In addition to the environmental challenge alone, climate change generates risks to economic and financial stability. With the rise in global temperatures accelerating and climate policies failing to keep up, the economic and financial system is doubly exposed. First, physical risk is growing with the proliferation of natural disasters. Second, transition risk could intensify with the adoption of new climate regulations or the emergence of disruptive technologies. These types of developments are likely to undermine economic activity (Champey and Gosset, 2026) and trigger severe corrections on the financial markets and devaluations of financial institutions’ portfolios.
In order to quantify the magnitude of the impact of climate breakdown on the French financial sector, this blog post draws on the “Disasters and Policy Stagnation” scenario – a short-term climate scenario that focuses on physical risk developed by the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and published in May 2025 (NGFS, 2025). This scenario simulates extreme but plausible regional weather events: a series of droughts, heatwaves and wildfires in 2026, followed by floods and storms in 2027. We put these results into perspective by comparing them with results based on the “Sudden Wake-Up Call” scenario, which focuses on the effects of a disorderly climate transition.
Two climate scenarios, with contrasting impacts
The first point to note is that, on average, the physical disaster scenario results in more significant and widespread losses than the sudden climate transition scenario. Under the first scenario (physical risk), the average potential share price correction would see a loss in value of 14.5% – five times greater than the 2.7% decline simulated under the second scenario (transition risk). This trend is confirmed in the case of corporate and sovereign bonds, which would fall by 4.2% and 3.2%, respectively, under the physical risk scenario, compared with just 1.0% and 0.6% under the transition scenario, as shown in Chart 1.
However, an analysis of extreme cases reveals that in certain instances the corrections can be far sharper. The sectoral and geographical dispersion of corrections is more pronounced under the transition risk scenario in the case of equities and corporate bonds. For example, the players most exposed to the transition to a low-carbon economy could be subject to severe devaluations of as much as 99% for equities and 83% for bonds issued by companies in the coal sector in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
Highly varied exposures across economic sectors
A sectoral analysis confirms this dual interpretation: climate disasters and transition shocks do not affect the same players, and they do not affect them in the same way. The “dry events” (droughts, heatwaves and wildfires) in 2026 would mainly affect certain sectors such as agriculture (a 41% drop in the share price of the few listed companies) and construction (an 18% decline), as illustrated in Chart 2. Conversely, the “wet events” (floods and storms) in 2027 would have a more widespread negative impact across all economic sectors, with an average downward correction of 15% in share prices due to damage to companies’ physical assets.
By comparison, the average impact on the economy of the sudden transition scenario is more limited (a 2.7% decline in share prices), but the corrections in the fossil fuel sectors would be considerable. Average losses would amount to 25% for shares in companies operating in the coal sector and 16.5% for companies in the oil sector. For the most polluting sectors located in certain geographical regions, the corrections could prove even more substantial. Losses could hit 99% in the coal sector, 67% for gas power generation, and up to 53% for the oil sector.
Chart 2: Share price valuation shocks: breakdown by sector and scenario