-11 period. In Table 3 we report the coefficients from the regression of the daily change in each of our four default-risk indicators on the daily change in the three benchmark interest rates: the 5-year Treasury yield; the 30-year (current coupon) agency MBS yield; and the yield on longer-term (maturity greater than five years) agency bonds.

Several points about these results are worth noting. First, all the coefficients on interest rate changes are negative and highly significant, both in economic and statistical terms. This negative relationship implies that when longer-term risk-free rates were falling during the crisis, default risk in a broad sense and default risk specific to the financial sector were both increasing. Second, in terms of the type of interest rate, the changes in Treasury yields appear to have had the largest economic impact on the changes in the CDS spreads, followed by the changes in yields on longer-term agency bonds. And lastly, the largest (absolute) coefficients are associated with the speculative-grade firms and with the broker-dealers, two relatively highly leveraged segments of the
U.S. corporate sector.

Two natural and related interpretations of these results spring to mind. The first is that the negative relationship between the changes in default risk and interest rates is driven by adverse news to economic fundamentals, which signals a deterioration in the outlook for credit quality, reflecting a downward revision to future growth prospects. As a result, market-based indicators of default risk increase, while longer-term risk-free rates decline. This interpretation is consistent with the result that the negative relationship between the changes in risk-free interest rates and CDS spreads is most pronounced for lower-rated corporate credits and broker-dealers, highly-leveraged financial intermediaries that faced significant balance sheet and funding pressures during this period.

The second interpretation is that there are shocks to risk premiums that trigger a “flight-to-quality,” a phenomenon that causes investors to dump risky assets to purchase safer investments. In that case, the expected returns on risky assets increase, while those on riskless assets fall. This interpretation is consistent with the result that, in absolute terms, the largest coefficients on interest rate changes are associated with Treasuries and longer-term agency bonds. We argue below that both of these mechanisms will lead to a downward bias in the OLS estimates of the response of CDS spreads to LSAP announcements.

4.1 Identification Through Heteroskedasticity

As emphasized by Rigobon and Sack [2004], causal inference regarding the impact of policy announcements on asset prices may be difficult in an environment where both policy rates—in our case yields on Treasuries, MBS, and agency debt—and asset prices endogenously respond to common shocks in periods surrounding policy announcements. To illustrate the argument more formally, let $\Delta i_t$ denote the change in yields on safe assets that are directly influenced by the LSAP announcements, and let $\Delta s_t$ denote the change in yields on risky corporate assets, as measured by the changes in the relevant CDS spreads. Furthermore, let $x_t$ denote a common shock that simultaneously affects both CDS spreads and risk-free interest rates; $\epsilon_t$ is a policy shock (i.e., the LSAP announcement); and $\eta_t$ is a shock to CDS spreads that is independent of the common shock $x_t$. It is assumed that shocks $x_t$, $\epsilon_t$, and $\eta_t$ are homoskedastic with variances $\sigma^2_x$, $\sigma^2_\epsilon$, and $\sigma^2_\eta$, respectively.

The response of interest rates and CDS spreads to various shocks is captured by a simultaneous system of equations of the form:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta i_t &= \beta \Delta s_t + \gamma x_t + \epsilon_t; \\
\Delta s_t &= \alpha \Delta i_t + x_t + \eta_t.
\end{align*}
\]

The aim of the exercise is to estimate the structural coefficient $\alpha$, which measures the direct

\[17\]While the government guarantee behind agency MBS was certainly prized by investors, these securities carry a significant prepayment risk. They were therefore unlikely, during flight-to-quality episodes, to be viewed by investors as safe as Treasuries or agency bonds.
effect of the changes in the risk-free interest rates on the changes in CDS spreads vis-à-vis the announcement effect \( \epsilon_t \). In this context, a positive realization of \( \eta_t \) can be interpreted as an adverse shock to economic fundamentals (i.e., growth prospects), which increases the likelihood of future defaults. If longer-term risk-free rates decline in response to a deterioration in the economic outlook, it follows that \( \beta < 0 \). The common shock \( x_t \), by contrast, can be interpreted as a shock to risk premiums, which captures the flight-to-quality dynamics in financial markets. A sudden flight-to-quality boosts the demand for safe assets, putting downward pressure on risk-free rates, while causing yields on risky assets to increase. As a result, we also expect that \( \gamma < 0 \).

The reduced form of the system (2)–(3) is given by

\[
\Delta i_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha \beta} \left[ (\beta + \gamma) x_t + \beta \eta_t + \epsilon_t \right];
\]

\[
\Delta s_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha \beta} \left[ (1 + \alpha \gamma) x_t + \eta_t + \alpha \epsilon_t \right],
\]

and the bias of the coefficient \( \alpha \) obtained from an OLS regression of \( \Delta s_t \) on \( \Delta i_t \) is equal to

\[
\alpha_{OLS} = \alpha + (1 - \alpha \beta) \left[ \frac{\beta \sigma^2_{\eta} + (\beta + \gamma) \sigma^2_x}{\sigma^2 + \beta^2 \sigma^2_{\eta} + (\beta + \gamma)^2 \sigma^2_x} \right].
\]

To understand the sign of the bias, suppose that \( \beta = 0 \), so that there is no direct feedback from CDS spreads to risk-free interest rates in response to a deterioration in economic outlook. In that case, the OLS coefficient \( \alpha \) is given by

\[
\alpha_{OLS} = \alpha + \frac{\gamma \sigma^2_x}{\sigma^2 + \gamma^2 \sigma^2_x} < \alpha,
\]

where the downward bias in \( \alpha_{OLS} \) reflects the flight-to-quality phenomena (i.e., \( \gamma < 0 \)).

Now consider the alternative case in which \( \gamma = 0 \) and, without loss of generality, assume that \( \sigma^2_x = 0 \), so that the flight-to-quality shocks do not play any role in financial markets. In that case, the bias in \( \alpha_{OLS} \) is due to the simultaneous response of safe and risky assets to the fundamental economic shock \( \eta_t \):

\[
\alpha_{OLS} = \alpha + (1 - \alpha \beta) \frac{\beta \sigma^2_{\eta}}{\sigma^2 + \beta^2 \sigma^2_{\eta}}.
\]

If CDS spreads increase in response to policy innovations that reduce risk-free long-term interest rates then \( \alpha < 0 \), implying that \( (1 - \alpha \beta) > 1 \), and the OLS estimator of \( \alpha \) is again biased downward relative to the true structural coefficient \( \alpha \). Moreover, with \( \alpha < 0 \), the size of this downward bias is an increasing function of \( |\alpha| \); that is, the downward bias of the estimator \( \alpha_{OLS} \) will be greater the more sensitive is the response of yields on risky assets to the policy intervention.

At the same time, the bias of the OLS estimator \( \alpha_{OLS} \) is a decreasing function of \( \sigma^2_x \), the variance of the policy shock. Note also that as \( \sigma^2_t \) becomes large relative to \( \sigma^2_{\eta} \) and \( \sigma^2_x \), the bias disappears.
As emphasized by Rigobon and Sack [2004], high-frequency event studies that use OLS to estimate the effect of the changes in policy rates on financial asset prices effectively assume that \( \epsilon_t \) is the only source of volatility on policy announcement days. Given the heightened volatility and strains that characterized financial markets during this period, this seems a questionable assumption.

Building on the work of Rigobon [2003], Rigobon and Sack [2004] propose an estimator for the coefficient \( \alpha \) that is identified through the fact that the volatility of policy shocks increases on policy announcement days. The essential idea is that by knowing \( a \) priori on which dates the variance of policy shocks shifts, the researcher is able to identify the response of asset prices to changes in policy rates under a fairly weak set of assumptions by looking at changes in the comovement between policy rates and financial asset prices.

More concretely, let \( P \) denote a subset of \( T_p \) policy announcement days and \( \tilde{P} \) denote a subset of \( T_\rho \) non-announcement days. Furthermore, let \( \sigma^2_{\epsilon|P} = E[\epsilon_t^2 | t \in P] \) and \( \sigma^2_{\epsilon|\tilde{P}} = E[\epsilon_t^2 | t \in \tilde{P}] \) denote the conditional variances of policy shocks in the \( P \) and \( \tilde{P} \) subsamples, respectively, while \( \text{Var}_P = E[\Delta i_t \Delta s_t | t \in P] \) and \( \text{Var}_{\tilde{P}} = E[\Delta i_t \Delta s_t | t \in \tilde{P}] \) are the variance-covariance matrices of \( \Delta i_t \) and \( \Delta s_t \) across the two subsamples. Then under the identifying assumption that \( \sigma^2_{\epsilon|P} \neq \sigma^2_{\epsilon|\tilde{P}} \),

\[
\Delta V = \text{Var}_P - \text{Var}_{\tilde{P}} = \left( \frac{\sigma^2_{\epsilon|P} - \sigma^2_{\epsilon|\tilde{P}}}{(1 - \alpha \beta)^2} \right) \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \alpha \\ \alpha & \alpha^2 \end{bmatrix},
\]

and

\[
\alpha_i = \frac{\Delta V_{12}}{\Delta V_{11}} \quad \text{or} \quad \alpha_s = \frac{\Delta V_{22}}{\Delta V_{12}},
\]

where \( \Delta V_{ij} \) denotes the \((i, j)\)-th element of the matrix \( \Delta V \), are both consistent estimators of the structural coefficient \( \alpha \).

As shown by Rigobon and Sack [2004], these two estimators can be obtained from a simple instrumental variables (IV) procedure. To see this, define \( \Delta i \) and \( \Delta s \) as the \( T \times 1 \) vectors of stacked data corresponding to the two subsamples (i.e., \( T = T_p + T_\rho \)); let \( \text{d}_P \) denote the \( T \times 1 \) vector such that \( d_{t,P} = 1 \) if \( t \in P \) and zero otherwise; and let \( \text{d}_\rho = \text{I} - \text{d}_P \), where \( \text{I} \) denotes the \( T \times 1 \) vector of ones. Define

\[
\mathbf{z}_i = [\text{d}_P \odot \Delta i - \text{d}_\rho \odot \Delta i] \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{z}_s = [\text{d}_P \odot \Delta s - \text{d}_\rho \odot \Delta s],
\]

\[18\]For extensions of this identification approach see Sentana and Fiorentini [2001] and Klein and Vella [2010].

\[19\]Note that a necessary condition for identifications is that the coefficients \( \alpha, \beta, \) and \( \gamma \) are stable across the two sets of dates.
where \( \odot \) denotes the element-wise multiplication (i.e., the Hadamard product) of two vectors. Then the estimate of \( \alpha_i \) can be obtained directly from an IV regression of \( \Delta s \) on \( \Delta i \) using \( z_i \) as an instrument, while an IV regression of \( \Delta s \) on \( \Delta i \) using \( z_s \) as an instrument yields an estimate of \( \alpha_s \):

\[
\hat{\alpha}_i = (z_i' \Delta i)^{-1} (z_i' \Delta s) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\alpha}_s = (z_s' \Delta i)^{-1} (z_s' \Delta s).
\]

In this so-called identification-through-heteroskedasticity approach, the coefficients \( \alpha_i \) and \( \alpha_s \) can be estimated separately by 2SLS, but one can also impose a restriction that \( \alpha_i = \alpha_s = \alpha \) and estimate the structural coefficient \( \alpha \) using GMM:

\[
\hat{\alpha}_{GMM} = \arg \min_{\alpha} \left[ (\Delta s - \alpha \Delta i)' Z W [Z' (\Delta s - \alpha \Delta i)] \right],
\]

where \( Z = [z, z_s] \) is the \( T \times 2 \) matrix of valid instruments, and \( W \) is an appropriately defined weighting matrix. Because the coefficient \( \alpha \) is over-identified, one can test the restriction \( \alpha_i = \alpha_s \).

And lastly, in the case where \( \Delta s \) is a \( T \times k \) matrix of asset prices—so that \( \alpha = [\alpha_1 \, \alpha_2 \ldots \, \alpha_k]' \) is a \( k \times 1 \) vector of policy response coefficients—it is natural to implement this approach within a system of equations estimated by GMM, where \( Z = [z, z_{1,s}, z_{2,s}, \ldots, z_{k,s}] \) is \( T \times (1 + k) \) matrix of valid instruments.

### 4.2 The Results

Before delving into the results, we discuss the construction of the \( P \) and \( \tilde{P} \) subsamples, a critical aspect of the approach outlined above. The subsample \( P \) naturally contains the nine LSAP announcement dates used in the event-style analysis. The construction of the subsample \( \tilde{P} \) consists of the following steps. First, let \( \tau_j, j = 1, 2, \ldots, 9 \), denote the \( j \)-th LSAP announcement day and define a set of dates \( \tilde{\tau}_j = \{ t : t \in [\tau_j - 20, \tau_j - 19, \ldots, \tau_j - 2, \tau_j + 2, \tau_j + 3, \ldots, \tau_j + 20] \text{ and } t \neq \tau_k \text{ for } k \neq j \} \); that is, the set of dates \( \tilde{\tau}_j \) includes all days in the 20-day symmetric window bracketing the announcement day \( \tau_j \), except the days \( \tau_j - 1, \tau_j, \) and \( \tau_j + 1 \) and any other announcement day \( \tau_k \) that may be covered by this window.

In the second step, we define a subset \( \tilde{P} = \tilde{P}_1 \cup \tilde{P}_2 \cup \ldots \cup \tilde{P}_9 \), and from this set of dates, we eliminated all dates associated with non-LSAP policy announcements. These non-LSAP announcements included speeches and testimonies by policymakers as well as any other FOMC communication that could have left an imprint in financial markets. And lastly, given that our sample period is characterized by an exceptional turmoil in financial markets, we also eliminated from the subset \( \tilde{P} \) a small number of dates associated with extreme changes in the two CDX indexes, a move designed to mitigate the effect of outliers on our estimates.²⁰ All told, this procedure yielded 123

²⁰Specifically, we dropped from the subset \( \tilde{P} \) all dates in which the change in either investment- or speculative-grade CDX index was below the 1st or above the 99th percentile of its respective distribution.
observations for the final subsample $\tilde{P}$.

In the analysis, we consider three estimators of $\alpha$, the coefficient measuring the response of default risk to changes in risk-free rates induced by the LSAP announcements: (1) HET-2SLS-i: a 2SLS estimator of the coefficient $\alpha$ obtained from an IV regression of $\Delta s_t$ on $\Delta i_t$, using $z_i$ as an instrument (this corresponds to the estimator $\alpha_i$ above); (2) HET-SE-GMM: a single-equation GMM estimator of $\alpha$ that uses both $z_i$ and $z_s$ as instruments (this corresponds to the estimator $\alpha_{GMM}$ above); and (3) HET-SYS-GMM: a system GMM estimator of the vector of coefficient $\alpha$ that uses all valid instruments when analyzing the response of multiple default-risk indicators to changes in risk-free interest rates. In both instances of GMM estimation, the optimal weighting matrix is obtained from a two-stage procedure that sets the weighting matrix equal to the identity matrix in the first stage and then computes the optimal weighting matrix based on the first-stage estimates.

In Table 4, we report the various estimates of the coefficient $\alpha$, focusing on the response of broad measures of U.S. corporate credit risk—that is, the investment- and speculative-grade CDX indexes—to the LSAP announcements. We consider three alternative measures of interest rate changes: the change in the 5-year Treasury yield; the change in the 30-year agency MBS yield; and the change in the yield on longer-term (greater than five years) agency bonds.

The top panel reports the results for the case where $\Delta i_t$ corresponds to the change in the 5-year Treasury yield. Using the HET-2SLS-i estimator, the estimates of $\alpha$ for both investment- and speculative-grade CDS indexes are positive but imprecisely estimated and hence are not statistically significant. Although the standard errors are roughly the same across the three estimators, the point estimates of the coefficient $\alpha$ increase substantially as we move from a single-equation 2SLS estimation to either the single-equation or system GMM estimation methods. In particular, the HET-SYS-GMM estimator yields an estimate of $\alpha$ for the investment-grade CDX index of 0.455 and an estimate of 1.365 for its speculative-grade counterpart. In addition to being marginally statistically significant, one cannot reject—using the Hansen [1982] $J$-test—the over-identifying restrictions for either the single-equation or system GMM estimators.

As shown in the bottom two panels, using the agency MBS yield or the agency bond yield in place of the Treasury yield to measure the changes in risk-free interest rates produces similar results. In all instances, the estimates $\alpha$ are positive, and they become statistically significant with the use of GMM methods. In addition, when using the HET-SYS-GMM estimator, the estimated response of both investment- and speculative-grade CDX indexes to the declines in agency MBS and agency debt yields prompted by the LSAP announcements is comparable to the response of the two default-risk indicators to the LSAP-induced declines in the 5-year Treasury yield. Again,

---

21 Note that in our notation, $T_P = 9$ and $T_{\tilde{P}} = 123$. Because the two samples are of unequal sizes, all endogenous variables and instruments in the $P$ subsample are normalized by $\sqrt{T_P}$, while those in the $\tilde{P}$ subsample are normalized by $\sqrt{T_{\tilde{P}}}$. It should also be noted that our results were robust to reasonable variation in the choice of dates included in the subsample $\tilde{P}$. 

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Table 4: LSAP Announcements, Interest Rates, and Default Risk
(Identification Through Heteroskedasticity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Rate: Treasury (5y)</th>
<th>HET-2SLS-i</th>
<th>HET-SE-GMM</th>
<th>HET-SYS-GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Default Risk Indicator</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: investment grade</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: speculative grade</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; W&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; J&lt;sub&gt;T&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.218/0.226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Rate: Agency MBS (30y)</th>
<th>HET-2SLS-i</th>
<th>HET-SE-GMM</th>
<th>HET-SYS-GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Default Risk Indicator</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: investment grade</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: speculative grade</td>
<td>0.685</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>1.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; W&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; J&lt;sub&gt;T&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.236/0.320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Rate: Agency Debt (gt. 5y)</th>
<th>HET-2SLS-i</th>
<th>HET-SE-GMM</th>
<th>HET-SYS-GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Default Risk Indicator</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: investment grade</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX: speculative grade</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; W&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; J&lt;sub&gt;T&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.193/0.255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Obs = 132. Dependent variable in each regression is the 1-day change in the specified default risk indicator. Entries under the heading Coef. denote estimates—based on three different IV-heteroskedasticity estimators—of the coefficients associated with the 1-day change in the specified interest rate; entries under the heading S.E. denote the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors. Estimators: (1) HET-2SLS-i = single-equation 2SLS; (2) HET-SE-GMM = single-equation GMM; and (3) HET-SYS-GMM = two-equation GMM system (see text for details). All specifications include a constant (not reported).

<sup>a</sup>P-value for the joint significance test of coefficients associated with interest rate changes in the two-equation GMM system.

<sup>b</sup>P-value for the Hansen [1982] J-test of the over-identifying restrictions. In the single-equation GMM estimation, the first/second p-value corresponds to investment-grade/speculative-grade CDX index.

as indicated by the p-values of the J-test, we do not reject the over-identifying restrictions in all the cases.

The results in Table 4 imply that market-based measures of corporate default risk, as measured by the CDX indexes, decline significantly in response to a drop in the yields on safe
Table 5: LSAP Announcements, Interest Rates, and Financial Sector Default Risk  
(*Identification Through Heteroskedasticity*)

### Interest Rate: Treasury (5y)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Default Risk Indicator</th>
<th>HET-2SLS-(i)</th>
<th>HET-SE-GMM</th>
<th>HET-SYS-GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS: commercial banks</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr (&gt;\ W^a)</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr (&gt;\ J_T^b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS: broker-dealers</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Interest Rate: Agency MBS (30y)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Default Risk Indicator</th>
<th>HET-2SLS-(i)</th>
<th>HET-SE-GMM</th>
<th>HET-SYS-GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS: commercial banks</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr (&gt;\ W^a)</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr (&gt;\ J_T^b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Interest Rate: Agency Debt (gt. 5y)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Default Risk Indicator</th>
<th>HET-2SLS-(i)</th>
<th>HET-SE-GMM</th>
<th>HET-SYS-GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS: commercial banks</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr (&gt;\ W^a)</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr (&gt;\ J_T^b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Obs = 132. Dependent variable in each regression is the 1-day change in the specified financial sector default risk indicator. Entries under the heading Coef. denote estimates—based on three different IV-heteroskedasticity estimators—of the coefficients associated with the 1-day change in the specified interest rate; entries under the heading S.E. denote the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors. Estimators: (1) HET-2SLS-\(i\) = single-equation 2SLS; (2) HET-SE-GMM = single-equation GMM; and (3) HET-SYS-GMM = two-equation GMM system (see text for details). All specifications include a constant (not reported).

\( a \) \( p \)-value for the joint significance test of coefficients associated with interest rate changes in the two-equation GMM system.

\( b \) \( p \)-value for the \textit{Hansen} [1982] \( J \)-test of the over-identifying restrictions. In the single-equation GMM estimation, the first/second \( p \)-value corresponds to commercial bank/broker-dealers CDS index.

assets induced by the LSAP announcements. Moreover, the system-GMM estimates indicate that the decline in the speculative-grade default-risk indicator is roughly three times as large as in the investment-grade segment of the U.S. corporate sector, a result consistent with that of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011], who find that the first asset purchase program
(LSAP-I) significantly lowered yields on lower-rated corporate bonds. More generally, these results are consistent with the earlier discussion, which argued that an OLS event-type estimator of the change in CDS spreads on the LSAP announcement indicators is likely to be biased downward, relative to an estimator that controls for the simultaneity between the changes in risk-free rates and CDS spreads during the crisis period.

We now turn to the impact of the LSAP announcements on the market perception of default risk in the financial sector. Table 5 summarizes the results from IV regressions, in which the change in the CDS spreads for our two types of financial intermediaries is regressed on the change in the benchmark risk-free interest rates. The striking feature of these results is that, regardless of the estimation procedure or the choice of the benchmark interest rate, all estimates of $\alpha$ are statistically indistinguishable from zero; moreover, the estimates are essentially zero in economic terms. Thus, in contrast to the response of broad, economy wide indicators of corporate credit risk, the results in Table 5 indicate that the declines in risk-free rates induced by the LSAP announcements had no discernible effect on the CDS spreads of U.S. commercial banks or broker-dealers.

The combination of results presented in Tables 4 and 5 implies that the Federal Reserve’s asset purchase programs that significantly lowered the level of longer-term interest rates, while appreciably reducing the overall level of default risk in the economy, boosted the CDS spreads of key financial intermediaries. To formally test this hypothesis, we estimate the response of the CDS spreads of commercial banks and broker-dealers relative to the response of the investment-grade CDX index, the relevant benchmark as all institutions in our two indexes carry an investment-grade rating. Specifically, we define the relative default risk in the financial sector as

$$\Delta \tilde{s}_t = \Delta \text{CDS}_t - \Delta \text{CDX}^{IG}_t,$$

where $\Delta \text{CDS}_t$ is the change in the CDS spread for either commercial banks or broker-dealers and $\Delta \text{CDX}^{IG}_t$ is the change in the investment-grade CDX index. Using this measure of relative default risk, we estimate the response coefficient $\alpha$ for the two type of financial intermediaries employing a two-equation system-GMM estimator (HET-SYS-GMM) that uses all available instruments for each equation.

The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6. Consistent with our previous findings, the estimated response coefficient $\alpha$ for both commercial banks and broker-dealers is negative and statistically significant when looking at the LSAP-induced changes in the Treasury and agency MBS yields—that is, relative to a broad indicator of corporate credit risk, the CDS spreads of commercial banks and broker-dealers increased in response to the declines in risk-free interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements. Although the coefficient estimates are similar in magnitude when the changes in yields on longer-term agency bonds are used to gauge the effect of the LSAP announcements on the relative default risk in the financial sector, the standard errors in that case are notably larger, and the estimates of the two response coefficients are statistically
Table 6: LSAP Announcements, Interest Rates, and Relative Financial Sector Default Risk

(Identification Through Heteroskedasticity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Default Risk Indicator</th>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS: commercial banks</td>
<td>Treasury^a</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS: broker-dealers</td>
<td>Agency MBS^b</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>-0.369</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>-0.298</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency Debt^c</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Obs = 132. The dependent variable in each regression $\Delta \hat{s}_t = (\Delta CDS_t - \Delta CDX_{IG}^{c})$, where $\Delta CDS_t$ is the 1-day change in the specified financial sector default risk indicator and $\Delta CDX_{IG}^{c}$ is the 1-day change in the investment-grade CDX index. Entries under the heading Coef. denote HET-SYS-GMM estimates—from a two-equation system—of the coefficients associated with the 1-day change in the specified interest rate (see text for details); entries under the heading S.E. denote the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors. All specifications include a constant (not reported).

^a 5-year Treasury yield.
^b 30-year agency MBS yield.
^c Long-term (gt. 5y) agency debt yield.
^d p-value for the joint significance test of coefficients associated with interest rate changes.
^e p-value for the Hansen 1982 J-test of the over-identifying restrictions.

indistinguishable from zero.

To the extent that loans extended by financial intermediaries, along with their other financial investments, should be less likely to default or deliver subpar returns when the broad-based indicators of corporate default risk fall, these results appear puzzling. One possible explanation for these findings is that the profitability of the financial sector—the primary purpose of which is to perform maturity transformation—declines when longer-term interest rates fall relative to short-term interest rates. This interpretation is consistent with the recent work of English et al. 2012, who document that the return on assets in the U.S. commercial banking sector drops sharply in response to the flattening of the Treasury yield curve, reflecting the ensuing compression of banks’ net interest margins.

At the time when the financial sector is already facing significant capital and liquidity pressures, an LSAP-induced reduction in longer-term interest rates would put a further downward pressure on the sector’s profitability, which may cause the CDS spreads of financial institutions to increase—relative to broad measures of default risk—because the deterioration in their near-term creditworthiness outweighs the improvement in the economic outlook. An alternative possibility is that the various LSAP announcements reinforced the investors’ perception that the government may impose significant losses on the holders of unsecured debt claims issued by the financial sector because the LSAPs eliminated the extreme tail risk associated with the systemic financial crises. If market participants believed that the wholesale government bailout of the financial sector—which
would have been more likely in the case of an extreme deterioration in economic conditions and in which all creditors would also likely be made whole—was less probable as a consequence of the LSAPs, the financial sector CDS spreads might increase relative to broad measures of corporate credit risk.

4.3 A Case Study of the Top 5 Financial Holding Companies

One potential critique of the above analysis is that the single-name CDS spreads of banks and broker-dealers in the two sectoral indexes are not as liquid as the components of the tradable CDX index. As a result, our default-risk indicators for the financial sector may not respond to the LSAP announcements in a sufficiently timely manner. In addition, to the extent that default risk in the U.S. financial sector during the crisis was concentrated at the largest institutions, the focus on the average change in bank or broker-dealer CDS spreads may not be very indicative of how the LSAPs may have altered the market’s perception of default risk in the financial sector.

As a final exercise, therefore, we focus on the CDS spreads of the five largest and most prominent U.S. Financial Holding Companies (FHCs): JPMorgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., and Morgan Stanley. Reflecting their systemic importance, the financial health of these FHCs was of direct concern to both policymakers and market participants during the crisis. As a result, the CDS contracts written on these companies are highly liquid. Through their commercial bank subsidiaries, these FHCs also engage in the traditional provision of credit to businesses and households, while at the same time pursuing nonbanking activities that offer customers a wide range of financial services, including the opportunity to invest in securities and, in some instances, to purchase insurance products; they also operate highly leveraged broker-dealer subsidiaries, which as argued above, play an important role in financial markets.

Figure 3 shows the CDS spreads for these systemically important global financial institutions. The investors’ perception of default risk associated with these five institutions clearly changed significantly with the onset of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007. Among them, the two former investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, had the most volatile CDS spreads, reflecting, in part, their business models that involved the use of high leverage and heavy reliance on short-term funding to engage in maturity transformation. Not surprisingly, there is a high

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22 As a simple check of this hypothesis, we re-did our event-style analysis using the properly constructed 2-day changes of the sectoral CDS spread indexes, but the results were essentially the same as those reported in Table 2.

23 As before, our analysis is based on the CDS contracts with the MR clause. As a robustness check, we re-did the exercise using the CDS spreads based on the contracts with the XR clause, but that change had immaterial effects on the results.

24 On September 21, 2008, after being severely roiled by the turmoil that swept financial market in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies, a move that put them under the supervision of the Federal Reserve. As a consequence of this regulatory change, both institutions were granted access to permanent liquidity through the discount window, leading to a reduction in both the level and the volatility of their CDS spreads. Note that our subset of non-announcement days includes only days, when both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were no longer investment banks.
degree of comovement in the CDS spreads of these five institutions; indeed, reflecting their common exposure to the macroeconomic risk factors, the first principal component explains about 75 percent of the variability in the changes of CDS spreads over the crisis period.

To examine formally the impact of the LSAP announcements on the CDS spreads of these institutions—again relative to the investment-grade CDX index—we employ a system-GMM estimator, which allows to estimate simultaneously the response of the institutions-specific CDS spreads to the LSAP-induced change in the risk-free rates. In the estimation, we allow the response coefficient $\alpha$ to differ across the five FHCs. Table 7 reports the results of this exercise.

According to the entries in the table, the estimated response of the relative CDS spreads to a decline in the benchmark risk-free interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements is uniformly negative for all five FHCs. The median estimate of the response coefficient implies that a reduction of 100 basis points in the 5-year Treasury yield leads to a rise of about 30 basis points—relative to the investment-grade CDX index—in the CDS spreads of large FHCs; the median response to a decline in the yield on agency MBS is of similar magnitude, while the response to a decline in the yield on longer-term agency bonds, at 20 basis points, is slightly lower. These coefficients are also estimated with considerable precision, with standard errors on the order of five basis points or less. Furthermore, as evidenced by the $p$-values, the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected.
Table 7: LSAP Announcements, Interest Rates, and Relative CDS Spreads at Top 5 FHCs
(Identification Through Heteroskedasticity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative CDS Spread</th>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasury^a</td>
<td>Agency MBS^b</td>
<td>Agency Debt^c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPMorgan Chase</td>
<td>-0.340 0.032</td>
<td>-0.231 0.047</td>
<td>-0.155 0.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citigroup</td>
<td>-0.335 0.049</td>
<td>-0.330 0.048</td>
<td>-0.224 0.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America</td>
<td>-0.254 0.024</td>
<td>-0.360 0.051</td>
<td>-0.198 0.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldman Sachs</td>
<td>-0.311 0.044</td>
<td>-0.294 0.051</td>
<td>-0.181 0.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Stanley</td>
<td>-0.149 0.048</td>
<td>-0.113 0.107</td>
<td>0.005 0.049</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; W^d</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr &gt; J_T^e</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Obs = 132. The dependent variable in each regression \( \Delta \tilde{s}_i = (\Delta \text{CDS}_i - \Delta \text{CDX}^{IG}_i) \), where \( \Delta \text{CDS}_i \) is the 1-day change in the CDS spread for firm \( i \) and \( \Delta \text{CDX}^{IG}_i \) is the 1-day change in the investment-grade CDX index. Entries under the heading Coef. denote HET-SYS-GMM estimates—from a five-equation system—of the coefficients associated with the 1-day change in the specified interest rate (see text for details); entries under the heading S.E. denote the corresponding heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors. All specifications include a constant (not reported).

^a 5-year Treasury yield.
^b 30-year agency MBS yield.
^c Long-term (gt. 5y) agency debt yield.
^d \( p \)-value for the joint significance test of coefficients associated with interest rate changes.

In all instances. The estimates of the response coefficient are similar in magnitude across the five institutions, with the exception of Morgan Stanley, where the elasticity of CDS rates with respect to risk-free interest rates is estimated to be significantly lower. Overall, these results are consistent with our earlier findings, which showed that the CDS spreads of financial firms—relative to a broad measure of corporate credit risk—increased notably in response to the LSAP-induced reductions in the benchmark safe interest rates.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we analyzed the impact of the changes in risk-free interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements on indicators of default risk, both for the broad segments of the U.S. corporate sector and for the indicators specific to the financial sector. Most importantly, we used the identification-through-heterogeneity approach advocated by Rigobon [2003] and Rigobon and Sack [2004] to correct for the simultaneity bias that plagues the standard event-style analysis. This approach, which allows us to identify more cleanly the structural response of CDS spreads to the LSAP-induced declines in the benchmark risk-free interest rates, indicates that the policy an-
nouncements led to a significant reduction in default risk for both investment- and speculative-grade corporate credits.

While the unconventional policy measures employed by the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy appeared to have lowered the overall level of credit risk in the economy, they had no measurable impact on the default risk specific to the financial sector. Put differently, our results imply that the declines in longer-term interest rates induced by the LSAP announcements boosted default risk in the financial sector relative to the overall level of credit risk in the economy. This apparently puzzling result could reflect the fact that the flattening of the yield curve engineered by the LSAPs reduced the profitability of financial institutions that intermediate funds across maturities, which, in turn, boosted the CDS spreads of financial firms.

Alternatively, the CDS spreads of financial institutions may have increased because the announcements of the purchase programs led market participants to lower their perceived likelihood of wholesale bailouts of the financial sector, situations in which the bondholders would likely suffer only minimal losses. To the extent that the LSAPs eliminated the extreme tail risk associated with the systemic financial crises, investors may have realized that the government is more likely to impose greater losses on the holders of unsecured debt claims issued by financial firms, a reassessment of risk that would have boosted the financial sector CDS spreads relative to broad measures of corporate default risk.

References


