

# Tracking Fragmentation in World Trade

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The views put forward are those of the authors and do not represent the official views of the Banque de France or the Eurosystem.

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## Key Message

- Rising concerns that geopolitical tensions will lead to rifts in global trade between countries of opposing geopolitical blocs
- We build an empirical tool to assess the degree of geopolitical fragmentation in global trade, based on a standard gravity equation of trade
- We find evidence in favor of trade fragmentation between geopolitical blocs, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Falling trade between geopolitical blocs, and more trade within blocs ("friendshoring")
- Current and future work will look into which countries/products are driving this fragmentation
- Going forward, and depending on demand, the estimates can be regularly updated to provide a tracker of trade fragmentation.

## What we do

- We run a standard gravity equation on product-level bilateral international trade data, augmented by dummies for geopolitical alignment
  - Countries are sorted into geopolitical blocs (East, West, Neutral), where bloc affiliation is taken from a recent ECB contribution
  - A flow is characterized as either inter-bloc (East-West), intra-bloc (within East, or within West), or neither (all flows involving neutral countries)
- We estimate this equation quarter-by-quarter, and study the evolution of inter-bloc and intra-bloc trade over time
- Our results indicate that inter-bloc trade has fallen, and intra-bloc trade has grown since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Both results are *relative* to trade involving neutral countries

## Data

### Trade Flows

- Quarterly bilateral trade data from Trade Data Monitor (TDM), currently 2017Q1 - 2023Q3, aggregated at the HS4 product level (roughly 1,600 products).
- Data from 55 reporting countries, including all major countries (US, CN, DE, JP, KR, FR, etc.) and 221 partner countries.
- Russia (and Belarus) stopped reporting their flows in early 2022. They are included as partner countries

### Political Alignment

- Index of geopolitical alignment by the ECB (den Besten et al, 2023)
- Based on four proxies, for each country:
  - 1 # was sanctioned by Russia/China - # sanctioned by the US (Global Sanctions Database)
  - 2 % military imports from Russia and China - % military imports from the US (SIPRI database)
  - 3 Whether it participates in the *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI)
  - 4 Vote in the United Nations Resolution of March 2, 2022
- Use the index to construct three geopolitical blocs: West (81 countries), East (53), Neutral (95). [▶ Detail](#)

## Countries' affiliation

Countries for which we have trade data in **blue** (List not complete).

“Connector” countries (Gopinath et al. 2024; Bloomberg, 2024) are reported in a **box**.



<b>East</b>	Bangladesh Pakistan	Belarus Russia	<b>China</b> Venezuela	<b>Iran</b> Yemen	Myanmar Zimbabwe
<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Argentina</b> <b>Indonesia</b>	<b>Brazil</b> Kazakhstan	<b>Chile</b> Malaysia	<b>Colombia</b> <b>Mexico</b>	<b>India</b> <b>Morocco</b>
	Niger <b>South Africa</b>	Nigeria <b>Thailand</b>	Saudi Arabia <b>Turkey</b>	Singapore <b>Uruguay</b>	Senegal <b>Viet Nam</b>
<b>West</b>	<b>Australia</b> <b>Czechia</b> <b>Greece</b> <b>Japan</b>  <b>Norway</b> <b>Slovakia</b> <b>Taiwan</b>	<b>Austria</b> <b>Denmark</b> <b>Hungary</b> <b>Latvia</b> <b>Poland</b> <b>Slovenia</b> <b>USA</b>	<b>Belgium</b> <b>Finland</b> <b>Ireland</b> <b>Lithuania</b>  <b>Portugal</b> <b>Spain</b> <b>Ukraine</b>	<b>Bulgaria</b> <b>France</b> <b>Israel</b> <b>Netherlands</b>  <b>Rep. of Korea</b> <b>Sweden</b> <b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>Canada</b> <b>Germany</b> <b>Italy</b> <b>New Zealand</b>  <b>Romania</b> <b>Switzerland</b>

## Interbloc and Intra-bloc Trade

We construct dummies that vary at the country-pair level. For an exporter  $i$  and an importer  $j$ :

$$Interbloc_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (i \in \mathcal{W}, j \in \mathcal{E}) \text{ or } (i \in \mathcal{E}, j \in \mathcal{W}) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$Intrabloc_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (i, j \in \mathcal{W}) \text{ or } (i, j \in \mathcal{E}) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$




## Econometric Specification

$$\Delta \ln Export_{ijkt} = \beta_t Interbloc_{ij} + \alpha_t Intrabloc_{ij} + \gamma_t X_{ij} + FE_{ikt} + FE_{jkt} + u_{ijkt}$$

- $i$  : exporting country
- $j$  : importing country
- $k$  : HS4 product category
- $t$  : quarter
- $\Delta \ln Export$  : y-o-y variation in log exports
- $X$  : log distance, contiguity, common language, colonial link, common religion, fta , common legal system, common colonizer

## Interbloc VS Intra-bloc VS Neutral

$$\Delta \ln Export_{ijkt} = \beta_t Interbloc_{ij} + \alpha_t Intra-bloc_{ij} + \gamma_t X_{ij} + FE_{ikt} + FE_{jkt} + u_{ijkt}$$




- Decline of roughly 10% in inter-bloc trade on average in 2022. But at least partly driven by outright sanctions on trade with RU.
- Do we observe trade fragmentation beyond trade with RU?




## Unpacking Eastern Countries

We re-run the same estimation but considering Russian trade separately from the rest of Eastern Trade.



←→ Inter-bloc trade, Russia included


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←→ Inter-bloc trade, Russia separate

$$\begin{cases} \Delta \ln Export_{ijkt} = \beta_t Interbloc_{ij} + \alpha_t Intrabloc_{ij} + \gamma_t X_{ij} + FE_{ikt} + FE_{jkt} + u_{ijkt} \\ \Delta \ln Export_{ijkt} = \beta_t Interbloc_{ij} + \alpha_t Intrabloc_{ij} + \rho_t \mathcal{W}\text{-RU}_{ij} + \eta_t \mathcal{E}\text{-RU}_{ij} + \gamma_t X_{ij} + FE_{ikt} + FE_{jkt} + u_{ijkt} \end{cases}$$

## Unpacking Eastern Countries



- Fragmentation is twice smaller when we exclude Russia
- However, there is still a substantial slow down in inter-bloc trade in 2022.

## Unpacking Eastern Countries, continued





Figure (1) Growth of trade between Russia and the West

**Note:** The country groups considered in the regression are  $\mathcal{W}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$  and Russia. Control group: Trade with Neutral countries.

- Flip side of the previous picture: Trade between West and Russia decreases massively.
- Growth rate reduced by 80p.p in 2023.


## The Role of “Connector” economies

- All the effects so far are relative to trade with Neutral countries
- It might be that the decrease in inter-bloc trade is simply an increase of trade with Neutral countries, via “connector” countries.
- Does trade fragmentation remain if we put connectors as a separate group?



**Note:** Beside “connectors”, the country groups considered in the regression are  $\mathcal{W}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$ , Russia.  
Control group: Trade with Neutral countries.

## The Role of “Connector” economies, continued




**Note:** The country groups considered in the regression are  $\mathcal{W}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$ , Russia and Connectors. Control group: Trade with Neutral countries.

- There is no evidence of trade reallocation towards connectors

## The role of US-China Trade


- How much of trade fragmentation is driven by US-China trade wars?
- we re-estimate, with US and China excluded from the West and East blocs, respectively



**Note:** Beside the US and China, the country groups considered in the regression are  $\mathcal{W}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$ , Russia and Connectors. Control group: Trade with Neutral countries.

- Once US and China are excluded from the blocs, post-2022 fragmentation is harder to detect.

## The role of US-China Trade, continued




**Note:** The country groups considered in the regression are  $\mathcal{W}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$ , Russia, Connectors, US and China. Control group: Trade with Neutral countries.

## Directed effects

### Fragmentation from West to East and from East to West


- So far we have considered undirected effects
- Is fragmentation bi-directional or uni-directional?



**Note:** The country groups considered in the regression are  $\mathcal{W}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$ , Russia, Connectors, US and China. Control group: Trade with Neutral countries.



## Geofragmentation by Broad Economic Classification



**Note:** The country groups considered in the regression are  $\mathcal{W}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$ , Russia, Connectors, US and China. Control group: Trade with Neutral countries.

## Next Steps

- Use of  $\Delta \log$  means we only look at intensive margin. Potentially move to PPML to include extensive margin
- Update requires manual data download. Should be automated if demand for frequent updates


## Conclusion

- We develop a "trade fragmentation tracker" – a tool that measures the degree of fragmentation along geopolitical lines in global trade
  - Based on structural gravity equation in international trade
  - Quarterly frequency (but can be done at monthly frequency)
  - Easy to update: Publication lag roughly 3-4 months after the end of a month or quarter
  
- We find evidence of trade fragmentation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and that fragmentation is not entirely driven by outright sanctions on trade with Russia
  - Roughly 5% decline in inter-bloc trade (excluding Russia)
  - Notable fall in intermediate goods trade
  
- Some evidence for friendshoring: Intra-bloc trade grows faster than trade with neutral countries
  
- Little evidence of indirect trade through connector countries


## Appendix: Measuring Fragmentation

We use the index to **construct three geopolitical blocs**:

- West ( $\mathcal{W}$ ):  $<0.25$
- East ( $\mathcal{E}$ ):  $>0.75$
- Neutral ( $\mathcal{N}$ ): between 0.25 and 0.75
- Advanced economies tend to be closer to the US
- EMEs tend to be closer to the China/Russia, with higher dispersion



## Appendix: Measuring Fragmentation



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