

Modelling payment systems as a risk assessment tool

Discussion of papers by
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Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the discussant and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank.

R/B/S/G/B: possible extensions

Simulate additional scenarios:

- Operational outage of global banks
- Outage for more than one banks

Alter some assumptions:

- Time dimension
- Asymmetric systems
- Mix between PvP and non-PvP

R/B/S/G/B: research and policy

“Lucas critique” (Robert): micro-foundations

- Banks make strategic choices
- Liquidity level is not exogenous
- Focus on banks' risk-management

“Lucas critique” (Yvon): policy implications

- Responsibility beyond domestic system
- International oversight cooperation
- Influence on liquidity levels as catalyst and operator
 - Encourage sound liquidity management
 - Provide facilities that prevent or limit effects of “liquidity sink”

M/H: possible extensions

Review current assumptions:

- Description of the first design variant
- Cost of delay

Further develop the model:

- Focus on cost functions and equilibrium outcomes
- Additional dimensions of banks' behaviour
- More than two banks?
- Comparison with statistical data or simulation results

New developments in securities settlement systems:

- Distinction between DvP Models still up-to-date?
- TARGET2-Securities: integrated model with cash accounts that are separated but interlinked with RTGS system

Implications for central banks:

- Review operational involvement?
- Review costs structure for intraday liquidity?
- Provide information/transparency
- Encourage co-ordination among banks