

The Crowding Out Effect of Local Government Debt: Micro- and Macro-Estimates

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Motivation

- ▶ Government debt may adversely affect private sector via **financial crowding out effect**

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial \text{Output}}{\partial \text{Gvt debt}}}_{\text{Debt-financed multiplier}} = \underbrace{\text{Effect if no constraint on financing supply}} - \underbrace{\text{Crowding out}}$$

↑ government debt demand
⇒ ↓ supply of corporate debt
⇒ ↓ corporate investment & output

- ▶ Challenges to empirical quantification:

- Government debt: ① is **endogenous**; ② affects firms via **multiple channels**

- ▶ **This paper:** Quantify **crowding out effect** of **local government bank debt** on corporate credit, investment and output

- Local government bank debt is large and growing:
 - Over 1990-2019, local government debt-to-GDP ↑ from **12%** to **22%** (G20 countries)
 - **80%** of local government debt = bank debt
- Identification strategy to isolate financial crowding out

Methodology

Data: French credit registry over 2006-2018

1. **Identification:** causal reduced-form evidence

– ↑ Local government borrowing from a given bank

⇒ ↓ Corporate loans by that bank?

⇒ ↓ Investment for that bank's borrowers?

→ Isolate crowding out

2. **Aggregation:** model

– Estimated cross-sectional effects ⇒ Aggregate output loss?

Main findings

- 1. Existence:** Local government loans crowd out corporate loans
- 2. Quantification:** \uparrow €1 local government loans \Rightarrow \downarrow €0.2 aggregate output
- 3. Determinants:** More severe when borrowing from more **constrained banks**
 \rightarrow Mode of financing of government debt matters

$$\frac{\partial \text{Output}}{\partial \text{Gvt debt}} = \text{Effect if no constraint on financing supply} - \text{Crowding out}$$

Debt-financed multiplier What we know (≈ 1.5) 0.2