

# Climate Change Mitigation: How Effective is Green Quantitative Easing?

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# Research Question

- How much can Green QE contribute to climate change mitigation?
- Comparison of Green QE to Carbon Tax with respect to emission / temperature reduction
- Green QE understood as ...
  - ... shift in central banks' private sector securities portfolio ...
  - ... towards green assets
  - Rationale for QE itself not modeled

# Approach

- Integrated Assessment Model (IAM)
  - World economy
  - General equilibrium
  - Two production sectors: **Clean** (green) and **Dirty**
  - Dirty energy sector emits CO<sub>2</sub>
  - Climate module
  - Portfolio choice: clean and dirty capital
    - Idiosyncratic return-risk
    - Imperfect correlation → partial crowding out

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    - Imperfect correlation → partial crowding out
- Policy Experiments:
  - Carbon tax
  - Green quantitative easing (QE)
  - Carbon tax + green QE

- **Investigate maximum effect of (stylised) QE**
  - Immediate and complete shift towards green assets of central banks' portfolio of privately issued securities (held constant to total capital stock)
  - Perfect taxonomy
  - High elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty goods
  - Zero correlation of asset returns

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- **Modest Carbon Tax**
  - Carbon tax of 50 USD/tC ( $\approx 13.6\text{USD}/t\text{CO}_2$ ), tax rate constant

- Green QE can contribute to climate change mitigating
- But less effective than a carbon tax
- Green QE complementary, if insufficient carbon pricing through taxes or other fiscal policies

## Related Literature

- IAMs along the **transition**: Golosov et al. (2014), Kotlikoff et al. (2019, 2021), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Van Der Ploeg and Rezai (2021), etc.
- **DSGEs** with climate module and green monetary policy: Heutel (2012), Giovanardi, Kaldorf, Radke, and Wicknig (2021), Ferrari and Landi (2020), Benmir and Roman (2020)




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- Papoutsis, Piazzesi and Schneider (2021): Carbon bias in Eurosystem's corporate bond portfolio


# Model Overview

## Components




# Model Overview

## Energy Production




# Model Overview

## Intermediate Sectors




# Model Overview

## Households




# Model Overview

## Climate Module




# Model Overview

## Monetary and Fiscal Authorities



# Model Overview



All Together









# Results - Baseline

## Exogenous Driving Forces





# Results - Baseline

## Intermediate Production Inputs





# Results - Baseline

## Final Production Inputs





# Results - Baseline

## Climate Variables



# Policy Scenarios



## Driving Forces



- 1 **Carbon tax:**  $\tau_t^E = 50 \text{ USD/tC} = 13.6 \text{ USD/tCO}_2$ , growing with dirty energy price ( $\approx 0.4\%$ )
- 2 **Green QE:** full shift to  $K^C$ , growing with capital ( $\approx 2.0\%$ )

# Results - Scenarios

## Dirty Energy Price & Capital Return



# Results - Scenarios

## Mechanisms

- **Carbon Tax:** 2 mechanisms of a dirty **energy price increase**  $p^{E^D} \uparrow$ 
  - ① **Final** production: Shift **away** from dirty intermediate good:  
 $p^{E^D} \uparrow \rightarrow p^D \uparrow \rightarrow Y^D \downarrow \rightarrow E^D \downarrow$
  - ② **Intermediate** production: Shift **away** from dirty energy:  
 $p^{E^D} \uparrow \rightarrow E^D \downarrow$

# Results - Scenarios



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  - ② **Intermediate** production: Shift **away** from dirty energy:  
 $p^{E^D} \uparrow \rightarrow E^D \downarrow$
- **Green QE:** 2 mechanisms of a dirty **cost of capital increase**  $r^{K^D} \uparrow$ 
  - ① **Final** production: Shift **away** from dirty intermediate good:  
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  - ② **Intermediate** production: Shift **towards** dirty energy:  $r^{K^D} \uparrow \rightarrow E^D \uparrow$



# Results - Scenarios

## Climate Variables - Reductions




Year 2100 temperature reduction of **Green QE** equivalent to  
 $\approx 11 \text{ USD/tC} \approx 3 \text{ USD/tCO}_2$  carbon tax


# Results - Scenarios

## Combining Carbon Tax & Green QE

**T - Temp. increase compared to pre-industrial (C°)**




**Temperature reduction due to QE (C°)**



Green QE on top of carbon tax (somewhat) less effective than standalone.

# Results - QE-Scenario

Why no crowding out?



**Imperfect crowding out** of private held capital  $K^{C,HH}$  through quantitative easing  $K^{D,HH}$  due to **imperfect correlation** of clean and dirty capital.

# Sensitivity analysis

	Baseline	Flat QE	CO2 Bias	Pos. Corr.	Low SE	WAPR	CO2 Re.
$T$ in 2100	3.505	3.505	3.505	3.408	3.539	3.190	2.566
$\Delta T - \tau$	-0.167	-0.167	-0.167	-0.170	-0.155	-0.149	-0.107
$\Delta T - QE$	-0.039	-0.011	-0.056	-0.032	-0.005	-0.036	-0.029

Notes: Different calibrations for sensitivity analyses. "Flat QE": Size of monetary authority's balance sheet held constant over time. "CO2 Bias": Size of dirty assets on monetary authority's balance sheet 43% larger, i.e.  $K_{0st=dt}^m = 12770$ . "Pos. Corr.": Correlation between clean and dirty returns set to  $\rho_{cl,dt}^{\zeta} = 0.4$ . "Low SE": Low substitution elasticity  $\varepsilon = 2.25$  such that energy elasticity is  $\eta_{K_{st=ot}, P_{st=ot}}^{\varepsilon} = 1.05$ . "WAPR": time varying working age population ratio  $\omega_t$ . "CO2 Re.": strong CO2 reduction in baseline such that share of CO2 in GDP decreases at  $-1.5\%$  annually.

# Summary

↓ - Lower CO2 emissions      ↑ - Higher CO2 emissions

- Carbon tax leads to ...
  - 1 ↓ Final sector: **Lower demand** for dirty interm. good
  - 2 ↓ Interm. sector: **Lower demand** for dirty energy

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  - 1 ↓ Final sector: **Lower demand** for dirty interm. good
  - 2 ↑ Interm. sector: **Higher demand** for dirty energy
  - 3 ↑ Partial crowding out of private capital
- Carbon tax stronger ( $-0.167C^\circ$  vs.  $-0.039C^\circ$  for green QE) ...
  - Green QE equivalent to carbon tax  $\approx 3$  USD/tCO<sub>2</sub>
- ... but green QE complementary to carbon tax

End

Thank you for your attention!